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IN

AT BRITAIN

AND

IRELAND

REVD J. MONTGOMERY

POPERY

AS IT EXISTS

IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND,

Its Doctrines, Practices, and Arguments;

EXHIBITED FROM THE WRITINGS OF ITS ADVOCATES,

AND FROM ITS MOST

POPULAR BOOKS OF INSTRUCTION AND DEVOTION.

BY

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PREFACE.

THIS work is an attempt to exhibit Popery as it exists in our own country from the most authentic sources, especially the writings of its most eminent advocates, and the publications most popular and extensively circulated among members of the Church of Rome. There are some who seem to imagine that Popery, in such countries as Italy and Spain, derives its character from the people among whom it exists, and is very different from the Popery existing within our own shores. This is indeed to forget the pretensions of Popery itself, as well as to overlook its influence in moulding the characters of men. In fact, if Popery in Britain seem to differ in outward aspect from Popery in Italy, it will be found to be only in an ill-fitting disguise which it has tried to assume.

I have attempted to exhibit the arguments put forth by the advocates of Popery, as well as the doctrines and practices which they defend. I have not sought after novelty in the refutation of them,—but have acknowledged,

I believe, all that I have consciously borrowed from any particular author.

In some respects it would have been easier to have examined more fully any one Popish work instead of dipping into so many; but it would not have served the purpose which I had in view. It would perhaps have been easier also to have followed out some one branch of the subject than to have gone over so extensive a field, touching upon one point after another.

After all, I have been compelled to select some portions of the subject, instead of attempting to survey the whole. But a glance at the titles of the chapters will shew what selection has been made, and I trust it will be found to bring forward the things really most important.

In dealing with this subject, I have purposely abstained from seeking information in other than Popish books. I have not quoted Protestant descriptions, for example, of the existing Popery of Ireland. I found enough of materials within the limits to which I confined myself.

In choosing the books to be consulted, I was guided mainly by two considerations already indicated. But with reference to these alone, I might have accumulated a larger number of Popish authorities; which, however, I felt would only have encumbered me, and as it is, the reader may perhaps sometimes have reason to complain that I have quoted from too many. I would gladly have

added specimen after specimen of Popery from all the works chiefly in use at Maynooth; but I found it impossible to make use of half the materials which I intended.

I have made reference, oftener than once, to an article in the Dublin Review, on *the Actions of the New Testament*, without being aware, till these parts of this volume were printed, that it has been acknowledged by Dr Wiseman, and republished in his "Contributions to the Dublin Review."

I might have quoted from Popish newspapers; but preferred publications issued by some more recognized authority.

I have avoided—although, perhaps, without necessity,—the writings of those who have recently joined the Church of Rome.

I have not made any use of Bailly's *Theologia Moralis*, although it has so long been, and I suppose still is, a text book at Maynooth. But having seen a statement that it had recently been put in the Index Expurgatorius, and not knowing what part of it was excepted against, I was unwilling to quote anything, the authority of which could be questioned. Perhaps in regard to Bailly I was unnecessarily scrupulous; but at all events, having Dens and Liguori to consult, I thought that I had enough.

To some readers, I have no doubt, all that they find in these pages will be quite familiar. I can only say that I

have not written for them, and will be happy if they deem the volume likely to be useful to others, not so well acquainted with the subject. And I commend it to the blessing of Him, the cause of whose truth I have endeavoured, however feebly, to promote.

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POPERY AS IT EXISTS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.

CHAPTER I.

JUSTIFICATION.

FAITH—WORKS—MERIT—SATISFACTION—SELF-TORTURE.

EVER since the fall of man and the gospel promise which was made to our first parents when they had reduced themselves to an estate of sin and misery, there have been two systems of religion in the world—one whose origin may be traced to that gospel promise, and which has ever been maintained by the word of God, the revelation made from heaven, and by the work of the Spirit of God in the souls of men—and another, which has him for its author who was a murderer from the beginning, and a liar, and which finds support in the congenial depravity of the human heart. The scope of the one system is to exalt God, to whom it ascribes all the glory, whilst man is exhibited as a humble dependent creature, owing everything to God's mercy and grace—ever needing and receiving pardon for newly committed transgressions—ever wandering and brought back to walk again and more closely with God—destitute in himself of all merit and excellency, but called to sing perpetual songs of praise for the great salvation which it pleases God freely to bestow. The tendency of the other system is to exalt man, and to represent him as capable of winning God's favour for himself and securing his final happiness by his own exertions. Yet because man's present wretchedness is too obvious to be altogether denied, there has always been found, even in the worst heathenism, some remaining trace of doctrines, which, if followed out to their own proper consequences, would appear rather to belong to the opposite system of

religion, but which the craft of the enemy has so contrived to inweave amidst his lies as to pervert them to his own purpose, and to secure, even by their means, the greater prevalence of a system of which these form the really characteristic part. For example, acknowledging the necessity of an expiation of guilt, and thus taking advantage of one of the deepest feelings of the human soul—not always strongly awakened, but powerful in the highest degree when it is,—he proceeded of old to persuade men that they could make this expiation for themselves, thus flattering their pride and enlisting in his cause one of the strongest of the passions which are the elements of man's corruption. And what do we behold in the Popery of these latter days, but the masterpiece of hellish ingenuity in the more intimate intermixture of falsehood with truth, so that the truth retained is employed to give currency to the falsehood; whilst the falsehood, not the truth, gives character to the whole system, and determines its effect upon the moral and the spiritual condition of the human being who comes thoroughly under its power? Pretending to exhibit the divine revelation and the gospel of Jesus Christ, —seeming to retain the doctrine of mercy and of the free grace of God, it leads away the soul to a dependence upon other sufferings and works than those by which Jesus magnified the law and made it honourable, introduces a doctrine of human merit, multiplies mediators and objects of adoration, and pollutes the very sanctuary of the Christian Church with blasphemous boastings and abominable idolatries.

Contemplating this great controversy betwixt one true and one false religion, as having subsisted from the very first ages of the world, it is important to note the part which Protestant divines have taken in maintaining it, as identifying them with those who, from the earliest times, have maintained the uncorrupted worship of the one true God, and the glorious gospel of his grace — and, comparing them amongst themselves, to note the identity of their views on the greatest and most essential points of religion. It would not be possible to regard them as continuing to preach that gospel which was preached beforehand

unto Abraham,[1] and which our Lord himself and his Apostles preached, if it should appear that they were all at variance with one another on the most important subjects. That there should be a perfect agreement on every point is impossible, without a perpetual inspiration and an inspiration of all; and the objections urged by Romanists on this head are merely captious, and their arguments preposterous; but it is a delightful evidence of the truth of a religion deduced by candid and earnest minds from the fountains of truth and knowledge, the inspired Scriptures, that in one age and another, in one country and another, the men who have searched these Scriptures for themselves, refusing human authority, but in humble dependence on that teaching of the Holy Spirit of God, different from inspiration, though not less important, which is promised in the Word of God as an ordinary gift to the Church,—have come substantially to the same conclusions, and have given substantially the same answers to the greatest questions that can exercise the mind of man. Those, therefore, have done no unimportant service to the cause of truth, who have exhibited the harmony of Protestant Confessions; and there is a confirmation of faith accessible to every one, and which may often be felt to diffuse a lively satisfaction through the soul, in opening the pages of one author after another, belonging to times or countries other than our own, or to other sections of the Church, and reading there in varied language the statement of truths with which we are already familiar, as the precious truths of our own evangelical religion.

The great question of religion, wherever religion can be said to exist, is certainly the question, How shall we enjoy the favour of God? or, in other words, How shall man be just before God? It being admitted that there is a God, the Creator and Preserver of all things, upon whom we are dependent, and to whom we are responsible, this is evidently the most important question that can occupy the attention of human beings. Constituted as human nature is, it cannot but often force itself upon the mind of man: and that even those who do not enjoy the light of revela-

[1] Gal. iii. 8.

tion, nor the knowledge of God and of sin, which it communicates, are still impressed with a sense of the importance and awfulness of this question, is proved by the bloody sacrifices and self-inflicted tortures of Heathenism, the children passed through the fire to Moloch, the atrocities of Saugur Island, and the Hindoo pilgrim measuring his weary way with his own body towards the temple of Juggernaut.

It is the answer to this great question which makes the Christian revelation a joyful sound. It is its departure from truth on this doctrine which constitutes the most essential feature of Popery, considered as a system of religion. It is an internal evidence of the truth of Christianity that it humbles man and glorifies God. It is a presumption against the doctrinal system of Popery, and marks it as antichristian, that it does not ascribe all the glory of man's salvation to God, but warrants man in taking some measure of credit and glory to himself even in the presence of God.

There are in fact but two ways which the soul awakened to real earnestness can pursue. There is the Protestant or Christian way of salvation by faith in Jesus Christ, and there is the Popish or Pagan way of works, austerities and self-inflicted torments,—the way of salvation by the merits of Christ, and the way of salvation fondly expected by the sinner's own merits, speciously introduced to eke out and complete what Christ is represented as having done. The soul must either find comfort in the doctrine of justification by faith alone, or seek it in the only other way that can be imagined, though the imagination be opposed alike to reason and to revelation. And what a contrast is presented, when we turn from Luther to Ignatius Loyola,—from the Saxon Reformer, filled with light and liberty, and peace and hope by these Scripture words, "The just shall live by faith,"[1] to the miserable founder of the Jesuits, kissing his crucifix, counting his beads and saying his Ave-Marias,—striving to extort merit from his own evil thoughts, [2] and shutting all the doors and windows of his chamber, that in its darkness he might be the more filled with a spiritual gloom and sorrow for his sins,—yea, for this reason also, avoiding even to think of such joyful things as the glorious resurrection of Christ.[1]! What a contrast between any humble Protestant taking up with exulting heart the Saviour's own exclamation of triumph, "It is finished," and a Popish devotee, like St Rose of Lima, *disciplining* herself with a scourge of iron chains, till her blood is sprinkled on the walls, and flows down in the middle of the room, in the hope of doing what Christ has not sufficiently done, and finishing his work for herself![2] Here is light, and there is darkness. Here is liberty, and there is bondage. Here is happiness, and there is misery.

Where the doctrine of justification by faith is held in its purity and simplicity, everything else in the system of religion and not only in the doctrinal system, but in practical religion and in the mode of worship, must be framed in accordance with it. He who lives under the power of this truth must look upon everything else in the light of it; and as everything is harmonious with it in the sacred page, so he cannot but seek to have everything harmonized with it in himself, and in the Church. Departure from this doctrine soon appears in consequences not to be mistaken. The practice of religion, and the outward framework of the Church are speedily changed. The feelings of the heart are essentially different, and can no longer find their expression through the same channels. There grows up a system of error, whose parts, though ill compacted after all, have still a certain coherence and mutual dependence. Such is the history, and such the nature of the whole system of Popish doctrine, and Popish priestcraft.[3]

[1] Merle D'Aubigné, Hist. Ref. B. ii., ch. 6.

[2] The spiritual exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola. Translated &c., . . . preface by the Right Rev. Nicholas Wiseman, D.D., &c. London, 1847, —p. 20. "In two ways is merit drawn from evil thought, in the matter of mortal sin."

[1] The spiritual exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola, p. 42.

[2] The Lives of St. Rose of Lima, the Blessed Columba of Rieti, and of St. Juliana Falconieri. (London, 1847) p. 32. (The vol. is edited by F. W. Faber, also called Father Faber.)

[3] It is much to be regretted that in their controversy with the Church of

Popery is nothing else than a relapse into Paganism. And it is when tried with primary reference to the great question of a sinner's justification, that the essential Paganism of Popery becomes most perfectly apparent. It can be shewn indeed to be throughout its entire system a crafty and wicked accommodation of Christianity to the heathenism which Christianity was sent to destroy,—a purchase of temporal prosperity to the nominal Christian Church, and immediate aggrandizement to its ministers by the sacrifice of all that is best in religion and purest in worship. It can be shewn that rites and even doctrines have been borrowed from the ancient religion of Numa and his successors,—that local superstitions have been incorporated with it everywhere, from the system of every barbarous tribe—that even the worship of many divinities, disguised under new names as saints and angels, has been transferred into what still boasts of being the one true Church of the one true and living God. The use of images—the consecration of their shrines—the sprinkling of

Rome, Protestants have not always exhibited a due sense of the importance of the chief doctrinal differences, and especially of the difference as to the doctrine of justification. This may too certainly be ascribed to the same corruption of the human heart, to which Popery itself owes its origin. It is a painful thing to trace the workings of the mystery of iniquity even in those who stand aghast at its fullest developements. In the early days of the Reformation, the grand question was, how man is justified. But in many writings of more recent times, this question is in a great measure lost sight of, and shrinks into a secondary place,—although when this is the case, neither Popery nor Protestantism can be thoroughly understood; for Protestantism does not consist in the mere maintenance of a right of private judgment and searching of the Scriptures, apart from all consideration of the mode in which that right is to be exercised,—under a sense of responsibility and humble dependence on the Holy Spirit,—and apart from the results to which it conducts. The Protestant Church refuses to acknowledge the Unitarian as amongst its members. But it is not even the question of the rule of faith and the right of private judgment, which is frequently brought into such prominence as to draw away attention from the doctrine of justification. It is melancholy to see Protestant divines entering into controversy with Popish Bishops about their respective claims to apostolical succession, and denouncing the Popish Church in England, as schismatical rather than as apostate and idolatrous.

holy water—the burning of incense and waving of censors—the mumblings, and mutterings, and frequent repetitions—the votive offerings hung up before the image of some favourite or patron saint—the lamps and candles which burn in holy places—the pompous processions—the contemptible doll swaddled in rich robes, tricked out with costly jewels, and ostentatiously conveyed to the houses of the sick that they may be healed[1]—are all so many proofs, and all the more offensive because of any recurrence of the name of Jesus, that the present religion of Rome is essentially identical with that which prevailed there nineteen hundred years ago. Nay, in the homage paid to morsels of dough, or to crosses and to relics—to iron spikes and shapeless bits of wood—to nail-parings and locks of hair—to soles of shoes and measures of the soles of shoes, represented as possessing most inestimable virtues, and capable of communicating signal benefits to the devout, Popery appears a viler superstition than that which it supplanted on the seven hills, and more like that of Egypt, which even the heathen satirist ridiculed, where leeks and other vegetables received religious veneration, and every garden was prolific of gods.

But the Paganism of Popery is best understood when attention is primarily fixed upon its opposition to these two distinguishing characteristics of true religion,—the doctrine of salvation by grace, and the doctrine of the individual immediate responsibility of every man to God.[2] These two doctrines are essentially connected with one another, so that departure from the one entails departure from the other. Introduce the priest between the Christian and his God, and the doctrine of salvation by grace is obscured. Let the doctrine of salvation by grace be obscured, and it is quite natural for priesthood and priestcraft to arise. Yea,—such is human nature,—men necessarily seek after a priest when they know not how to seek after God. Occupied before their eyes in the solemnities and pomps of religion,—associated

[1] See the Rev. Hobart Seymour's "Pilgrimage to Rome," chap. viii. "The Bambino," &c.

[2] See Merle D'Aubigné, Hist. Ref., B. i., ch. 1.

in their imagination with its temples, its altars, and its rites,—the priest appears to ill-instructed multitudes as one who dwells nearer to God than themselves—as one who must needs know what they know not, and possess powers which they possess not; they look to him, they cling to him, and he becomes the object of their mistaken reverence and confidence.

What then is the doctrine of the Popish Church concerning justification? and how is that doctrine stated by the Popish Church itself? These two questions might seem to be identical, but in reality they are not. For with all deceivableness of unrighteousness, truth is professed in words, which yet is practically denied. The Apostle Paul in his Epistle to the Galatians teaches us to look to the practice of a Church for evidence of its real doctrine,—and especially may we look to that practice which is inculcated or authorised. According to the Apostle, the doctrine of justification by faith was virtually renounced and denied when the observance of Jewish rites was enjoined, or even when circumcision was represented as necessary to salvation, and this although there had been no formal renunciation or denial of it. It is a trite remark, that there is a voice in deeds more impressive than words, and we read in Scripture of those who "profess that they know God, but in works deny him, being abominable and disobedient, and to every good work reprobate."[1] If a Church inculcate and insist upon practices at variance with doctrines which retain their place in her formularies, the effect of her dogmatic statements must be more than neutralized. The case is, if possible, still worse when one dogmatic statement is opposed to another, and when one statement apparently agreeable to the truth must be received with the fatal qualification which arises from comparison of it with another statement inconsistent with that truth altogether.

Whatever admissions Popish theologians may seem to make in favour of sound doctrine should be viewed as counterbalanced, and more than counterbalanced by their other doctrines, and

[1] Tit. i., 16.

by rites and rules inconsistent with a simple faith in Christ. "Their penances and pilgrimages, their masses and their merits of saints, their holy spittle and their holy water, their beads and their crucifixes, and the whole host of their superstitious observances and idolatrous practices, were all invented" (says M'Gavin) "for the very purpose of being put in the place of Christ's righteousness, and that by them a sinner might merit justification for himself, and appear before God in a righteousness of his own."[1] Such is their evident character: and had there been nothing in the decrees of the Council of Trent, which, taken by itself, could be interpreted by a too partial mind as accordant with evangelical doctrine, such men as Pascal and Martin Boos would not probably have remained in connection with the Church of Rome. But the mixture of truth and falsehood has served Satan's purpose better than a simple statement of absolute error would have done; the occasional employment of language which might seem like a profession of truth, has retained those within the pale of the Popish Church whom a frank and honest avowal of its doctrines would have driven away. However, all other considerations apart, whatever may seem to be admitted in favour of justification by faith, ought really to pass for nothing when we find an anathema denounced against all who deny the good works of justified persons to be truly meritorious of increase of grace, and of eternal life. These are the words:—"If any one shall say, that the good works of a justified man are, in such a sense, the gifts of God, that they are not also the good merits of the justified man himself; or that the justified man, by his good works which are wrought by him through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, of whom he is a living member, does not truly merit increase of grace, eternal life, and if only he die in a state of grace, the actual reward of eternal life itself, and even an increase of glory, let him be anathema."[2] And if we find amongst the canons of the Council of Trent one which utters its anathema against those who shall maintain that

[1] The Protestant, No. 121. [2] Concil. Trid., sess. vi., canon 32.

a man is justified by his own works without the divine grace which comes through Christ Jesus;[1] and one which equally condemns all who shall assert that the divine grace is given through Christ Jesus, only that men may more easily live well and merit for themselves eternal life, as if this were a thing which they could, although with more difficulty, accomplish by their own unaided efforts,[2]—the effect of these seemingly evangelical statements, introduced for reasons which the history of the Council sufficiently explains, and because these points had already been decided against the Pelagians,[3] is more than done away, when we come to read the canons which anathematise all who deny the co-operation of the free will of man with the divine grace in disposing and preparing a man for obtaining the grace of justification,[4] and all who assert that we are *formally* justified by the righteousness of Christ,[5] or that we are justified by the mere imputation of the righteousness of Christ;[6] or when we find amongst the decrees of the Council a sentence like this, "And therefore life eternal ought to be held forth to those who work well [*or* do good works] even to the end, and who hope in God, both as a free gift mercifully promised to the sons of God through Christ Jesus, and as a reward to be faithfully bestowed in virtue of the promise of God himself, for their good works and merits."[7] The sentence is absurd, these two things being utterly inconsistent with one another,—*free-gift* and *the reward of merit.* The absurdity will be found to pervade the whole system of Popish theology. But the quotation is made to shew what that theology is, in respect of the doctrine of human merit. And of these two opposite elements in the theological system, incongruous and incapable of being harmonised, it is easy to see which is the most likely to prevail and to be carried out to practical consequences. The reader will bear in mind that the decrees of

[1] Concil. Trid., sess. vi., canon 1. [2] Ibid., sess. vi., canon 2.
[3] So Bergier mentions in his "Dictionnaire De Théologie," IV., 319. (Besançon 1846,) under the word *mérite.*
[4] Ibid., sess. vi., canons 4 and 9. [5] Ibid., sess. vi., canon 10.
[6] Ibid, sess. vi., canon 11. [7] Ibid., sess. vi. can. 16.

the Council of Trent are regarded by Popish theologians as inspired. They enumerate it amongst the general councils whose decisions they tell us are to be regarded *as the decisions of the Holy Ghost,* as may easily be seen by reference to the books most esteemed and circulated amongst the Papists of these islands,—for example, to Mr Keenan's Controversial Catechism.[1]

But let us now look into some of these works, for their exhibition of the great doctrine under consideration.

The doctrine of justification is set forth by Berington and Kirk in these three propositions, in their work on the Faith of Catholics, a work which, since its publication in 1812, has held a high place in the estimation of Papists in Britain, and which is commended by Cardinal Wiseman:[2]

"I. When man has sinned, the remission or pardon of sin is not attainable by him, otherwise than in and by the merits of the sufferings and death of Jesus Christ, who freely purchased our ransom.

"II. It is only through the same merits of Jesus Christ, that the just man can obtain either an increase of holiness in this life or eternal happiness in the next.

"III. The good works of a just man, proceeding from grace and charity, are so far acceptable to God, through his goodness and sacred promises, as to be truly deserving of an eternal reward; 'God crowning his own gifts, when he crowns the good works of his servants.'"[3]

The first and second of these propositions are well enough

[1] Keenan's Controversial Catechism, ch. ix., sect. 1. ["Controversial Catechism; or Protestantism refuted and Catholicism established, by an appeal to the Holy Scriptures, the testimony of the Holy Fathers, and the dictates of Reason; in which such portions of Scheffmacher's Catechism as suit modern controversy are embodied. By the Rev. Stephen Keenan. Second Edition. Edinburgh, 1849.] This work appears to be in very high repute amongst Papists in this country.
[2] "Lectures on the Principal Doctrines and Practices of the Catholic Church, delivered at St Mary's, Moorfields, during the Lent of 1836. By Nicholas Wiseman, D.D., now Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster." Third Edition. London, 1851. Vol. I., preface.
[3] Berington and Kirk, 2-4. [Edition of 1830.]

calculated to present Popish doctrine in a favourable aspect to the minds of Protestants; but the third is of a very different character. And the doctrine of the Popish Church must be considered as exhibited not merely by one or two of these propositions, but by all of them taken together. Viewing them together, the third is evidently the most important, determining the sense of the two former, and inculcating a doctrine of human merit inconsistent with a true humility or a complete dependence upon Jesus Christ for salvation. For what can be more ridiculous than to say that men owe their salvation entirely to Jesus Christ and his merits, if, at the same time, their own works are represented as truly meritorious, yea, deserving of an eternal reward? It is in vain that the Council of Trent exclaims, with seeming fervency, "God forbid that a Christian should trust or glory in himself and not in the Lord, whose bounty is so great unto all men, that he will have those gifts which he bestows upon them to be their merits."[1] Men will trust and glory in themselves, if they may but suppose that they have merits. And why should they not? Here we are again brought to the consideration of the absurdity just pointed out, of attempting to reconcile the ideas of *grace* and *merited reward*. It is utterly unreasonable to represent the good works of a justified man as truly meritorious, and yet as depending for their meritorious character upon the promise and grace of God. The notion that *God's gifts* become *our merits* is a mere absurdity, even although this may, as by the Council of Trent, be ascribed to God's bounty. The one of these ideas is necessarily exclusive of the other. But, absurdity and inconsistency notwithstanding, the human heart is ready to embrace such doctrine, in which self-righteousness is glozed over and disguised, however wretchedly; as human pride is secretly flattered all the while that humility is professedly taught, and man is encouraged to dependence upon himself and his own merits whilst yet a shew is made of trusting in Christ. What are the first two

[1] Concil. Trid., sess. vi., c. 16, quoted and translated by Berington and Kirk, 7.

propositions of Berington and Kirk, thus viewed in connection with the third, but well-turned compliments to Christ, whilst the human heart, constituted as it is, is left to cling to the notion of merit which the third proposition introduces? What is the whole system expressed in these propositions, but the very perfection of that accommodation which natural men are ever trying to make betwixt the gospel and self-righteousness, and which, under whatsoever form, and however specious, is really a denial of Christ's righteousness and of Christ himself?

We must keep our eyes fixed a little longer on this part of the subject, and see how it is presented to the people of this country by Mr Keenan in his catechism. "Can one who is in a state of grace merit heaven? The just, who are in a state of grace, may, by good works, merit an increase of glory, but even they can never, by any or every good work of theirs, merit the first degree of glory, that is a right to heaven."[1] Yet they have merit of their own, he holds, though he would draw a veil, after the example of the Council of Trent, and the most distinguished Popish theologians, over the deformity of a doctrine which so evidently exalts and glorifies man, by telling us that good works derive all their value from "sanctifying grace, which is within us," and "which is the pure gift of God's liberality to us," and which we owe "to the merits of Jesus Christ, and these alone."[2] It is thus that the Church of Rome juggles with the understandings of men. Traced through sanctifying grace, and back to the merits of Christ, yet a man has *merits of his own;* and it comes to this again, that Christ "was not satisfied with meriting heaven for us; he also, by his grace, put us in a condition to merit greater degrees of glory in heaven."[3] What a strange entangled web is here! Nor when we attempt to unravel it, can we find that the glory all belongs to Christ. On the contrary, it appears that there must be a dividing of it betwixt the just man and him.

But it is the practice of Popish controversialists, who write for Protestant eyes, to soften down the worst features of the system

[1] Keenan, Controversial Catechism, c. xvii. sec. 2. (Throughout this section he closely follows Scheffmacher.) [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

which they defend, and they contrive to represent it in such a way, as whilst it leaves it essentially the same, still prevents it from making the same instant and powerful impression upon the mind of a Protestant, as in the statements of theologians, who wrote with a different object. What in writings of one class must be dragged from behind the veil of fair expressions, is, in writings of another class, prominently exhibited in its naked deformity. It may be as well, before proceeding further, to look at the Popish doctrine of justification thus exhibited.

Turning therefore to Peter Dens, we find some things explained according to the strongest sense which we could possibly have ventured to put upon the specious words of controversialists, and our worst inferences from these words avowed in terms which leave no room for doubt. Peter Dens, explaining the difference betwixt merit of congruity, (*de congruo*), and merit of condignity, (*de condigno*),—merit of corresponding fitness, and merit of corresponding worthiness,—tells us that the latter kind, which he afterwards says is alone merit in the strict sense of the term, "is a work whose reward or payment is due according to justice; thus the acts of a just man working by grace, do, *of condignity*, (*de condigno*), merit grace and glory."[1] As for the other kind of merit, merit *de congruo*, or of congruity, "to which a reward or retribution is allowed not according to justice but according to liberality and condecency," he finds an instance of it in "the supernatural acts of a penitent sinner meriting grace."[2]

It is not the avowed doctrine of the Church of Rome that a sinner can absolutely merit the grace of justification or the remission of his sins. Dens indeed finds a merit *de congruo* even here, which, if carefully examined, will appear in no small degree to interfere with the doctrine of free grace; but, as may be seen from the canon of the Council of Trent already quoted, it is after justification, or, as Papists say, after *first* justification, that good works become, according to their doctrine, in a higher and stricter sense, meritorious. Dens himself perceives the difficulty which attends the supposition of merit in the high-

[1] Dens Theol., II. 458. (8 vols. Dublin, 1832.) [2] Ibid.

est sense attaching to the works of man; and, therefore, after ascribing a merit of condignity to the works of a just man working through grace, he tries to guard himself by a statement that when man is thus said to merit, it is not to be understood of merit in the very strictest sense, [*non de merito rigoroso*] but of merit less strictly understood, although it be properly merit, [*de merito minus rigorose sumpto, licèt impliciter tali,*][1] in all which there is, no doubt, much confusion, but nothing to abate the offensiveness of the doctrine of human merit previously propounded. This attempt to distinguish between the merit of Christ and of just men, ascribing a higher degree of merit to Christ whilst yet a merit properly so called is ascribed to saints, whose good works are said to deserve grace and glory as a recompense due to them according to the justice of God, is like the attempt to abate the monstrosity of Popish polytheism by ascribing to Christ a superiority over the many mediators of intercession to whom the Papist is taught to have recourse in his necessities.

As Peter Dens is unquestionably a theologian in good repute amongst the Papists of this country,—however for reasons of prudence his theology may not formally be made a text-book at Maynooth,—it may be proper to exhibit his views more fully by one or two further quotations.

He maintains, that when God rewards human merits, he does it according to *commutative justice*;[2] and this he states to be the opinion also of Suarez, Sylvius, and Daelman, theologians to whom he often refers, and of no mean reputation in the Popish church. No stronger assertion of the doctrine of human merit seems possible than this, *that it obtains a reward according to commutative justice*, unless a man were to say, which of course even the grossest Popish theologian will avoid, that it equals or excels the merits of Christ. But this reference to commutative justice is scarcely less monstrous; for commutative justice supposes an exact equality of one thing and another, of the act and its recompense. "But what equality can there be between the imperfect good works of the best men and the most perfect happiness of

[1] Dens Theol. II. 458. [2] Ibid., II. 460.

another world, especially when that consists in the fruition of the beatifical vision?"[1]

Dens has a chapter on the *quantity of merit*, shewing how it is to be measured and wherein it is to be sought,—as not merely in the *charity* pertaining to the meritorious work, but also in the dignity of the work itself, the quantity of the work, its duration, &c.[2]

Further quotation is needless, but a difficulty which meets the theologian is too interesting to be passed unnoticed. It is amongst the conditions of a merit of condignity in the works of men, that they be wrought in the present state of being, by one who is on his pilgrimage heavenward, [*viator*,] "living in the body, in mortal condition," as Peter Dens expresses it, whereby he excludes all idea of merit in any works which may be wrought in heaven or in purgatory. But Enoch and Elijah could hardly be said to have lived in this mortal condition; what then is to be thought of Enoch and Elijah? It is probable, says the learned Peter, that they in fact did not *merit* anything for themselves at all. Could anything have been invented fitter to turn the whole doctrine into ridicule? Such are the questions which occupy the theologians of Rome.

In dealing with this subject, however, it is not right to leave out of account even that inferior kind of merit—if it be inferior—which Popish theologians call merit of congruity. For, however they may tell us that this is not strictly entitled to the name of merit, *yet they give it that name;* and their notion of it may be as fairly inferred from that circumstance as from their curiously worded explanations.

Now, some of their writers tell us, that, with this merit of congruity, men may merit even first grace; salving all, as an eminent Protestant writer has well expressed it, by saying that this endeavour must be from divine assistance—though, as

[1] Stillingfleet, Doct. and Pract. of Ch. of Rome, ch. vi.
[2] Dens Theol. II. 464, 465.

he adds, Pelagius acknowledged that no less than they.[1] Bonaventure maintained this opinion, and his opinion can be of no light weight, for he is one of the highest order in their heavenly peerage, a canonized saint; "for," says he, "there must be some congruity when a man does what in him is."[2] And Peter Dens cites other great names in favour of this opinion, although he himself does not very frankly adopt it, seeming rather to be of the way of thinking of those who admit it only in respect of *congruous merit in a wider sense* [*latius sumptum*],[3] where we have a beautiful instance of that multiplying of arbitrary and subtle distinctions which Owen has happily ridiculed, saying, "We shall not ere long be able to look through them, so as to discover the things intended, or rightly to understand one another; for as one said of *lies*, so it may be said of arbitrary distinctions, they must be continually thatched over, or it will rain through."[4] And, indeed, as we have seen that the Council of Trent itself has declared certain preparatory dispositions for justification to be requisite in man, (and Peter Dens gives us a long enumeration of them,[5] as do other learned men of his class,) it seems plain enough that there is, according to this system, a *merit*, properly so called, which is held to precede and to qualify for justifying grace. And men will doubtless hold it to be so, and feel and comport themselves accordingly. This we shall have further occasion to consider. But at all events, by the introduction of this other kind of merit, Popish theologians advance the glory of human merit so far that a man is held not only to merit for himself, but also for others. They tell us, indeed, that merit of condignity can only be upon a man's own account, but merit of congruity may be upon account of others:[6] "The prayers and merits of the saints may be the meritorious cause of grace," says

[1] Clarkson, Sermon on the Doctrine of Justification dangerously corrupted in the Roman Church.
[2] Bonaventura in Secundum, Dist. xxviii., n. 39, quoted by Clarkson as above.
[3] Dens Theol., II. 465.
[4] Owen on Justification, Works (new ed.), V. 290.
[5] Dens Theol. II. 449-51.
[6] Ibid. II., 466.

Peter Dens, "but subordinate to the merits of Christ, because these are joined to them: thus, a just man, by the works which he does through grace, may of condignity merit increase of grace for himself, and of congruity first grace for another."[1] But this merit of congruity cannot be a small matter, upon which men are taught to depend for all the good they derive from the saints. Hence, also, we may more clearly see how very high an estimation is to be formed of the merit of condignity, which entitles a just man himself to his reward.

Popish theologians of the highest reputation—Bergier, for example, and Perrone—labour hard to prove that their Church is not liable, in respect of its doctrine of merit, to the charge brought against it by Protestants, of glorifying man, and derogating from the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ. Yet they teach substantially the same doctrine which is taught by Peter Dens, concerning dispositions preparatory to justification,[2] and concerning merit of condignity and merit of congruity. They think it enough, to clear their doctrine from the reproach cast upon it, that they deny the merit to belong to the sinner's actions done in his own natural strength, and that for the strength by which his meritorious works are done, he is represented as indebted to the grace and merits of Jesus Christ. "To render the *merit of condignity* odious," says the Abbé Bergier, "Protestants have attached a false meaning to the term, making it signify *a merit of the strictest kind* [*un mérite rigoureux*], founded upon the intrinsic value of the actions. We grant that such a merit belongs to Jesus Christ alone; because, he being God, all his actions were of an infinite price, value, and *merit*."[3] But in

[1] Dens Theol., II. 423.

[2] "Praenotamus has dispositiones praeter fidem, quae omnium consensu ad justificationem requiritur, esse timorem, spem, charitatem saltem inchoatam, poenitentiam et propositum servandi in posterum divina mandata." Praelectiones Theologicae quas in Collegio Romano Societatis Jesu habebat J. Perrone, e Societate Jesu, in eodem Collegio Theologiae Professor. (12th ed.) Paris, 1842. I. 1407.

[3] Dictionnaire de Théologie, par L'Abbé Bergier (Besançon, 1846), IV. 319, under the word *Mérite*.

fact, Peter Dens himself has this sort of saving clause, and the reader may judge how consistent it is with his account of *merit of condignity*, already quoted, and with the way in which, as we have seen, he speaks of it, when giving it the preference over *merit of congruity*. Perrone also rests upon this, that the meritorious works of men are regarded as depending, for their meritorious character, upon the merits of Christ;[1] that is, he plunges into the abyss of absurdity into which we have already for a moment glanced, and into which one Popish theologian after another hesitates not to precipitate himself, as the Council of Trent requires, making the merits of men to arise from their own works, and yet to be the gifts of God. What can be plainer than that, if their mention of the merits of Christ be not an empty form of fair words, they make of them, at all events, nothing more than a foundation upon which they may build a glorious edifice of merits of their own? Even Perrone himself represents *merit of condignity* as [*meritum proprie dictum*] *merit properly so called*.[2] It is vain to speak of this as not tending to man's glory, or not derogating from the glory of the Lord Jesus Christ. "And since the word is never applied to them in Scripture," it has been unanswerably argued, "what daring presumption is it in Papists to apply to the actions of weak and sinful men the very same word which they apply in the very same sentence, because they can apply no higher, to the perfect righteousness of our Lord Jesus Christ."[3]

But it is better for us to look into works more generally in the hands of the Papists of our own country.

In Keenan's Controversial Catechism, as in Scheffmacher's, which he follows, we meet with statements evidently intended for Protestant eyes, or to prepare Papists for contending with Protestants; and which, taken by themselves, might be

[1] Perrone, Praelect. Theolog., I. 1438. [2] Ibid., I. 1445.

[3] Discourses on the Fundamental Doctrines of Christianity, as opposed to the Corruptions of the Church of Rome. Edinburgh, 1837. No. IV. By Dr Cunningham, p. 19.

understood, by those who are unfamiliar with Popish ways, like some sentences in the Decrees of the Council of Trent, to indicate an adoption of the very doctrines which Protestants have been accustomed to hold precious with regard to justification. "How then is the sinner justified?" asks Mr Keenan, and to this he replies, "He is justified gratuitously by the pure mercy of God, not on account of his own or any human merit, but purely through the merits of Jesus Christ: for Jesus Christ is our only mediator of redemption,[1] who alone, by his passion and death, has reconciled us to his Father."[2]

Wondrously evangelical religion! but that we may the better ascertain its precise import, let us compare it first of all with what occurs in a previous place of the same catechism. Bringing some of the ordinary Popish charges against Luther, such as violation of monastic vows, and the abolishing of "confession, abstinence, fasting, and every work of penance and mortification," Mr Keenan asks, "How did he attempt to tranquillize the consciences he had disturbed by these scandalously libertine doctrines?"—it being Mr Keenan's way, the reader may observe, to deal very profusely in the most opprobrious epithets,—and he answers the question thus, "He invented a thing which he called justifying faith, to be a sufficient substitute for all the above painful religious works,—an invention which took off every responsibility from our shoulders, and laid all on the shoulders of Jesus Christ; in a word, he told men to believe in the merits of Christ as *certainly applied to them*, and live as they pleased, to indulge every criminal passion, without even the restraints of modesty."[3] I do not stay at present to show how gross and inexcusable is this misrepresentation of Protestantism and of Luther's doctrine,—but I venture to think that the reader, viewing it

[1] "Our only mediator *of Redemption*." Because Popery has many mediators *of Intercession*.

[2] Keenan's Controversial Catechism, ch. xvii., sect. 1, almost exactly translated from Scheffmacher. (Catechisme de controverse, composé par Le R. P. Scheffmacher, de la Cie de Jesus.)

[3] Keenan, Controversial Catechism, ch. iii., sec. 3.

merely in reference to the subject of justification, will be disabused of any notion that the answer to the question, "How is a sinner justified?" could possibly be meant by Mr Keenan in anything like an evangelical sense. He will be prepared to expect that its apparent evangelical import will be sufficiently modified and effectually done away by subsequent statements; and he will not be disappointed,—although he may find that where a Popish controversialist treats expressly of justification, he speaks more cautiously with regard to it than when he has another subject in hand.

But Mr Keenan, as if feeling that he has gained an advantage by his first declaration concerning the way of a sinner's justification, pursues it, asking in the next question, "Why then do Protestants charge us with believing that the sinner can merit the remission of his sins?" and answering, "Their ignorance of the Catholic doctrine is the cause of this, as well as many other false charges." In like manner, afterwards, we find this question and answer, "To whom do we owe our permission to enter heaven?—Solely to the mercy of God and the merits of Jesus Christ; for it is by the sufferings and death of Jesus that we acquired heaven as our inheritance; and it is God's mercy alone which gave us such a Mediator and Redeemer."[1] All this looks well enough; but instead of going on immediately to further comparison of it with what Mr Keenan himself elsewhere says in his own catechism, let us turn to a catechism intended not for the eyes of Protestants nor for the purpose of training Papists to enter into controversy with Protestants in their workshops or abodes, but simply for the spiritual guidance of Papists themselves. This catechism exhibits to us Popery as it exists in Ireland. It is entitled "The Most Rev. Dr James Butler's Catechism, revised, enlarged, approved, and recommended by the four R. C. Archbishops of Ireland, as a General Catechism for the kingdom." It may be proper to add that the copy which has been used bears also to be of the "thirty-first edition, care-

[1] Keenan, Controv. Cat. ch. xvii, sec. 2, (after Scheffmacher.)

fully revised, corrected, in some parts made more explanatory, and particularly approved of, for the Diocese of Dromore, by the Right Rev. Dr. Blake," which was published so recently as the year 1845.[1] It is wonderful what a different aspect Popery presents when it adjusts itself for controversy, and seeks to ingratiate itself into the good opinion of Protestants, or to evade the force of their arguments, from that which it wears, when, as it were, it is at home in its own house and amongst its own people. In Dr Butler's Catechism, we see it in this latter character. Mr Keenan devotes a chapter to justification. Dr Butler does nothing of the kind. No chapter, section, or lesson on that subject has he. Yet perhaps there is no work which, more than his catechism, gives character to the actual Popery of Ireland. The word justification does not occur in it from beginning to end. Nor does he treat of the subject. This, as we shall see, is quite in keeping with the ordinary character of Popish books, in which justification occupies a very subordinate place.[2] *Merit*, indeed, is introduced. Accordingly,

[1] The cover bears date 1847, but the title page within, 1845.

[2] Prefixed to this Catechism are certain prayers and "Acts of Contrition, Faith, Hope, and Charity," genuine specimens of Popish devotion. The Act of Contrition is as follows,—"O my God, I am heartily sorry for having offended thee, and I detest my sins most sincerely, because they displease thee, my God, who art so deserving of all my love, for thy infinite goodness and most amiable perfections; and I firmly purpose, by thy holy grace, never more to offend thee."—Could anything be colder? Nay is not the conclusion more like self-confidence, than contrition? There is mention of grace, but the man's own firm purpose is the thing most prominently put forward.—O how unlike the examples of devotion which we find embodied in the Sacred Scriptures! how unlike the language of humility and piety employed by evangelical Protestants,—such as may be seen in the writings of those whom Popery has aspersed with every calumnious accusation, or who have been condemned for heresy and have sealed their testimony with their blood! how unlike, for example, the tone and spirit of the very first sentence of the "Confession of a Sinner," written by that Constantine Ponce de la Fuente, who was once chaplain to the Emperor Charles V., but who having embraced the doctrines of the Reformation, died in the dungeons of the Inquisition, the victim of long imprisonment, tortures, putrid air, and unwholesome diet, and of heartless, savage, intolerant bigotry.—"O thou Son of God, whom the eternal Father hath sent to be the Saviour of men, that thou mightest offer thyself a sacrifice as a satisfaction for sin, I would present myself before the throne of thy mercy, beseeching thee to listen while I speak, not of my own righteousness and merits, but of the transgressions and grievous errors which I have committed against men, and more especially against the majesty, the goodness, and the compassion of thy Father." [See M'Crie, Reformation in Spain, pp. 265, 266, and Appendix, No. III.]

in the sixth lesson, "On Original Sin, &c.," we find this question and answer, "What is the reason that darkness in our understanding, weakness in our will, and a propensity to evil, still remain, with many other temporal punishments, after original sin is forgiven? *To serve as an occasion of merit to us;* by resisting our corrupt inclinations, and by bearing patiently the sufferings of this life." Allusion has been made already to St Ignatius Loyola, whom Cardinal Wiseman recommends to the imitation of British Papists, *drawing merit in two ways from evil thought in the matter of mortal sin.* Dr Butler, also, we now see, knew how such a thing could be done. But in his seventh lesson, "On Jesus Christ, &c.," we look in vain for any statement even of the expiation of sins by the death of Christ, or of the doctrine of atonement, unless it may be found in the words, "*He purchased every blessing for us,*" or in the following question and answer: "What do you infer from the sufferings and death of Christ? The enormity of sin, the hatred God bears to it, and the necessity of satisfying for it." And that this is not to be understood, merely, if at all, of Christ's satisfying for our sins, may not only be concluded from the expression which seems so purposely general, but indisputably appears from other passages of the catechism, where satisfaction for sins comes again to be mentioned. So that to make out the meaning, we should perhaps read, "the necessity of our satisfying for it." Thus in lesson 28, "of Confession and Indulgences," it is asked, "What is the fifth condition necessary on our part for the Sacrament of Penance?" And the answer is, "To make satisfaction to God and our neighbour." It is asked, "How is satisfaction made to God?" And we have for answer, "By fulfilling the penance enjoined by our confessor, by fasting, prayer, alms-

deeds, by bearing patiently whatever crosses come in our way, and by gaining the spiritual indulgences which the Church is accustomed to grant to the truly penitent." This brings before us the Popish doctrine of *satisfaction*, a subject which we shall view in its connection with the doctrine of justification, of which it seems naturally to form a part. Nothing can be plainer than the absolute self-righteousness here taught. And indeed, one of the principal arguments to prove the apostasy of the Church of Rome, in respect of the doctrine of justification, is to be found in the self-righteous character which pervades her whole doctrine concerning mortal and venial sin, temporal punishments, purgatory, penance, works of supererogation, and indulgences. On all these points, the Most Rev. Dr James Butler's catechism, contains statements sufficiently gross. But in the meantime, I shall only quote one question and answer more from his tenth lesson, which is "On the True Church," where, having taught that no one can be saved out of "the True Church," he asks, "Will strict honesty to every one, and moral good works ensure salvation, whatever Church or religion one professes?"—and answers, "No; unless such good works be enlivened by faith that worketh by charity." From which it appears that according to his scheme of doctrine, though not according to Gal. v. 6, to which he refers, strict honesty to every one, and moral good works ensure salvation to the members of what he is pleased to call the True Church, when these good works are enlivened by faith that worketh by charity; and whilst the necessity of faith is not denied, it is made only to take its place along with charity, honesty, and moral good works, amongst the things which ensure salvation; faith itself being thus reduced to the class of works, as it is also by other heretics whose profession of religion seems very different from that of Papists, but in whom the operation of the same mystery of iniquity may in fact be seen.

Allusion has been made to the extraordinary manner in which the subject of justification is passed over by Dr Butler in his Catechism. Very similarly he deals with the subjects of faith, the satisfaction made by Christ for sins, and others of a like nature,

passing them over either with slight notice or in absolute silence. But nothing can be more striking than the contrast betwixt the prominence given to these subjects in Protestant writings and systems of theology generally, and the small space which they occupy in the most popular Popish books. The reader may compare Turretine with Peter Dens, or he may look into Berington and Kirk's Faith of Catholics, where a page or two of a considerable volume suffice for faith and justification: or into Archbishop MacHale's handsome volume on the Evidences and Doctrines of the Catholic Church, where he will find justification only slightly and incidentally mentioned.[1] Or he may look into Bishop Challoner's "Catholic Christian Instructed,"[2] a little work which has long been in very high repute amongst the Papists of this country, where, although the first words of the preface tell us that the design of the work is to "explain the *doctrine* and ceremonies of the Catholic Church, and to vindicate the same from the misrepresentations of our adversaries," yet the table of contents, which exhibits chapters devoted to the "Sign of the Cross," to the "Use and Veneration of Relics," &c. &c., has no mention of justification, the atonement, the intercession of Christ, or similar great doctrines, any notice which may be taken of any of them in the book being merely incidental, and what might be requisite in discussing such subjects as baptism, or indulgences, or the sacrifice of the mass, or purgatory. This is a feature in the aspect presented by Popery, even in our own country and time, to which attention cannot be too strongly directed.

But now to return to Keenan. His catechism was intended for another purpose than Dr Butler's, and so he treats of justification. He tells us that a sinner *cannot merit justifying grace*,

[1] "The Evidences and Doctrines of the Catholic Church, shewing that the former are no less convincing, than the latter are propitious to the happiness of society. By the Most Rev. John MacHale, D.D., Archbishop of Tuam." (Second Ed.) London, 1842.

[2] "The Catholic Christian Instructed in the Sacraments, Sacrifice, Ceremonies, and Observances of the Church, by way of question and answer. By the Right Rev. Dr Challoner. By lawful authority. Derby . . . For the Catholic Book Society," 1843.

"because all the good works which a sinner performs whilst he is in a state of mortal sin, are *dead works*, which have no merit sufficient to justify."[1] Then he gives us that apparently evangelical account of justification which has been already noticed,[2] and ascribes it to the ignorance of Protestants that they charge Papists with believing that a sinner can merit the remission of his sins. We do not charge the Popish Church with plainly setting forth this as her doctrine: she is more cautious; but we charge her with doctrines and practices which lead her members even into this extremest error, notwithstanding the occasional disclaimers and protestations of her theologians. Nor has she ever set herself to oppose this error in its most glaring forms, with the zeal which she has displayed against the doctrine of justification by faith alone. She has dealt with those as heretics who have ascribed too much, as she thought, to faith in the matter of justification, but whom has she punished or censured for ascribing too much to works?

Mr Keenan having duly exhibited this part of his doctrine, or what may be called the evengelical side of it,—forthwith proceeds to draw a curious distinction, which, although certainly in accordance with the decrees of the Council of Trent, is not so manifestly in accordance with Scripture, or with common sense. "The sinner may *obtain* the grace of justification by good works proceeding from a broken and penitent heart, because these are necessary predispositions and conditions, but no works of his own can ever MERIT the grace of justification."[3] This very seriously modifies his former evangelical-seeming doctrine of justification. The distinction is a very nice one, carefully framed, so as to resemble that which subsists with regard to prayer, by which we *obtain* blessings, but do not *merit* them. But the resemblance is merely apparent, and vanishes when the subjects are considered. The very exercise of prayer implies a renunciation of all merit; a prayer such as shall be accepted of God cannot be framed without it. But the performing of good works is

[1] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xvii, sect. 1.
[2] See page 20.
[3] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xvii., sect. 1.

a thing of a different kind, nor is it possible to see how it can have any sort of antecedent connection with justification, except in a way of merit. He who cries "God be merciful to me, a sinner," and is presently made to know and feel that God has answered his prayer, cannot, whilst he retains that feeling pure and unalloyed, imagine that his sins have been forgiven because of the merit of that prayer, but must ascribe it to that free mercy of God, which in his prayer he acknowledged, and which is only manifested in Christ; and instead of his justification being regarded as obtained by his prayers, his first true prayer may rather be regarded as the first evidence of a freely bestowed justification. But it must be otherwise with him who is taught to think that by performing good works, he has *obtained* the grace of justification. However these good works may be represented as proceeding from a broken and penitent heart, yet he cannot but regard God as pleased with him, and admitting him to his friendship upon account of their inherent goodness; and how can the idea of *merit* be excluded? Will all the disclaimers of priests or of councils prevent this idea from arising, where every circumstance seems so favourable for generating it? Let the priests of Rome explain to us how these good works *obtain* for men this grace of justification, that we may see whether the idea of merit does not enter into this *obtaining*. Whenever they enlarge upon this subject, they prove that this is the way in which they really regard it. And Mr Keenan, in the sentence under consideration, speaks of good works as possible for a man not in a state of justification,—another error intimately connected with the former, and tending to the establishment of human excellency.

He goes on to ask, "What part has faith in the justification of the sinner?" "It is its root and foundation," he says, "the first step to its attainment, an all-necessary condition, without which no man can ever be justified; because the Apostle says, '*without faith*, it is impossible to please God.'" He next asks, "But is faith alone sufficient to justify the sinner?"—and answers, "No; God requires other dispositions in order to the reception of justifying grace. He requires the sinner to fear God, to love God, to

hope in God, to be sorry for past sin, and to have a well-grounded purpose not to sin again," and these, he says, are required *not as meritorious works*, but "*as necessary conditions*, without which God will not receive the sinner in grace."[1]

This is just the theology of Peter Dens. And here, in these *predispositions* or *necessary conditions*, we have the good works by which men are to obtain the grace of justification. Yet, if no other good works were intended than such dispositions as these, to what purpose is reference immediately afterwards made in this argument to the Apostle James, as proving that faith co-operates with works[2] in the matter of justification?

It is also worthy of further observation, were it only because of the strange confusion which it indicates, that those *good works*, whatever they are, by which justification is obtained, are represented as *dead* works. They are "dead works," Scheffmacher says.[3] How, then, they can be effectual for obtaining justification, it is difficult to comprehend. Mr Keenan tells us at first, that they have no merit sufficient to justify.[4] Scheffmacher's words are, that they are "utterly inadequate to merit so great a grace;[5] from all which, it would seem that they have *some* merit, and one is tempted to ask what becomes of it—whether it is expended in *obtaining* justification, or laid up for future occasions? In the language just quoted, the sinner is certainly taught, that even in a state of mortal sin he may merit something—not hell and wrath, but something good, at the hand of God. But shortly afterwards we are told that all these works are "dead, and of *no* value;"[6] or, according to Mr Keenan, all the works which a man performs while in a state of mortal sin, "are dead works, and of course have *no* merit."[7] Have we then mistaken

[1] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xvii., sect. 1.

[2] "Seest thou that faith did co-operate with his works?"—James ii., 22. Popish version.

[3] Scheffmacher, Cat. de Controv., ch. x., sec. 1.

[4] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xvii., sec. 1.

[5] Polemic Catechism, translated by Bishop Coppinger, p. 80. (Cork, 1830.)

[6] (In the original, "Trop peu de choses pour pouvoir meriter," &c.)—Scheffmacher, Coppinger's transl., p. 33.

[7] Controv. Cat., c. xvii, sec. 2.

the meaning of the previous statements, or do we perceive the working of two different influences in the minds of these Popish authors, the one moving them to keep in some sort of correspondence with Scripture doctrine, and the other leading them to set forth, in most direct contradiction to it, what sprung up most naturally in their own minds? There is an evident inconsistency. They are at variance with themselves. But the view which is carried forward into consequences is that which is most favourable to the notion of strictly human merit. By good works justification is *obtained*. It is vain, therefore, to say that they are *dead* works, and of *no* value. Nor would it ever have been said, had it not been for the difficulty and strait of controversy, and in order to preserve some shew of ascribing salvation to the merits of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Moreover, from the quotations which have just been made, it is sufficiently apparent that the works which are contrasted with those called *dead works*, are regarded as having merit sufficient to justify, if only it were possible that a man not already in a state of grace could do them. The very attempt to cloak over the deformity of the Popish doctrine of human merit in one part, serves but to exhibit it more offensively in another.

But the subject is one on which, the more that Papists write and speak, the more deeply do they commit themselves. "Have we reason to trust much in our good works?" asks Mr Keenan, with beautiful simplicity, following indeed the example, and exactly translating the words of Scheffmacher,[1] which an Irish bishop, translating Scheffmacher's Catechism, had previously thought it as well to modify by omitting the word *much*.[2] And he answers this question by quoting the Council of Trent, "God forbid that any Christian should glory or confide in himself, and not in the Lord?" "How is it, then," he proceeds, "that Protestants reproach Catholics with placing too much confidence in their good works? They reproach us because they do not know

[1] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xvii., sec. 2. Scheffmacher, Cat., ch. x., sec. 4.

[2] Coppinger, p. 86, ("Have we reason to confide in our own works?")

us; and the only return we should make for their ill treatment of us is to pray, as Christ did for the ignorant Jews who put him to death, 'Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.'" What an amiable spirit! It is a pity, indeed, that Charles IX. and Catherine de Medicis had not listened to such teaching on the eve before the massacre of St Bartholomew. Might not the Duke of Tuscany add to his stock of merit by adopting, in the case of the Madiai, the course here recommended? Might not this doctrine be preached with advantage to the Papists of the Cowgate, who seem, if the Police reports may be relied on, to have some mistaken notion that merit is to be obtained by breaking heads? We shall have other opportunities, however, of observing the amiable mildness of Mr Keenan, especially in reference to Maria Joaquina and Dr Kalley.

How much we may have reason to trust in our good works, we have seen that Scheffmacher and Mr Keenan fail to tell us—putting away the question with an exclamation in the words of the Council of Trent, meant to pass for the very language of self-denying humility. But how far it would be right to accept this language very absolutely, must be inferred from the other evidence bearing upon this subject. Perhaps, though it is not necessary, some help towards a solution of the question may be obtained from what Cardinal Bellarmine says, when defending Peter Lombard, the Master of Sentences, as he is called, and for centuries one of the great acknowledged authorities of the Church of Rome, against the attacks of the Reformers, who found fault with him for laying a twofold foundation of hope—the grace of God, and the merit of works.[1] Even this monstrous avowal of a doctrine inconsistent with the idea of giving God the glory, is not too gross for Bellarmine to defend. "The Catholic Church," he says, "takes the middle way, which teaches that indeed the principal hope and confidence are to be placed in God; but yet, that some measure of hope and

[1] Calv. Inst., lib. iii., cap. 2, sec. 43, (quoting Peter Lomb., Sent. lib. iii., dist. 26.)

confidence may be placed in merits."[1] But woe to the man who adventures his soul on the twofold foundation of Peter Lombard!—The middle way is not the safest, where truth is the one extreme.

Mr Keenan tells us,[2] that we owe to Jesus Christ a sovereign confidence, "because he is the only mediator, in a proper sense of the word, between God and man." And then follows the question, "Why do you say he is the only mediator?" To which the answer is, "Because he alone could and did satisfy for sin; he alone merited for us all the graces we receive from God."[3] After which are added some further statements in explanation and confirmation, to the effect that the saints, by their prayers, may *obtain* graces for us, but they cannot *merit* them. Thus, Mr Keenan presents the same view of the subject which Gother,[4] Milner,[5] and other Popish controversialists, have presented, although all of them must have been well aware, that in the most authorized devotional books of their Church, and in its most authorized books of popular instruction, God is asked to grant, or is represented as granting spiritual blessings through the merits of the saints.[6] Keenan, indeed, is here more wary than his predecessors, and says, "They cannot of themselves merit them." Scheffmacher says more simply, "They do not merit them for us." "Jesus Christ," he adds, "has [alone] merited them for us, and purchased them with his blood."[7] Here, again, Keenan differs a little from the continental Jesuit. "It was Christ alone who

[1] Bellarmini Opera, IV., 1092, (Col. Agrip., 1617.)

[2] Following Scheffmacher, with some slight variation of expression.

[3] Keenan's Controv. Cat., ch. xiii., sec. 1.

[4] See Stillingfleet's Doctrines and Practices of the Church of Rome truly represented, ch. ii. Dr Cunningham's Edition, Edinburgh, 1845, pp. 82-85.

[5] End of Controversy, Letter xxxiii.

[6] Dr Cunningham's note to the above quoted chapter of Stillingfleet, (p. 90.)

[7] Scheffmacher's Polemic Catechism, translated by Coppinger. p. 57. Scheffmacher, Cat., ch. vi., sec. 2. The word *alone* seems to have been introduced by Coppinger.

could and did merit and purchase them with the price of his blood, both for the saints and for us."[1]—The saints cannot, *of themselves*, merit graces for us! Mr Keenan is still unwilling to take away all the glory from these fellow-creatures, and to give it to Jesus Christ. Probably he remembered the doctrine of indulgences, and the "heavenly treasures," which Scheffmacher actually seems for the moment to have forgotten. Perhaps he had the Most Rev. Dr James Butler's Catechism before him, or his memory might recall the familiar words, "When the Church grants indulgences, what does it offer to God to supply our weakness and insufficiency, and in satisfaction for our sins?—The merits of Christ, which are infinite and superabundant, together with the virtues and good works of his Virgin Mother, and all his saints."[2] After all, how can he reconcile either Scheffmacher's words or his own with this statement, sanctioned and approved by such high authority? Was it Christ then—Christ alone—who could and did merit and purchase graces with his blood, both for the saints and for us? Yet the Church offers to God, in satisfaction for our sins, the virtues and good works of the Virgin and all the saints, along with the merits of Christ, "which are infinite and superabundant," and had the less need, one would think, to be supplemented in this way. Vainly does Mr Keenan afterwards attempt to lay before us a doctrine regarding the benefits which we derive from the merits of the saints, according to which it would seem that all their merits merely gave greater value and power to their intercession, even as in the case of good men upon the earth, whose prayers we esteem the more, according to the measure of their own piety. Vainly does he strive to persuade us that this is all, and that his Church would only have us to put the saints, "not in the place of Jesus Christ but in *our own*," and to "conjure them to join us in fervent prayer to God, that, through Jesus Christ, we may obtain all the graces we stand in need of."[3] This was also what Dr Milner

[1] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xiii., sec. 1.
[2] The Most Rev. Dr James Butler's Catechism, Lesson xxviii.
[3] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xiii., sec. 2.

was pleased to say. "In short, they do nothing for us mortals in heaven but what they did while they were here on earth, and what all good Christians are bound to do for each other, namely, they help us by their prayers."[1] And he has more to the same purpose, very clear and decided—the calm confidence of his tone being well fitted to impose upon the unwary reader. But to all such fair representations of Popery, we have only to oppose the Most Rev. Dr James Butler's statement just quoted. There we see the real Popish doctrine concerning the merits of saints—a doctrine in more ways than one most derogatory to the glory of Christ, and inconsistent with dependence upon him for pardon, justification, and salvation. There we have the Popery of Ireland—Popery, as it always would appear if Protestantism did not press it into inconvenient controversy, where the simple Inquisition argument of fire and faggot cannot be employed.

It is curious to mark the attempts which are made by Papists to get quit of the difficulty which this point occasions them. "Are the merits of the saints useless to us?" says Scheffmacher. "The more agreeable they are to God, the more powerful their intercession, in which sense alone their merits are useful to us."[2] These words are adroitly put together, and a Protestant might readily suppose them to deny more, in regard to the merits of the saints, than the Jesuit author intended. We have still to learn *how* the *merits* of the saints give efficacy to their intercession, and how far this corresponds with what may be asserted of Christ himself. Keenan, however, is not contented with this statement, but answers the same question at greater length. "No; the more agreeable the saints are to God, the more powerful will their intercession be in our favour; consequently, the more meritoriously they have co-operated with God's grace, the more useful will their prayers be to us; in the same manner that we value more the prayers of the man who is *truly* just than we do those of him who is *imperfectly* so."[1] The reader will

[1] Milner's End of Controversy, Letter xxxiii.
[2] Scheffmacher, Polem. Cat., Coppinger's Translation, p. 59.

notice in passing, the indications of doctrinal opinion afforded by these incidental expressions—"the man who is *truly* just," and "him who is *imperfectly* so." As to the point in hand, it is easy to see what advantage in controversy, and what admirable refuge from a charge of inconsistency, may be found in these mysterious words, "the more meritoriously they have co-operated with God's grace." But what is gained on the one hand is lost on the other; for in these words we have new evidence of a system of absolute self-righteousness. And this meritorious co-operation with God's grace—a thing often spoken of by Papists—is in truth an impious exaltation of the creature, subversive of the doctrine of grace, and derogatory to the glory of the Creator. Now, with his own hand, the Popish theologian rubs the deceitful gloss from his doctrine of human merit. And it is, perhaps, when we consider what is ascribed to the saints, that we see that doctrine in the strongest light. We learn what a man must be held capable of doing in the matter of his own justification, and in procuring for himself the favour of God, from what we are told of *their* co-operation with God's grace, their works of supererogation, the dependence which worshippers may place both on what they have done and on what they are to do, and the heavenly treasures and stock of merits which they have bequeathed to the personages facetiously styling themselves St Peter's successors. We are no longer entangled amongst subtle distinctions, superlative refinements, and wire-drawn ratiocinations. We clearly see that merit and glory are ascribed to men in the same way (and we may overlook the question of degree), as merit and glory are ascribed to Jesus Christ. But to this we must recur, as shewing that same general scope and tendency of the whole Popish system which is also illustrated by the following brief questions and answers of a little Catechism, "intended to serve as a form for examining children and others who have learned the Christian doctrine, and attended the instruction of their pastors, before their admission to communion."

[1] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xiii. sec. 2.

"What must you do to partake of the benefit of your redemption?"—"I must avoid evil, and do good." "What is the reward of those who avoid evil and do good?"—"The everlasting sight and possession of God in heaven."[1]

That doctrine of justification by works, which forms the most essential and characteristic part of Popery, may likewise be very readily traced in the distinction betwixt mortal and venial sin, and in the doctrines of satisfaction for venial sin and of temporal punishments to be endured for mortal sins after the eternal punishment is remitted—doctrines which, in some of their aspects, we shall perhaps more conveniently consider in connection with the subject of Purgatory. It is impossible, in treating of Popery, properly to consider one point without touching upon others; and because of the very connection of one part of the system with another, a little anticipation, and a little repetition, must be endured. But it shall be my object to keep before the mind of the reader, throughout the whole of this volume, the doctrine of justification, and to show how the parts of the Popish system which come in succession before us, are inconsistent with the glory of Christ, in respect of his atonement, obedience, and righteousness.

Papists tell us very distinctly that man can never satisfy God's justice for one mortal sin. And upon this they insist very strongly, and seem anxious to impress us with the idea that by this doctrine they give full glory to the Lord Jesus Christ. It is a way they have to dwell upon some partial statement of a Christian doctrine, as if it was the same in its nature, and carried with it the same consequences, as the whole doctrine, whereby they introduce more easily some fatal modification or inconsistent addition, whose proper consequences are sure to follow through the natural workings of the human heart. "Neither man nor angel," says Mr Keenan, "nor both men and

[1] Questions and Answers on the necessary Truths and Duties of Religion. Glasgow (Denis Kennedy) 1832.

angels, can ever satisfy for one mortal sin. Jesus Christ alone could and did satisfy our sins."[1] But alas! the first words too plainly imply, that there are sins for which a man can satisfy. The doctrine is marred by the distinction between mortal and venial sins. Again, Mr Keenan tells us, that "we can certainly, with the help of God's grace, apply to ourselves the satisfaction of Jesus,"—a doctrine surely less humbling to the pride of human nature than that of the Shorter Catechism: "The Spirit applieth to us the redemption purchased by Christ." And having spoken of "temporal punishment reserved for us to endure" after eternal punishment is remitted, he assures us that a penitent can pay "the debt of temporal punishment which is due to the justice of God." Now here, it is evident that the doctrine of satisfaction by Christ is very much obscured—nay, that very much is torn away from it. If there is a satisfaction made by Christ, there is a satisfaction made by man also,—in the temporal punishment which remains, according to this doctrine, even for *mortal* sins after the eternal punishment is remitted, and by which all venial sins are to be expiated in the fires of Purgatory, if not previously cancelled by almsgiving or other good works, which Papists teach us to regard as a payment, or part payment, of the debt due to the justice of God.[2]

The doctrine of satisfaction is thus stated by Berington and Kirk, in their work on the Faith of Catholics; a work by no means intended to present their religion in the aspect most repulsive to Protestants, but rather to conciliate, and to make it appear that the difference is not so great as Protestants generally believe:—

"Though no creature can make condign satisfaction, either for the *guilt* of sin, or for the *pain eternal* due to it, this satisfaction being proper to Christ, our Saviour, only; yet *penitent* sinners, as members of Christ, may, in some measure, satisfy by

[1] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xvii., sec. 3.
[2] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xvii., sec. 3 (last question).

prayer, fasting, alms-deeds, and other works of piety, for the *temporal pain* which, in the order of the divine justice, sometimes remains due after the guilt of *sin* and *pain eternal* have been remitted. Such penitential works, notwithstanding, are no otherwise satisfactory than as joined and applied to that satisfaction which Jesus made upon the cross, in virtue of which *alone* all our good works find a grateful acceptance in the sight of God."[1]

Leaving the question of temporal punishments due to the justice of God, and the distinction betwixt mortal and venial sins, to be considered in connection with the subject of Purgatory, yet we may here take notice what confusion is indicated in the way in which the *guilt* of sin, and the *pain* due to it, are spoken of. For what is guilt but the obligation to punishment? And *guilt* being removed, how can *pain* be due?[2] It is necessary, therefore, to conclude, in order to get any meaning for the words employed, that guilt is not fully removed by the satisfaction of Christ. And this leads us to consider the tendency of all error to increase; and how manifestly impossible it is that the doctrine above stated can be taught without those who receive it falling into dependence upon themselves, and falling away from dependence upon Christ—first combining their own works with his as the ground of their confidence, and then more and more losing sight of his, and dwelling in contemplation on their own. O, how unlike the doctrine of him, who, renouncing all confidence in the flesh, counted all things but dung that he might win Christ, and be found in him, not having his own righteousness, but the righteousness which is of God by faith![3]

[1] Berington and Kirk, p. 339.
[2] On the vanity of the distinction between the *reatus culpae* and the *reatus poenae*, see Owen on Justification, chap. viii. There can be no greater nonsense than we read in that favourite Popish Manual, the Abridgement of Christian Doctrine, where it teaches, that in the fifth petition of the Lord's Prayer, we pray, "that God would pardon us the sins of our life past, *as also* the punishments which are due unto them."
[3] Phil. iii. 3-9.

It was with admirable craftiness and guile, that the Council of Trent devised a way of stating the doctrine of satisfaction, so as ostensibly to give the glory to Christ, though in reality to take it away. The statement of the doctrine just quoted, is not so cunningly framed as the decree of the Council itself. "The satisfaction which we make for sin, is not so ours, as if it were not through Jesus Christ; for we, who can do nothing of ourselves, as of ourselves, can do all things with him that strengthens us. Man then has nothing wherein to glory; but all our glory is in Christ; in whom we live; in whom we merit; in whom we make satisfaction, bringing forth fruit worthy of penance."[1] So Berington and Kirk translate the decree into English, but where they have, "We can do all things *with* him that strengthens us;"—perverting in a way which even the Rhemish Testament does not sustain, an expression taken from Phil. iv. 13, "I can do all things *through* [not with] Christ which strengtheneth me;"[2]—there the original Latin of the Council is stronger still in its evil sense, "*Eo co-operante*," *He co-operating with us*. But it is particularly to be observed, that the satisfaction is said to be *ours*, *made by us*, however there may be a profession of giving the glory of it to our Lord Jesus Christ; and *we* are said to *merit* by these works of satisfaction, or penances *of ours*, however we may be told that it is *in him that* WE MERIT. Now, let the mind of man dwell upon this,—let this be received as indisputable truth, and let the heart be fully brought under the power of it, then with what propriety could a man be said to have no confidence in the flesh, or to glory only in the cross of Christ, or to rejoice in Christ? In spite of himself, he must rejoice at least partly in himself, and from partly to wholly the transition is easy here. He *must* take some credit to himself, for if this doctrine be true, he would be far from doing himself justice if he did not.

With regard to satisfaction, Peter Dens defines the term, in

[1] Sess. xiv., c. viii., as quoted and translated by Berington and Kirk, 348.
[2] "I can do all things in him who strengtheneth me."—*Rhemish Test.*

its general sense, to mean "a voluntary endurance of punishment to compensate for wrong done to God."[1] He does not shrink from the consideration of what he calls *the objection of heretics;* "Christ has satisfied for us to the utmost, therefore our satisfactions are superfluous." He admits that Christ has fully satisfied; but yet he says, "his satisfactions require to be applied to us, that they may avail us anything, and for this our satisfactions serve, and therefore they are not superfluous." In other words, Christ has fully satisfied for us, but yet he has not fully satisfied for us. It is blowing hot and cold with the same mouth. The unavoidable inference is, that Christ's satisfaction has a certain efficacy, and that our own satisfactions have a certain efficacy, and that the one becomes available to us by means of the other, as the water of the river becomes available at the mill by means of the mill-race, the making of which is man's work, though the river is the work of God. On any other view of the subject, the objection of the "heretics" remains unanswered, and is plainly unanswerable. On this view of the subject, the doctrine establishes a good ground for human gloriation. And when we are told that "our satisfactions derive all their efficacy from the satisfactions of Christ," it seems as if the remark had not been intended to refute, but to enforce the objection that our satisfactions are superfluous, and involves the theologian again in confusion, through his desire (of which even Peter Dens gives indications,) not to place the doctrine of the Church in too palpable opposition to that first principle, both of revelation and of reason, which ascribes all the glory to God.

Such is the value of the *satisfactions* of men, according to the Popish theology, that they may be available, not only for those who perform them, but for others. And this Dens supports by reference to the fellowship of the saints. But satisfaction appointed by way of penance, cannot be performed by proxy, it being in its nature personal. However, here comes in a very subtle distinction, and the priest of Rome may contrive it so

[1] Dens Theol. vi., 242.

that a penitent upon whom he does not wish to press hard, and who can pay for a substitute, may have the benefit of his services, whilst he may lay heavy burdens upon any whom he has reasons of his own for choosing so to treat. "It is imposed with good effect as a sacramental penance, that the penitent shall see to have works of satisfaction performed for him by others. Yet these works performed by others are not part of the sacrament; but the act of the penitent himself attending to it, that these should be performed for him, is part of the sacrament."[1] A very nice and interesting distinction indeed!

As to these satisfactions, this celebrated author discusses at some length, their *quality*, and their *quiddity*.[2] To follow him into this discussion, would belong rather to another part of the subject, if space could be found for a chapter on the Popish Sacrament of Penance, and would draw us too far away from the subject of justification. But some of the penances or satisfactions which he recommends the priest to appoint in ordinary cases are curious enough, and some of them do not appear very formidable to the flesh,—as the reading of a psalm, saying a certain number of prayers, (or more exactly, saying five *Paters* and five *Aves*,)[3] hearing a sermon, reading a chapter in Thomas à Kempis, &c., &c. But there are others also of a severer kind; and a certain amount of abstinence from eating and drinking, would appear to be one of the favourite penances,—in which no doubt a high meritoriousness or satisfactory efficacy must be thought to reside. It would be curious to calculate what amount of merit a man might acquire, or what amount of purgatorial pain he might anticipate, and undo for himself or for a friend, if he could afford to hire some score or two people to fast for him a whole forenoon, he merely attending to it that they *did* fast. A slaveholder might have wonderful advantages in this way.

[1] Dens Theol. vi. 242. [2] Ibid. vi. 246, &c.

[3] "*Dicere quinque* Pater Noster *et* Ave Maria," for it is the *saying of prayers*, and not praying that Popery looks to. It is the *saying* of prayers that is a *meritorious work*, and a satisfaction for sins.

But in sacramental satisfactions or penances the Popish priest is advised to be careful not to impose too much, which might no doubt produce some recoil of feeling and unpleasant temporal consequences, whereas Peter Dens very complacently assures him there is no danger but that any defect will be made up in Purgatory;[1] a pious reflection, which if it might not be agreeable to the penitent, may at least keep the priest's mind easy.

In connection with this view of the doctrine of penance and satisfaction, as taught by Peter Dens, it may be proper to advert to one of the points of a dispute which many persons in Edinburgh and throughout Scotland must well recollect as having arisen a few years ago betwixt Mr Frederick Monod of Paris and the great champion of Popery in Edinburgh, Bishop Gillis. In a speech addressed to the General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland in 1845, Mr Monod made a number of statements concerning Popery, and especially the existing Popery of France, which the Bishop of Limyra (as he is styled) made all haste to contradict. It is only with one of these statements that we have at present to do;—to the effect that certain old women in Paris made a livelihood by saying prayers; because the Church of Rome having perverted the great and glorious privilege of man approaching his God in prayer into a punishment, and giving people prayers to say as a punishment for their sins, they, feeling this to be tedious, think it more convenient to expend a little money, and obtain some old woman who sits in the church, ready for such employment, to say their prayers for them.[2] Bishop Gillis, in a letter to the editor of an Edinburgh newspaper, ascribed to Mr Monod's *boldness* the assertion "that it is customary for the Catholics of Paris to pay a set of old women, to say for them in their churches the prayers that may have been enjoined to them as a penitential exercise;" met it with a positive contradiction, which he required the pub-

[1] Dens Theol. vi. 250.

[2] Speech delivered in the General Assembly of the Free Church on 28th May 1845, by the Rev. Frederick Monod. Published in the Reports of the Assembly, and as a pamphlet.

lic to believe on the strength of his more perfect acquaintance "with the churches of Paris, and with the habits of those who frequent them," and waxed facetious after a fashion which seems a sort of second nature to a Popish priest, indulging in low jocularity about "the reverend speaker" having "guaged the brains of his hearers," and about "an assemblage of old women," and a place "beyond the Atlantic" called "Goose Creek."[1] Mr Monod replied by reiterating his assertion; and the Popish bishop reiterated his contradiction, daring his antagonist to name any one church in Paris where the old women sit and say the prayers enjoined to others as a penitential exercise.[2] How are these statements to be reconciled without supposing one or other of the parties guilty of downright falsehood? I suspect we shall not be far wrong in looking to Peter Dens for the solution of this seemingly difficult problem. Bishop Gillis keeps close by the original terms of the statement; and perhaps Mr Monod omitted to take account of the nice distinction, which we have just seen that Popish theology draws, betwixt the sacramental penance of performing works of satisfaction in one's own person, and the sacramental penance of the penitent *taking care* to have these done for him by others. This distinction being duly considered, probably few Protestants will think that it much affects the substantial accuracy of Mr Monod's statement. But is it not upon this that Bishop Gillis entirely depends for the truth of his contradiction of it?

In the controversy respecting this practice of Parisian Popery, the appointment of prayers as penitential exercises came incidentally into view. Mr Monod adverted to it in the contemp-

[1] A Letter to the Editor of the Caledonian Mercury, in refutation, &c., &c. By the Right Rev. Bishop Gillis. (Published as a pamphlet.)

[2] Popery in France; Answer to the Rev. Bishop Gillis's "*Refutation*, &c., &c." By the Rev. Frederick Monod (Edinburgh, 1845), p. 8.—"A First Reply," by the Right Rev. Bishop Gillis, to the *Answer*, &c. &c." (Edinburgh, 1845), p. 5.—A Letter to the Moderator of the General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland, containing a refutation of certain statements, &c. &c. By Bishop Gillis (Edinburgh, 1846), p. 9.

tuous exclamation, "Prayer a penitential exercise!"[1] And Bishop Gillis, commenting upon what he calls this "parenthesis of astonishment," defends the monstrosity, as indeed he could not well do otherwise, for it is wrought into the whole system of his Church—an awful exhibition of her views of justification, of prayer, and of the very attributes of that Being whom the penitential exercise is meant to propitiate, and to whom prayer ought to be made. "May I ask, Rev. Sir," he says, addressing Mr Monod, "have you never yet prayed to God to forgive you your sins?"[2] The amiable spirit in which this style of controversy is adopted will commend itself to every reader. And in another place he says, in the pure strain of Popish pleasantry, "If Mr Monod would only go to confession himself, let us hope that his devotion might not have occasion to be taxed beyond its powers."[3] Devotion! What has this saying of prayers to do with it?—this taskwork repetition of *Paters* and *Aves?* But Bishop Gillis has his instances, and from Scripture too, to bear him out in making prayer a penitential exercise,—David, who "became weary of his crying till his throat was dried," and the humble publican, *smiting upon his breast*, and saying, "*God be merciful to me a sinner*," who "went down to his house justified." So the bishop makes the quotation. The *smiting upon his breast* he seems to reckon a main point. But would the character of the whole case not be altered considerably if the man were said to have smitten upon his breast a prescribed number of times, and to have repeated a corresponding number of times the same words of prayer; or if the idea of penitential exercise were at all admitted—if the prayer and the accompanying action were to be regarded as aught else than the utterance of what was in the heart and the natural expression of feeling? But it is well that a leading prelate amongst our Scottish Papists should have spontaneously come forward to make such an exhibition of his religion.

Of the same nature with the Popish doctrine of *satisfaction*,

[1] Popery in France, p. 8. [2] A First Reply, &c., p. 5.

[3] Letter to the Moderator, &c., p. 9.

and equally subversive of the Christian doctrine of justification, is the Popish doctrine regarding the efficacy of the sacraments. "In what case," says Mr Keenan, "are both the eternal and temporal punishments remitted by the application of the satisfaction of Christ to our souls?" "In baptism," he replies, "by which all sin, and all punishment due to sin, is remitted."[1] Such is also the doctrine concerning the Lord's Supper, and such is the doctrine concerning the spurious Sacraments of Confirmation, Penance, and Extreme Unction.[2] It is obvious that this doc-

[1] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xvii., sect. 3. So also Bishop Challoner—"What are the effects of the Sacrament of Baptism? 1st, It washes away original sin, in which we were all born, by reason of the sin of our first father Adam. 2dly, It remits all actual sins which we ourselves have committed (in case we have committed any before baptism), both as to the guilt and pain. 3dly, It infuses the habit of divine grace into our souls, and makes us the adopted children of God. 4thly, It gives us a right and title to the kingdom of Heaven. 5thly, It imprints a character, or spiritual mark, in the soul. 6thly, In fine, it lets us into the Church of God, and makes us children and members of the Church."—(Catholic Christian Instructed, chap. ii.)

[2] "As it is by the right use of the Sacraments that man is sanctified, so it is by the same means that his sins are forgiven him, or, when these are forgiven, that sanctifying grace is increased."—(Moehler's Symbolism, translated by Robertson, I., 292.) Confirmation, Mr Keenan says, confers "a grace of the Holy Ghost, which strengthens and secures the faith of the Christian."—(Controv. Cat., ch. xxiii.) "What is the Sacrament of Penance? It is a Sacrament by which the sins we fall into after baptism are forgiven us. Is this Sacrament necessary for salvation? It is necessary to salvation to all those who have lost their baptismal innocence by mortal sin."—(Instructions for the Sacrament of Penance. Edinb., printed for James O'Donnel, 1834.) "What are the effects of the Eucharist? It replenisheth the soul with grace, and nourisheth it in spiritual life."—(Abridgement of Christian Doctrine. Dublin, printed by Richard Grace. This is one of the most popular Popish Catechisms.) "What is Extreme Unction? A Sacrament which gives grace to die well, and was instituted chiefly for the spiritual strength and comfort of dying persons."—(Dr James Butler's Catechism, Lesson xxix.) "What is the invisible grace given [in extreme unction]? The sanctifying grace of God, by which sin is washed away and forgiven; the actual grace of God, by which the soul is strengthened," &c.—(Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xxviii.) —I have purposely selected these statements from different sources.

trine is subversive of the soul's dependence upon Christ, and the application of his blood and righteousness. A system of religion, which thus exalts the efficacy of the Sacraments, necessarily ceases to be evangelical. As the necessity of circumcision, taught in Corinth and Galatia, was inconsistent with the gospel with which it was professedly connected, calling forth in defence of that gospel all the ardour of the Apostle Paul, so the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, the doctrine of the remission of all sins in baptism, and of justification in baptism, or of the impossibility of salvation without baptism, and the corresponding doctrines regarding the Lord's Supper—to say nothing of the spurious Sacraments—inevitably draw away the soul from Christ, and fasten down its confidence to an outward rite. No one can read Popish books without perceiving that this result has followed to the utmost extent; and the same tendency is equally obvious in the writings of the Tractarians of the Church of England.

There must be a correspondence betwixt the views entertained by any person or Church as to justification, and the views entertained as to the nature of faith in Christ. Evangelical Protestants are careful to guard against the idea of merit in faith itself, this being evidently a re-introduction, under a more subtle form, of the doctrine of justification by works. Thus, in the Larger Catechism of the Westminster Assembly, it is said that "Faith justifies a sinner in the sight of God, not because of those other graces which do always accompany it, or of good works that are the fruits of it, nor as if the grace of faith, or any act thereof, were imputed to him for his justification, but only as it is an instrument by which he receiveth and applieth Christ and his righteousness."[1] Thus Zanchius, the Italian Reformer, with particular reference to what the Apostle asserts of justification in Rom. iv., 5, says: "Faith, as it is a work, is excluded from the office of justifying. Wherefore, when he saith, faith is imputed for righteousness, the Apostle does not

[1] Q. 73.

intend faith as it is in any sense a work of ours, but as it apprehends an object—to wit, the righteousness of Christ."[1] And Dr Owen, in his work on Justification, with particular reference to the same passage of Scripture, enters into an argument of some length against the notion that faith, as a work, is imputed unto us for righteousness.[2] And such is the whole strain and tenor of evangelical Protestant divinity.

How different that of the Church of Rome. The following are the words of the Council of Trent:—

"When the Apostle says that man is justified by faith, and gratuitously, his words are to be understood in that sense which the perpetual consent of the Catholic Church has held and expressed; to wit, that therefore is man made just by faith, because faith is the beginning of man's salvation, the foundation and root of all justice, without which it is impossible to please God."[3]

Now here, justification by faith is evidently transmuted into justification by works, and especially by *that kind of work* called *faith*—and thus, whilst the language of Scripture is retained, its doctrine is sophistically set aside. There is still more of the same deceiveableness of unrighteousness in the proposition in which Berington and Kirk set forth their whole doctrine concerning "Faith, its object and character." It is as follows:—

"The merits of Jesus Christ, though infinite in themselves, are not applied to us without a right faith in him, which faith is one, entire, and conformable to its object, which object is Divine Revelation—that is, the truths taught by Christ; and to that Revelation, or to those truths, faith gives an undoubting assent."[4]

In support of this, they quote the Council of Trent as above; and accordingly, although the doctrine is very artfully glozed

[1] Zanchii Opera. II., 349.
[2] Owen on Justification, ch. xviii. (Owen's Works, new ed., V., 318.)
[3] Sess. vi., c. viii., quoted and translated by Berington and Kirk, 8.
[4] Berington and Kirk, p. 7.

over, we discover the meaning to be, that our faith is a work, concurring with the works and merits of Jesus Christ unto our justification.

"While faith is the principal root of all justification," says Cardinal Wiseman, "there are yet other acts and other feelings of virtue, MORE CONFORMABLE TO THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD,[1] and more consistent with the order of his institutions in the New Law, through which the soul passes, up to that last act which seals its justification. St Paul tells us again and again, that except through faith, no man can be justified, and that all justification is through Christ and through faith in him; and so this progress of justification begins in that faith, and ends in the application of the blood of our Redeemer, as the only means of salvation."[2] It must be observed, that faith, according to Papists, has not, as according to Protestants, Jesus Christ for its great object, but merely revelation, such as they represent revelation to be, comprising tradition as well as Scripture.[3] A mere historical faith is all that is acknowledged. And the greatest merit which can be found in faith is represented as arising from that faith which is *implicit;* being, according to the Popish use of the term, that which most readily receives doctrines upon the authority of the *Church.* But this implicit faith, owing its origin to the free will of man and not to the grace and Spirit of God, cannot be saving.[4] And the Popish exaltation of it affords proof, in at least two different ways, that the Popish system ascribes salvation to man himself, rather than to God.

So entirely are the minds of Papists possessed with the idea of justification by works, that they seem unable even to apprehend the meaning of the statements made by Protestants as to the way in which a man is justified by faith. They fancy, therefore, in their blindness, that they can retort the arguments

[1] The Cardinal does not employ these capitals.
[2] Wiseman's Lectures on the Principal Doctrines, &c., II., 12.
[3] See Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. iv., sect. 1.
[4] See Bishop Davenant's *Determinationes*, quest. xxix. ("Implicit faith is not saving faith.")

which we use against them and their doctrine, by saying, What is there in faith to make it so meritorious, that men should be justified on its account alone? What is there in faith more than in other good works?

The following sentences of Cardinal Bellarmine will illustrate this remark. Arguing against the Protestant interpretation of what Paul says in Rom. iii., that a man is justified by faith without the works of the law, he demands to know—"if it is the same thing to be justified by faith alone and by faith without the works of the law,—whether that expression '*without the works of the law*,' excludes all works and every law, or only some kinds of works and of laws. For if it excludes all works, without exception," says he, "and every law, it excludes also faith itself. For the act of faith is a certain kind of work, and indeed an eminent kind;" and he seeks a proof of this in John vi. 29, "This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent," indicating a misapprehension of the meaning of that text and of the whole scope of that passage, which may well be regarded with astonishment.[1] In like manner, arguing against imputation, he tells us, that in God's infallible judgment, that man alone can be reckoned just (or righteous) who is really so, and that when it is written, "Abraham believed God and it was accounted to him for righteousness,"—"it means nothing else than that that act of believing was in Abraham a just work, and was accounted as such by God."[2]

"Does not the ridicule fall upon Protestants themselves which they attempt to heap upon Catholics?" says the Abbe Bergier. "We demand how it happens that this act of faith is of greater value, or more efficacious, and more proportioned to the remission of sins than the other human actions which we call *good works*. We demand, if this faith works the remission of sins *ex opere operato*, how it happens that in this act a man neither sins mortally nor venially, seeing that he sins, according to Protestants, in all his other actions."[3]

[1] Bellarmini Opera IV., 861. [2] Ibid V., 188.
[3] Bergier, Dict. de Théol., IV. 319, under the word *mérite*.

With this may be compared the following extract from one of Cardinal Wiseman's lectures. "It is said that the Catholic destroys the efficacy of Christ's merits, because he believes that it is in his power to satisfy the divine justice, in some respect, for sin; in other words, that the intervention of any human act in the work of justification, or this introduction of human merits, is radically opposed to simple justification, through the merits of Christ. I would ask, is there not as much done by man, in any other system, as there is here? How is it that in the other system he lays hold of the merits of his Saviour, and by their application to himself, obtains justification? Is not man a sinner, and is not this a much more difficult act for one immersed in sin? Does it not imply greater power and energy in the criminal, than our doctrine, that God alone can indeed forgive sins,[1] but that he demands humiliation, and painful sacrifices to appease, in some degree, his offended majesty? Surely, this is not giving very much to man, strengthened by grace; for, as you will see, the Catholic maintains GRACE to be the CHIEF INSTRUMENT IN THE WORK OF SATISFACTION. But how much more do you attribute to man, when you suppose that in a moment, while wallowing in his iniquities, he can appropriate to himself all the sublime merits of Christ, and BY AN EFFORT OF HIS WILL, so completely clothe himself in them, as to stand justified and holy in the sight of God? The latter ATTRIBUTES TO MAN A VALID, COMPLETE ACT OF JUSTIFICATION; the other imposes upon him painful conditions, subject to a sacramental action, with the consoling thought, that God will accept them."[2]

[1] This statement of Popish doctrine must however be understood with a certain reservation or qualification, in respect of the power delegated to the priest in the sacrament of Penance. "Who have the power of forgiving sins in this sacrament? Bishops, and priests approved of by their bishops. Every priest at his ordination receives the power of remitting sin; but this power he cannot use without the approbation of his bishop, unless in case of necessity." And this is made all the worse by what follows. "How can a priest, who is only a man, forgive sin, which is an injury done to God? Because he acts in the name and person of Jesus Christ," &c. (Instructions for the Sacrament of Penance, Edinb. 1834.)

[2] Wiseman's Lectures on the Principal Doctrines, &c., II. 40. I have given the quotation the benefit of a few capitals.

Yes! such a thought as they had to console them, who passed their children through the fire to Moloch. But from what Protestant authorities did Cardinal Wiseman learn that we attribute to man the act of his own justification, or that it is accomplished by an effort of *his* will? We may accept his statement of his own doctrine, as an acknowledgment that his Church does not ascribe *all* to the grace of God.

How amazing an ignorance of Protestant doctrine is displayed by all these eminent Popish theologians and controversialists! What an utter incapacity to admit the simplest elements of scriptural and Christian truth! It is not to enter into an argument which would too much protract this chapter, that these quotations have been made, but merely to exhibit by their aid the inveterate attachment of the Popish mind to the notion of justification by works. The quotations already made in a former page are sufficient to exhibit, in clear contrast, the real doctrine of Protestantism, and to shew that the arguments of the poor Popish theologians are missiles, flung not against a substance, but at some imaginary shadow in an obscure and hazy atmosphere. It seems strange that controversialists, who are continually quoting Calvin and the other Reformers, as if to refute them, or to extort from them admissions which they may turn to their own account, should entirely overlook such a passage as the following: "At length, after having wearied themselves with perversions of scripture, they slip into quibblings and sophisms. They cavil about this, that faith is sometimes called a work (John vi. 29); and thence they infer that we are far wrong in opposing faith to works. As if faith indeed, as it is obedience to the divine will, could, by its own merit, procure righteousness for us: and not rather, as by embracing the mercy of God, it exhibits to our hearts the righteousness of Christ, thereby offered to us in the preaching of the gospel. My readers will allow me to pass on, without spending time in the removal of such worthless objections; which of themselves, without any force from without, will fall to pieces readily enough from their own weakness."[1] Are we to imagine that the Popish writers

[1] Calv. Inst., lib. iii., cap. 18, § 10.

above quoted, and many who have written like them, have never chanced to see this passage, or the many passages to the like effect that are everywhere scattered over the pages of Protestant theology? Do they wilfully misrepresent? Or are such passages as unintelligible to them as if written in some unknown tongue; and this even because they declare a truth so spiritual and so vitally connected with all that is spiritual in religion? Let us thank God for that view which he has given us of the righteousness of Christ,—the Lord our righteousness. Blessed are they who rest on Christ, and not on any works of their own; who know that their very faith is so far from being perfect, that if their justification had depended upon its inherent excellency as a work of theirs, damnation must still be their portion; and that if their believing had depended upon their own strength or free will, they never would have believed unto righteousness; but who by that faith which is of the operation of the Spirit of God,—though it be but weak as yet, and struggling with corruption in their souls, and small as a grain of mustard seed,—are enabled to take hold of Christ and of his work which he finished for them upon the cross!

Those who regard faith as contributing to our justification as it is a work, necessarily build up a system of self righteousness, and go about it much in the same spirit with the Pharisees, who inquired which was the great commandment of the law. But the law has not been changed, and it is by no act of his own obedience, accepted instead of what he was originally bound to render, that a man is justified; it is by Christ's full satisfaction of all the demands of the law in our room and stead. Here are merits enough; and thus indeed salvation is by *works*,—that is, by the works of Christ. "It is clear we must go to heaven by merit, though not our own," says Fleming, the author of "*The Fulfilling of the Scripture*;" "yea, upon the exactest terms of justice, it is due to him who hath paid the price to the utmost value, that none of his purchase be lost."[1]

[1] The truth and certainty of the Protestant faith, sect. x. Thus also Owen; "Whereas God, in the justification of any person, doth declare

But however it may be possible, in the case just considered, to ascribe the misrepresentation of Protestantism to mere blindness of mind, it is not easy to speak in such gentle terms with regard to another misrepresentation which Popish writers continually make, and in which indeed, they follow one another so faithfully, that the later ones may perhaps have resolved to believe it upon the authority of their predecessors. I allude to their asserting that Protestants do not acknowledge the obligation of good works. This they make one of their chief arguments against the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith. There would not be so much cause to blame them, if they merely attributed this consequence to the doctrine, and endeavoured to shew that it necessarily flowed from it. However grievous their error, there would be no reason to doubt that they were sincere in maintaining the opinion; and we could meet them at once in the fair field of argument. But they are not contented with this; and their virulent antipathy to Protestantism breaks out in perpetual accusations against Protestants, as denying the necessity of good works, and setting at nought all the obligations of morality. Even the most respectable Popish writers indulge in this strain. Perrone does not hesitate to speak of the Protestant doctrine as leading to "that security, that jollity, which Protestants enjoy amidst fornications, adulteries, murders, and other sins of the like nature."[1] How he, like Bossuet, Moehler, and other advocates of Popery in former and present times, have insisted on this argument, it is impossible here to shew, nor how absurdly they have made it rest upon some strong paradoxical expressions of Luther, viewed apart from the whole purport and tenor of his doctrine. For nothing can be more certain, than

him to be acquitted from all crimes laid unto his charge, and to stand as righteous in his sight, it must be on the consideration of a righteousness whereon any man is so acquitted and declared; for the judgment of God is according unto truth." Owen on Justification, chap. x. Works, (new ed.) v. 223. A favourite but foolish argument of the Papists in favour of justification by inherent righteousness, is, that the judgment of God must be according to truth.

[1] Perrone, Praelect. Theol. I, 1419, 1420.

that he and the other Reformers inculcated the necessity of good works, as the Protestant Church has continued to do—not as subserving to a man's justification, nor as the ground of his confidence and hope, but as the necessary fruits and evidences of justifying grace. And to infer from that part of Protestant theology which sets aside good works as unavailing in the matter of justification, that they are set aside as unavailing and useless altogether, is much the same sort of reasoning, as if, to borrow the illustration of an old English divine, a man should say that iron is altogether useless, because it is not of use for food.[1]

We have already seen in what terms Mr Keenan speaks of Luther's doctrine concerning faith and good works. "He invented a thing which he called justifying faith." . . . . But the sentence is too offensive to be again quoted. The concluding part of it will suffice. "In a word, he told men to believe in the merits of Christ as certainly applied to them, and live as they pleased, to indulge every criminal passion, without even the restraints of modesty."[2] We shall hereafter have occasion to notice the style in which this Popish priest vilifies the Protestants of the present day, and, in particular, their ministers. In the meantime, one other sentence must be quoted regarding Luther's doctrine. "That he might secure followers, he employed such means as were calculated to flatter the passions of men; he strewed the path to heaven—not like Christ, with *thorns*, but like the devil, with *flowers;* he took off the cross which Christ had laid on the shoulders of men; he made *wide* and easy the way which Christ had left *narrow* and *difficult*."[3] In part, no doubt, this may be explained as referring to those voluntary austerities uncommanded of heaven, in which Papists suppose so much merit to subsist, and from which, along with the slavish fear which bound them as a yoke upon the necks of men who bore the name of Christians, Luther, by his doctrine of justification, emancipated the people of God; but the other sen-

[1] Coverdale, Confutation of Standish. Remains, 342. (Parker Society.)
[2] Keenan, Contr. Cat., ch. iii., sect. 3.
[3] Ibid.

tence, already quoted, shews that this is not all which its author intends. And thus he goes on, and other Popish authors generally in much the same way, not only trying to fasten upon the Protestant doctrine of justification, as a necessary consequence, that it releases men from the obligations of morality; but vilifying Protestants as both doctrinally holding themselves free from these obligations and practically setting them at nought. In this way it is that our Popish neighbours delight to speak evil of us, although, when they find it convenient, they are willing to approach us in the garb of charity, to shake hands with us, and to appear with us as brethren, if we are such fools as to allow it, on the platform of some public meeting—as our fellow-labourers, perhaps, in the education of the poor.

I am not here to shew how the doctrine of good works is maintained by Protestants; nor what is the connection between faith and works; nor how the concurrent voice of Protestant theologians from the Reformation downwards (and, indeed, it may be added, of those Protestants also, for they were Protestants under other names, who were before the Reformation) asserts, with the Apostle James, the vanity of that faith upon which good works do not attend. One good effect the accusations and objections of the Papists have produced, conspiring to this with the foul extravagances of the Anabaptists on the other hand. They led the Protestant divines in the very age of the Reformation, and those who immediately succeeded them, to insist very much upon this point; and the writings of these divines are full of the most admirable exhibitions of the truth of God concerning it.[1]

[1] I may be excused for quoting the following beautiful passage of Tyndale, the English reformer and martyr:—"If any man ask me, seeing that faith justifieth me, Why I work, I answer, 'Love compelleth me. For as long as my soul feeleth what love God hath shewed me in Christ, I cannot but love God again, and his will and commandments, and of love work them, nor can they seem hard unto me. I think not myself better for my working, nor seek heaven, nor any higher place in heaven, because of it. For a Christian worketh to make his weak brother perfecter, and not to seek an higher place in heaven. I compare not myself unto him that worketh not. No, he that worketh not to-day, shall have grace to turn and

Bishop Gillis affords a remarkable illustration of the way in which Papists reason concerning justification and the Protestant doctrine of justification. He tells us in one of his pamphlets, that "Catholic teaching on the subject of justification" is necessarily implied in "Catholic teaching on the subject of grace," so that he who holds the one must hold the other. "The reason is," says he, "that, according to that teaching, justification is in itself the work of grace; while grace, again, is the means through which justification is effected."[1] And he speaks of this argument as if it were an appeal to "a principle of common sense." Yet how can a doctrine which represents a man's works as contributing to his justification be reasonably supposed to be more in accordance with God's grace than that which declares justification to be *an act of God's free grace*, and to depend, not on the infusion of good principles into the soul—though the infusion of good principles is also maintained—but on the free and simple imputation of a Redeemer's righteousness? The strength of a Popish argument sometimes lies in the air of confidence with which it is brought forward; and its absurdity is disguised by the very arrogance of its appeal to that reason, which, if once it really examine it, can only reject it with scorn.

But the Bishop is quite in earnest, and shews it by referring to passages of Augustine, as proving that he held the doctrine of the Council of Trent concerning justification; which, however, prove nothing more at all than that he held the doctrine of re-

to work to-morrow; and in the meantime I pity him, and pray for him. If I had wrought the will of God these thousand years, and another had wrought the will of the devil as long, and this day turn and be as well willing to suffer with Christ as I, he hath this day overtaken me, and is as far come as I, and shall have as much reward as I: and I envy him not, but rejoice most of all, as of lost treasure found.'"[1] And such is the general strain of Protestant theology.

[1] Facts and Correspondence relating to the Admission into the Catholic Church of Viscount and Viscountess Fielding. By the Right Reverend Bishop Gillis, (Edinburgh, 1850).

1 Tyndale, Prologue on the book of Exodus. Works, I., 418. (Parker Society.)

generation, and ascribed it to the grace of God. I do not mean to say that Augustine's views of justification were identical with those of the Reformers, and as clearly and fully developed as theirs; nor is it necessary here to examine into the Augustinian theology, although an interesting study, and which would well reward the inquirer: but it would be amusing, if the nature of the subject permitted it, to find Bishop Gillis quoting the ancient father as "most unequivocally" teaching "the doctrine of the *inherence* of justifying grace," when he says, that "the spirit working interiorly the benefit of grace, undoing the bond of guilt, and reconciling what is good to nature, *regenerates* man,"[1]—or when he says that "God gives to the faithful a most hidden grace of his Spirit, which in an unseen manner, he also infuses into infants."[2] These passages do not appear to assert anything more than the doctrine of regeneration held by Protestants; however, it may be, that there are other passages in Augustine's writings which favour the Popish doctrine of justification by inherent grace.[3] But, in quoting these passages to prove this doctrine, Bishop Gillis seems to have supposed that he was arguing against persons, who, maintaining a doctrine of justification in an imputed righteousness, denied the doctrine of regenerating and sanctifying grace, and the necessity of good works. And, accordingly, he expresses this notion in plain enough words, saying:—"According to the Protestant doctrine on justification, justice is only *imputed* to man, not inherent in his soul. His sins are not taken away, but covered by the righteousness of Christ; as a leper might be swathed in the purple of a prince. No change of soul is implied necessarily suggestive of good works."[4] What can be more preposterous than this assumption, that because Protestants do not represent

[1] August. Epist. xxiii. or xcviii., as quoted by Bishop Gillis, who translates *Reconcilians bonum naturæ*, "*Reconciling what is good in nature.*" I venture to try another translation.

[2] August. Lib. i. de pecc. mer. &c. cap. 9, n. 10, (as quoted by Bishop Gillis; Facts and Correspondence, &c., p. 105).

[3] See Davenant de Justitiâ, c. xxv.

[4] Facts and Correspondence, &c., 103.

the change in the soul of a man as the ground of his justification, they therefore do not represent any change as taking place in him who is brought into a state of grace and salvation by Jesus Christ? But it is indeed strange that any man living in Edinburgh could suppose Protestant doctrine to be such as it is here represented, or could make such a representation of it.

Immediately afterwards, this Popish Bishop goes on to say, that "what constitutes justification," according to Protestants, "is that act of faith, as it is called, by which a man indubitably believes that his sins are forgiven him through the merits of Jesus Christ."[1] Might it not have been expected that, in a letter addressed to the Moderator of the General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland, the Protestant doctrine of faith should have been taken from the standards of that Church, as, for example, from the Shorter Catechism, which says, that "faith in Jesus Christ is a saving grace, whereby we receive and rest upon him alone for salvation, as he is offered to us in the gospel?" But this way of stating Protestant doctrine would not have been so suitable to the Bishop's purpose.

So great is the difference of doctrine between the Church of Rome and the Protestant Churches, that the term justification has necessarily a different sense amongst Papists from that which it bears amongst Protestants. For justification, in the Protestant sense, they have no equivalent term, as they do not admit the reality of that which it designates. They distinguish betwixt *first* and *second* justification, the distinction being founded upon radical errors concerning both the state of nature and the state of grace, and concerning the whole method of a sinner's salvation.[2]

[1] Facts and Correspondence, &c., 103.

[2] "Those of the Roman Church," says Owen [on Justification, ch. v.], "do ground their whole doctrine of justification upon the distinction of a double justification, which they call the *first* and the *second*. The *first justification*, they say, is the infusion or communication unto us of an *inherent principle* or habit of grace or charity. . . . . The *second* justification is an effect or consequent hereof; and the proper formal cause thereof is

"Justification," says Peter Dens, "is a translation from a state of sin to a state of habitual grace and the adoption of the sons of God through Jesus Christ our Saviour." [1]

But the term, thus employed, has no propriety. Another term might have been used as well, and the meaning is merely conventional. The definition given has at least as much to do with regeneration as with justification. In so far as appears from this definition, there is no forensic act at the commencement of the state of grace. By this definition, and by the whole tenor of Popish theology, justification is confounded with regeneration and sanctification.

This will more clearly appear if the following sentence, from the same page of Dens' Theology, be compared with his definition of justification above quoted. "Let it be also observed, that under habitual grace are comprehended the habits of charity, of the virtues, and of other gifts, which are infused along with sanctifying grace." And this error becomes more and more palpable when we read, that "the increase of sanctifying grace is usually also called justification," this (and not the restoration of a lapsed sinner to a state of grace, which, however, also belongs to their system) being the *second justification* of the Popish theologians; and when we find it condemned as an error of heretics that they hold "justification to take place, not through habitual grace inherent in the soul, but through the righteousness of Christ alone imputed to us." This doctrine of imputation Dens not only condemns as heretical, according to the decree of the Council of Trent and general doctrine of the Church of Rome, but ridiculously misrepresents. "The heretics teach," he says, "that in justification sins are not truly remitted, but only covered with the righteousness of Christ, as Jacob was

good works, proceeding from this principle of grace and love." Yet one may search in vain in certain modern Popish books of controversy for these terms of *first* and *second* justification; for instance, in Keenan's Catechisms or Wiseman's Lectures. But though the terms are laid aside, the distinction is really maintained. There is an accommodation of language to our Protestant notions, but the doctrine is still that of the Council of Trent.

[1] Dens Theol. II., 446.

covered with the garment of Esau." [1] There is an astonishing impudence in the assertion, which can have no excuse of ignorance, that those who maintain the imputation of Christ's righteousness teach that sins are not truly remitted.[2] We have already seen how Bishop Gillis expresses himself upon this point.[3]

As to the doctrine of imputed righteousness, Peter Dens dismisses it very summarily. "Prove, in opposition to heretics," says he, "that justification formally takes place by the infusion of habitual grace inherent in the soul, and not by the righteousness of Christ outwardly imputed to us." And his only proof, unless the decree of the Council of Trent be deemed a proof, is the text, Rom. v. 5, "The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us." [4] But what connection this text has with justification, or the proof with the thing to be proved, he does not condescend to show. He might as well have quoted the first verse of Genesis, "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth."

Mr Keenan's definition of justification, expressed in fewer words, is less palpably opposed to all our Protestant notions than that of Dens. "It is a grace which makes us friends of God." [5] Nor does he make any express mention of first and second justifications, although what he says is quite in accordance with the view of the subject which has given birth to that distinction. But he identifies justifying with sanctifying grace as thoroughly as even Peter Dens, for in answer to the question, "What are the effects of sanctifying grace?" he says, "It makes us the friends and children of God." [6] And thus also justification is plainly made to depend upon an inherent righteousness; or, in other words, the very gospel of Christ is perverted into a system of self-righteousness.

Even Dens, however, does not set aside the doctrine of imputed righteousness more completely than do the decrees of the

[1] Dens Theol. II., 447.

[2] "*Wherein he pardoneth all our sins*," says our Shorter Catechism, in its account of justification.

[3] See p. 56.

[4] Dens Theol. II., 448, 449.

[5] Keenan, Contr. Cat., ch. xvii., sec. 1.

[6] Keenan, Controv. Cat. ch. xvii, sec. 2.

Council of Trent. "If any one shall say that men are justified without the righteousness of Christ, by which he merited for us, or by it formally, let him be anathema." "If any man shall say that men are justified by the mere imputation of the righteousness of Christ, or by the mere remission of sins, exclusive of grace and charity diffused in their hearts by the Holy Spirit, and inherent in them, or even that the grace by which we are justified is only the favour of God, let him be anathema."[1]

Here is indeed a doctrine well enough calculated to support high notions of human merit and excellency. But it is a confused and self-destructive doctrine. So long as the remission of sins, even in the first instance, and whether supposed to take place in baptism or otherwise, is ascribed to the merits of Christ, the idea of the imputation of these merits cannot reasonably be excluded. The Council of Trent itself acknowledges the gratuitous remission of sins, and that this is the primary part of justification. "Now he that is justified by the gratuitous remission of sins is not justified by inherent righteousness; for to justify by the remission of sins, and to justify by exacting a righteousness of the man's own, are two things irreconcileably opposed."[2] Popish theologians set themselves to argue with all their might against the doctrine of imputation; and yet an imputation is certainly implied in their own statements, as when Mr Keenan says, "It is by the sufferings and death of Jesus that we have acquired heaven as our inheritance."[3] And the real effect of their doctrine, properly considered, is not to set aside all imputation—for imputation cannot be wholly set aside, however it may be denied in words, without an express and entire renunciation of grace, and a declaration of human merit and excellency, such as even Papists do not venture to make, which should ascribe man's inheritance of heaven to his own good works entirely, and without respect to the grace of God. But the effect of Popish doctrine is rather to deny to the merits of

[1] Conc. Trid. Sess. vi., Can. 10 and 11.
[2] Heideggeri Anatome Conc. Trid.; in Sess, vi., Quaest. viii.
[3] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xvii., sec. 2.

Christ their proper value, and to make it appear that, after the imputation of these, there still remains a need of other merits to make out a sufficient righteousness and title to glory. And the doctrine only becomes more confused and inconsistent with itself, when we find these other merits also ostensibly traced back to the merits of Christ. The doctrine is intelligible that men are justified merely by an imputed righteousness;—the doctrine is intelligible that men are justified merely by an inherent righteousness. But a doctrine which attempts to combine the one with the other is necessarily unintelligible, and one part irreconcileably at variance with another. Popery amalgamates the two doctrines—and cannot avoid doing so, without either renouncing, on the one hand, all merits save the merits of Jesus Christ, and holding by imputed righteousness; or, on the other hand, holding by inherent righteousness alone, and ceasing to make any pretence of trusting in Christ for justification or salvation.

It is unnecessary to pursue this subject farther, by adducing from other Popish writers their definitions of justification, or evidence that they confound justification with sanctification. But with what danger this is fraught to the souls of men no man can fail to perceive, who has obtained even a glimpse of evangelical truth, and of the way of salvation by Him *who was made sin for us though He knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him.*[1]

It is a most essential part of Christian doctrine to regard justification as a forensic act, whereby the sinner, previously under condemnation, is placed in a new state and an entirely different relation to God and to his law; which new state and relation being permanent, a man can only once be justified. For if it be held, as it is by Papists, that a man may fall from a state of grace by sin,[2] it must be held that there are frequent justifications of the

[1] 2 Cor. v., 21.
[2] "What do you mean by mortal and venial sin? That some sins rob the soul of justice and spiritual life, and render it deserving of hell," &c.—Keenan, Contr. Cat., ch. xviii.

same person;[1] or, as one error always needs to be sustained by another, the Popish distinction becomes requisite betwixt mortal and venial sin, and the Popish notion (so flattering to human pride), that men may, and that some even do, avoid all mortal sin, and so continue always "*just*" men, and in a state of grace.[2]

[1] "Qui verò ab acceptâ justificationis gratiâ per peccatum exciderunt, rursus justificari poterunt"—Concil. Trid. Sess. vi., can. 14.

[2] The following extracts from Bellarmine's Explication of the Thirty-second Psalm (or, as Papists call it, the Thirty-first Psalm) may be interesting to the reader, as exhibiting the Popish theology on this most important subject of justification. Nothing more perfectly antichristian than the sentiments here expressed by this great Popish doctor can be found in his own controversial writings, or in those of any controversialist whatever:—

"Verses 1, 2. . . . . He begins with indulgence, both because he would proceed from lesser to greater things, and because of his own most recent healing in that way. *Blessed are they whose transgressions are forgiven.* It is an exclamation by which he proclaims the benefit which is in indulgence, as if he said, O how happy are they, who, after they have sinned, are not despised by God, but being moved by His grace, are turned to penance [convertuntur ad pœnitentiam], and attain to indulgence! *And whose sins are covered.* The same thing is repeated in other words; for sins, when they are remitted, are hidden from sight, and covered, that they may never more appear; but of this term we shall speak again in a little. *Blessed is the man to whom God has not imputed sin.* He passes from indulgence, which is common to many, to innocence, which belongs to very few; as if he had said, O truly blessed and happy the man, whosoever he is, who has not done anything which could be accounted sin, to whom, therefore, the Lord, whose judgment is always most righteous, has not imputed anything at all as sin! Not only has he not sinned in deed, but even *no guile is found in his spirit*—that is, neither in word nor in thought has he sinned. . . . . Moreover, we understand innocence in this place, not as natural or acquired by a man's own works, without the gift of God, which kind has no existence; but as that which God, by the gift of his own singular grace, has imparted to a few individuals, to whom he has so remitted the sin contracted by the will of another—that is, original sin—as not to have permitted them by their own will to commit mortal sin, which is a more excellent kind of remission. Therefore all innocence has annexed to it some remission of sin; and concerning all men, Christ excepted, it can be said—*All have sinned and come short of the glory of God.* Therefore the Apostle to the Romans, chap. iv., adduces this place of the Psalm to prove that no man can be justified by works

I intended to have devoted more space than I can now afford to the Popish doctrine of man's co-operation with the grace of God. Of this, which stands in close connection with the doctrine of congruous merit and of the sinner's obtaining for himself the first grace of justification, and also with the doctrine of original sin, and of the natural state of fallen man, I shall now scarcely be able to say more, than, after a brief quotation or two from one of the greatest of recent Popish theologians, to refer to the illustrations afforded in the Lives of the Saints.

"By the mutual interworking of the Holy Spirit, and of the creature freely co-operating, justification really commences," says Moehler, in his Symbolism, a Popish work of very superior character to any of those hitherto quoted, or any which the Popish theologians of this country have produced,—a work in which, whilst melancholy proof may be found of the degrading power of Popery, there is evidence also of a highly gifted mind, of great learning, and of a liberality and elevation of sentiment, the expression of which, unlike what we usually meet with in Popish books, can more easily be received as sincere than set aside as hypocritical. "If man remains faithful to the work thus begun, the Divine Spirit, at once sanctifying and forgiving sins, communicates all the fulness of his gifts," &c. &c.[1] "God's holy power precedes,"

preceding grace, and says—*Now to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt. But to him that worketh not, but believeth in him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is accounted for righteousness,* &c. . . . . Moreover, the prophet appears to me to have had regard to some few particular persons, when he says—"*Blessed is the man to whom the Lord has not imputed iniquity*—to wit, holy Job," &c., &c. (Bellarmini Opera, V. 184-5.) And he goes on to speak in the usual Popish way, which we shall have occasion hereafter to consider in connection with the *Glories of Mary*, of those who have been sanctified in the womb, &c. How astonishing the perversion of Scripture in these extracts!—the labour to impose upon it meanings which it refuses to bear, and to connect with it doctrines with which it is utterly repugnant!

[1] Symbolism, or Exposition of the Doctrinal Differences between Catholics and Protestants, as evidenced by their symbolical writings. By John Adam Moehler, D.D., &c. &c. Translated, &c. &c. by James Burton Robertson, Esq. 2 vols. 8vo, London, 1843. I, 117. Moehler's Symbolism appears to be esteemed by Papists themselves, the greatest controversial

says this famous Popish doctor in another place, speaking of regeneration, which, of course, is with him the commencement of justification, "awakening, exciting, vivifying,—man, the while, being utterly unable to merit, call forth, or even desire that divine grace; yet he must let himself be excited, and follow with freedom. God offers his aid to raise the sinner after his fall; yet it is for the sinner to consent, and to receive that aid."[1] I commend this doctrine to the attention of our Scottish Morrisonians, and particularly request them to consider, what I believe most of them to be profoundly ignorant of, that this is *Popery*.

Our Scottish forefathers, in their National Covenant, solemnly rejected, amongst other things pertaining to Antichrist, "his corrupted doctrine of original sin;" and I am aware that a complete view of Popish doctrine, in respect of justification, cannot be presented without an exhibition also of the very serious errors maintained with regard to the natural state of man. These may, indeed, be in some measure inferred from what has already been stated of the Popish system, for they are necessary parts of the same system. And Moehler, after the statements of doctrine just quoted, admits this connection, saying,—"It is not difficult to see that the above-stated doctrine of the Catholic Church is determined by her view of original sin; for had she asserted that an utter extirpation of all germs of good, a complete annihilation of freedom in man, had been the consequence of his fall, she then could not have spoken of any co-operation on his part," &c.[2] But on this subject, and the pretended remission of sins in baptism, I must refrain from attempting to enter; preferring rather to adduce a few illustrations of the monstrous errors already noticed, from devotional compositions and other books not expressly doctrinal or controversial, where error

work on their side which has appeared upon the Continent in the present day.

[1] Symbolism, or Exposition of the Doctrinal Differences between Catholics and Protestants, as evidenced by their symbolical writings. By John Adam Moehler, D.D., &c., &c. I., 123.

[2] Ibid., I., 121-2

may be seen in its practical workings, rather than in mere naked statement or warily adjusted argument.

It has often been remarked that even where a considerable departure has taken place in men's opinions from the doctrine of the grace of God, yet they seem to find it impossible to use language opposed to that doctrine when they address the throne of grace itself, and their prayers are more evangelical than their creeds;—just as, in more solemn moments, or at the dread approach of death, even Popish theologians and controversialists have not dared to maintain their own merits, but have sought a surer ground of confidence in those of Jesus Christ.[1] In the Church of Rome, however, the doctrine of human merit is wrought into the very formularies of devotion. There are, indeed, a few beautiful prayers still preserved in her liturgies,—monuments of better times when superstition and self-righteousness had not gained their present supremacy. But nowhere can we find more convincing proofs of her fearful apostasy from Christ than in her litanies and prayers. There we may see that her high estimation of human merit will not permit an entire trust in Christ or an entire ascription of the glory of salvation to him: there, not only do we find evidence of her believing that men's own merits are to be put in the same scale with the merits of Christ to outweigh their sins, but we find prayer after prayer framed upon the assumption of merits acquired by the saints in their works of supererogation, which become available to the worshipper putting his trust in these saints, and making mention of them, or addressing himself to them in his devotions. And if there be anything which more strongly than all else demonstrates the extreme self-righteousness of Popery and the vanity of the pretence that Christ is glorified in the whole system, it is just this doctrine of the redundant merits of the saints,—the treasure accumulated by their works of supererogation,—"than which," says Owen, "they could have found no engine more powerful to evacuate the effi-

[1] See the end of this chapter.

cacy of the blood of Christ, both as offered and as sprinkled, and therewith, the doctrine of the gospel concerning faith and repentance."[1]

In almost every page of the devotional books of the Papists, there is matter of the kind we are now in quest of. We find them frequently, and heedless of the inconsistency of the two ideas which they so bring together, praying that they may *deserve* this or that blessing at the hand of God. And if an old ecclesiastical sense of the Latin verb *mereri* might be pleaded, in which it simply signifies to *obtain*,[2]—although such a plea would be merely fallacious at best, and contrary to what any one may easily satisfy himself is the truth; yet, perhaps, for our present purpose, it is better to consider how these prayers are translated in the English translations in which, with all the authority of bishops and vicars apostolic, they are now recommended for use in this country.

In the Ordinary of the Mass, is a prayer to be made by the priest when he goes up to the altar, which is thus translated in Husenbeth's Missal for the use of the Laity, a work approved by all the *vicars apostolic* in England, and permitted to be used in their respective districts; every man, to give the greater weight to his authority, prefixing a cross to his name.

"Take away from us, we beseech thee, O Lord, our iniquities, that we may *deserve* to enter into the Holy of Holies with pure minds: through Christ, our Lord. Amen."[3]

Similar to this is the prayer prefixed to the office of the Blessed Virgin Mary, as published in Rome with all ecclesiastical approbation and authority,—a prayer that those who recite the office may be able to recite it so well, that they "may *deserve* to be heard before the presence of the Divine Majesty, through Christ our Lord."[1]

[1] Owen, The Chamber of Imagery in the Church of Rome laid open. Works, VIII., viii., 584.

[2] This meaning of the word, Archbishop Usher has established by incontrovertible examples, in his *Answer to a Jesuit*, chap. xii.; from which a quotation sufficiently satisfactory may be seen in Allport's Translation of Davenant on Justification, II., 156, *note*.

[3] Husenbeth's Missal for the use of the Laity; (London, 1850), p. 6.

But instances of this kind are abundant enough, without our going to Italy for them. In the "*Key of Heaven*," an approved devotional book, recommended to the use of the Faithful by Archbishop Murray of Dublin, we find the following:—

"O God, who hast doomed all men to die, but hast concealed from all the hour of their death, grant that I may pass my days in the practice of holiness and justice, and that I may *deserve* to quit this world in the peace of a good conscience, and in the embraces of thy love, through Christ our Lord. Amen."[2]

What a prayer for a mortal sinful man to address to his Creator! Nor does the self-righteousness of it appear in the word *deserve* alone, but in its whole tenor.[3]

In the service for Good Friday are certain prayers for the Pope, one of which concludes thus—"that the Christian people, who are governed under thy direction, may under so great a pontiff have *the merits of their faith* increased."[4]

In perfect consistency with this exaltation of human deserts, and this overlooking both of God's free grace and of man's sinfulness, we sometimes meet in these devotional books with extraordinary prayers, in which men profess to pray for everything necessary to salvation, and yet almost or altogether omit to pray for pardon. An instance of this we have in the Key of Heaven, entitled *A Universal Prayer for all Things necessary to Salvation*, where there is nothing of pardon unless it be in this,—"Grant that I may ..... escape hell;" and nothing of sorrow for

[1] Uffizio della B. V. Maria, &c. &c. (Roma, 1845), p. 12.

[2] Key of Heaven; (London: Simms and M'Intyre, *N. Y.*), 244.

[3] In one of the examples set down for imitation in the Very Rev. P. R. Kenrick's *New Month of Mary*, we are told of St Francis Regis, that he "redoubled his exertions to attain perfection in all his words and actions, in order to merit the approbation of God and of his Holy Mother."—New Month of Mary, 126. (London, 1848).

[4] Husenbeth's Missal, 304. The Latin is "meritis credulitatis suae augeatur," and if the usual word for faith be not employed, perhaps the one substituted is more appropriate.

sin or confession of it, except this,—"I am sorry that I have offended thee: do thou increase my sorrow." Would it not have been as appropriate to have entreated God to forgive the offences which had been committed? We might think so, but we forget that there is merit in sorrow.—In the same prayer we find a petition to be enabled to *correspond with grace, keep the commandments, and work out salvation.*[1] (This same prayer may also be found in other Popish books.[2]) This is that co-operating with the grace of God, which, we have already seen, is set down as a reason for confiding in Popish saints.[3]

In the "Garden of the Soul, or Manual of Spiritual Exercises and Instructions for Christians, who, living in the World, aspire to Devotion; revised and approved by the Right Rev. the Vicar Apostolic of the London District," the reader is presented with ten Meditations of St Francis De Sales, in which is the following resolution:—"To expiate my sins past, I will accuse myself of them courageously; and will not leave one unbanished from my heart."[4] That even St Francis De Sales does not always speak in this way, and that in this very Garden of the Soul are to be found prayers and instructions which make a better acknowledgment of Christ crucified, is only an illustration of that inconsistency which subsists betwixt the two parts of the Popish system,—the doctrine of the merits of men, and the doctrine of the merits of Christ.

We frequently find in these Popish books of devotion, professions, which every worshipper is therefore taught to make, of loving Christ with *all possible* love, of detesting sins with a *perfect* detestation, and the like; where, according to a more evangelical system, confession and prayer would have been more appropriate: just as in the Lives of the Saints, there are abundant instances, presently to be noticed, of perfect love, perfect detes-

[1] Key of Heaven, 231-233.

[2] See the Complete Manual of Catholic Piety, &c. &c., by the Rev. William Gahan, O. S. A. (Dublin, 1847), 218-220.

[3] See p. 33.

[4] Garden of the Soul (Dolman, London, *N. Y.*), 36.

tation of sin, and perfect obedience, said to have been attained by these poor human beings. For example, "I humbly adore thy sacred Majesty, and with all the force and powers of my soul, exalt and praise thy holy name," &c.[1] The utterance of such devotions cannot be a very humbling exercise. The following is as remarkable for the bombastic extravagance of its style, as for the self-satisfaction which it breathes. "O king of heaven and earth! adorable sovereign! the author and preserver of the universe! behold I annihilate myself before thee, protesting that I would humble myself as much for thy glory, as thou dost here," (to wit, in the Eucharist), "for my salvation."[2] It is needless to multiply quotations of this kind. The following, which shall be the last, is from a little book intended for the use of children, sanctioned and approved by "Nicholas, Bishop of Melipotamus," the same gentleman who is now better known to the world as Cardinal Wiseman. "I adore and love thee, my God, as much as my weak nature is capable of doing."[3] What an attainment in piety!

"I offer and unite every thought, word, and action of to-day with those of the Holy Child Jesus at my own age."[4] Such is the language of devotion put into the mouths of children of tender years, in the same manual, and under the sanction of the same high authority. It not only conjoins the merits of these thoughts, words, and actions, with those of the thoughts, words, and actions of Christ; but it is offensive by its absurd specification of the thoughts, words, and actions of Christ, at that particular period of his earthly life,—and cannot fail to remind any one who has looked into the Lives of the Saints, of strangely offensive passages, in which the Saviour is described as appearing to them as an infant in the arms or in the company of his mother, and of strangely offensive pictures, which represent him

[1] Key of Heaven, 12.

[2] Gahan's Catholic Piety, 118. This inflated style is quite common; the natural substitute for elevation of sentiment.

[3] The Child's Manual of Prayer. By a Lady. (London, 1849.)

[4] Child's Manual, 5.

as an infant in heaven,[1] and sometimes as an infant in the arms of his mother, who stands upon the clouds, amidst the upper light, which seems to shine from her, her head surrounded with the stars.[2]

It is a common thing also to find that the saints have been very busy making amends to God for the indignities done by unbelievers and "bad Christians" to the "Most Holy Sacrament:" and prayers like the following are frequent in the books of devotion:—

"Pierced with the sincerest grief at the sight of my ingratitude, I come, O God of Majesty, to make thee some poor amends, for all the sacrileges and the impiety which were ever committed, or ever shall be committed against this adorable Sacrament."[3]

It is not only of the justice of God that a low notion is here manifested, but of the Godhead itself. But a sufficiently high notion must be entertained of the *poor amends*, if one may judge from the extent of surface over which the fine gold is to be made to spread.

The making of amends is a thing apparently much in the minds of Popish worshippers, or of those who teach them how to worship, and accordingly it appears in a variety of ways. A woman with child is taught to say, after confessing her sins, "I here offer myself to make what satisfaction for them I am able; and most willingly accept of whatever I may have to suffer in child-bearing, and offer it up now beforehand to thee for my sins:"[4] which may be compared with Mr Keenan's bold declaration, that when Protestants charge those of his Church with

[1] "It was usual for our saint to be absorbed and rapt in heavenly ecstasies and visions. . . . . On Christmas night, and other times besides, the infant Jesus descended into his arms, prolonging his stay for several hours." Life of St John Joseph of the Cross, in Lives of St Alphonsus Liguori, &c., whose canonization took place on Trinity Sunday, May 26, 1839. Edited by N. Wiseman, D.D., &c. (London, 1846), p. 150.)

[2] See the Frontispiece to the "The New Month of Mary. . . . By the Very Rev. P. R. Kenrick, (Dolman, London, 1848.)

[3] Key of Heaven, 24. [4] Key of Heaven, 75.

believing that the sinner can merit the remission of his sins, the *false charge* is entirely owing to "their ignorance of the Catholic doctrine."[1] "O God, who by sin art offended, and by penance pacified," is the beginning of another prayer in the *Litany of the Saints*,[2] which may throw further light on the same question. "May I endeavour by charity to make amends for all that I have sinfully, idly, or prodigally mis-spent, and thus recover whatever prejudice my soul has suffered through my fault,"[3] is a petition in another. It cannot be necessary to adduce further instances of the same kind. I shall trouble the reader only with one, perhaps the most monstrous of all he has yet looked at. In a "Litany for a happy Death," amongst other bombastic and turgid sentences, strung together in the usual ridiculous fashion, occurs the following, "When the last tear, the forerunner of my dissolution, shall drop from my eyes, RECEIVE IT AS A SACRIFICE OF EXPIATION FOR MY SINS; grant that I may expire the victim of penance; and in that dreadful moment, Merciful Jesus, have mercy upon me."[4] How truly did Latimer say, that the Popish doctrine of justification makes Christ only a Judge, and not a Redeemer![5]

It remains only to notice the frequent mention of the merits of the saints, in prayers addressed to God. When we come to the subject of Popish idolatry, and especially the worship of the Virgin Mary, we shall be compelled, upon other accounts, to contemplate too many instances of this kind. In the meantime, one or two examples may suffice. In the Ordinary of the Mass, the priest is directed to bow down with his hands upon the altar, and to say, "We beseech thee, O Lord, by the merits of those saints whose relics are here, and of all the saints, to vouchsafe to pardon all my sins."[6] In the service for the feast of 30th November, in honour of St Andrew the Apostle, the following prayer occurs, "We beseech thee, O Lord, that the holy prayer

[1] Keenan, Controv. Cat. ch. xvii., sec. 1. [2] Key of Heaven, 55.
[3] Key of Heaven, 77. [4] Do. 243.
[5] Latimer, Works, (Parker Society), II., 146, 147.
[6] Husenbeth's Missal, 6.

of the blessed Apostle Andrew may render our sacrifice pleasing unto thee, that it may be accepted by his merits, in whose honour it is solemnly offered. Through our Lord."[1] In the service of the festival of 6th December, in honour of St Nicholas, bishop and confessor, we find the following:—"O God, who didst adorn the blessed Bishop Nicholas with innumerable miracles, grant, we beseech thee, that, by his merits and prayers, we may be delivered from the flames of hell. Through our Lord, &c."[2] Here we may pause. Enough has been extracted for the present purpose. But he who desires to see more instances of the same abomination, may find them in the work from which these are extracted,—*The Missal for the use of the Laity*, "newly arranged, and in great measure translated, by the Rev. F. C. Husenbeth,"—a work which is indorsed and recommended to the world, as already mentioned, by all the persons calling themselves Vicars Apostolic of England, and, amongst others, by "Nicholas, Bishop of Melipotamus," now Cardinal Wiseman. This then is *his* religion. By the merits of St Nicholas,—his own patron saint, I presume,—he expects to be delivered from the flames of hell; unless, indeed, he is possessed of merits like those of this saint Nicholas, which might alter the case. And what now are we to think of the view which he presents of human merits and their efficacy, in his Lectures on the Principal Doctrines and Practices of the Catholic Church?—how are we to reconcile the one representation of his religion with the other? Defending the Popish doctrine of satisfaction, he says, "We believe that upon this forgiveness of sins, that is, after the remission of that eternal debt which God in his justice awards to transgressions against his law, he has been pleased to reserve a certain degree of inferior or temporary punishment, appropriate to the guilt incurred: and it is on this part of the punishment alone, that, according to the Catholic doctrine, satisfaction can be made to God. . . . . I wish to lay down the doctrine clearly and intelligibly, that it is only with regard to the reserved degree of temporal punishment that we believe the Chris-

[1] Husenbeth's Missal, 493. [2] Ibid., 496.

tian can satisfy the justice of God."[1] This, then, is all he would have us believe, that he or his Church regard a man as capable of doing for himself or for his fellow-man: all the rest is done by Christ. Yet we find him praying, that *by the merits of the blessed Bishop Nicholas*, who did innumerable miracles, he may be delivered *from the flames of hell*, or teaching others to make such prayers. Which of these two representations are we to receive? for they are not consistent with one another. Had the prayer been for deliverance from the flames of *purgatory*, an attempt might have been made to escape on the distinction betwixt the eternal and the temporal punishment; for purgatory is the place for perfecting the satisfaction in regard to the "reserved temporal punishment" merely. But as it is, there is no escape. Perhaps this comparison of these two different representations of the same religion may assist us to a view of more than its *doctrinal* character.

Let us now proceed to look for a little into the Lives of the Saints, that we may see what evidence we there find as to the Popish doctrine on this all-important question of justification.

Perhaps one of the most extraordinary spectacles of our age is the audacity with which the woman, sitting on the scarlet coloured beast, flaunts in the eyes of an educated and intelligent people, the most offensive of those very trappings which proclaim her the "mother of harlots and abominations of the earth." No circumstance of this kind is more significant, or in itself more wonderful, than the recent publication of numerous Lives of the Saints in the English language, and under the editorship, or with the approbation of the highest dignitaries of the Popish Church in this country. Abridged, as they indeed are, from the form in which they appear in Italy or other Popish countries, they still contain enough, one would think, to revolt and disgust every reasonable mind,—to create the utmost contempt and abhorrence in any one not already sunk in that abject spiritual

[1] Wiseman's Lectures on the Principal Doctrines, &c., (3d Ed., London, 1851,) II., 41, 42.

degradation to which they give such fearful testimony,—a degradation in which even high intellectual abilities may be seen abased to the servile work of glorifying an imbecility as pitiful as that of the Indian yogee. We are at present, however, to examine them merely with reference to the subject of justification, and the light which they cast on the Popish belief in human merits.

A volume of this class was published a few years ago, under the editorship of no less a personage than Cardinal Wiseman. It contains the "Lives of St Alphonsus Liguori, St Francis De Giralomo, St John Joseph of the Cross, St Pacificus of San Severino, and St Veronica Giuliani, whose canonization took place on Trinity Sunday, May 26th, 1839."—It contains such sentences as the following:—"*We are all capable of enduring much more than is demanded of us for gaining heaven.*"[1] "By this humble and saintly conduct, *he rendered himself worthy* of that divine grace which called him to a closer union with God."[2] "His horror of sin was equal to his love of virtue, *so that his mind, from the first dawn of reason, shrunk like a delicate plant from the very shadow of guilt, and was all-imbued with zeal for God's glory.*"[3] "Although, by the fall of our first parents, man has lost that command which was imparted to him over all creatures, yet we know full well, that *as often as men have been found upon the earth, who had never soiled the white robe of innocence, and had ever lived in a union of love and peace with God*, the inferior and even the most savage creatures whom he hath made, have become weak and docile, and have listened to their words: *for that which was lost by sin may be recovered by innocence; and to him who is obedient in all things to his Creator*, those whom sin makes rebellious, shew subjection and love."[4] This is in an account of certain respectful swallows that twittered round about St Pacificus of San Severino. Our present business, however, is not with the swallows, but with the saint, and those other men who have never soiled the white robe of innocence, but have been obedient in all things to their Creator. The question very naturally arises, What need had such men of Christ? He disclaims them, when he says, "They that are whole need not a physician, but they that are sick."[1] Nay, he seems to be disclaimed in plainest words on their behalf, when it is said, "That which was lost by sin may be recovered by innocence;" more especially when it is considered that original sin, according to the Popish theology, can have only given the opportunity of increasing their merits, presenting no obstacle but what it is clear and certain that they have overcome. For, says Mr Keenan, in his Catechism of the Christian Religion, "How was the liberty of man weakened by sin? After the commission of sin, *his faculty or tendency to good became less* than it had previously been."[2]

But perfect innocence, or perfect obedience, has been no rare thing amongst the Popish saints. In them has been reversed the saying of Solomon, "There is no man that sinneth not."[3] St Rose of Lima was one of these perfect ones—"the blessed Rose, who, when only three months old, gave proof of heroic[4] patience; for some one having thoughtlessly pinched her thumb, by shutting a chest hastily, she concealed the pain it gave her."[5] This is but the beginning of the story, but I cannot find patience to transcribe it, as it is scarcely necessary for the present purpose, and could only illustrate the childishness and the credulity of which these Lives bear the stamp everywhere; unless, indeed, it is rather that of imposture, which works upon credulity for gain. It is told of this saint, that "she managed so well, that she executed whatever her father and mother commanded her, without omitting the least part of her duty to God."[6]—It is

[1] Lives of Saints of 26th May 1839, p. 149. [2] Ibid. 179.
[3] Ibid. p. 121. [4] Ibid. 215, 216.

[1] Luke v. 31.
[2] Keenan's "Catechism of the Christian Religion, being, with some small changes, a Compendium of the Catechism of Montpellier," &c., (Glasgow, 1851), I. 21. [3] 1 Kings viii. 46.
[4] This use of the word *heroic* is one of the links which connects the idolatry of modern with that of ancient Rome.
[5] The Lives of St Rose of Lima, &c., p. 5.
[6] Ibid. p. 9.

needless to go farther. Enough has been quoted to prove how little need these persons had of the merits of Jesus Christ.

It may be said, indeed, and such is the ordinary Popish way of glozing over the antichristian offensiveness of such statements, that the white robe of innocence is received in baptism: though this way of stating its effect looks like a sort of imputation, and Dr MacHale keeps more closely by the doctrine of infused grace justifying, when he says that "baptism is the channel through which the infinite source of justification is conveyed."[1] But surely such accounts of perfect virtue can no more be reconciled with the idea of dependence upon Christ for pardon and salvation than they can be reconciled with the language of Scripture. However, the Church of Rome maintains the possibility of a perfect keeping of the commandments, by the help of God's grace. "Would he not be a cruel tyrant," says Mr Keenan, in his own style of peculiar reverence and propriety, "in excluding us from heaven, and punishing us with hell, if the commandments he orders us to keep were for us impossible in practice?"[2] But what of those, who, never being baptized, never get this help of God's grace? Mr Keenan does not explain himself as to the justice of their punishment, or the possibility of their escaping it by obedience, but he says, "Many are mentioned in Scripture who did perfectly keep these,—Abraham,—Job,"—bad instances both, as any man who knows the Bible may easily satisfy himself—and "the parents of John the Baptist, of whom it is said, 'They were both *just* before God, walking in all the commandments and justifications[3] of the Lord, without blame,'"—a passage of which any one but a Papist will readily find a meaning more consistent with that instance of Zachariah's conduct, which is presently afterwards recorded, and which brought upon him a visitation of Divine displeasure.

It is pleasant to contrast with this miserable Popery the following Protestant sentiments:—"It may seem somewhat extreme which I will speak; therefore let every one judge of it even as his own heart shall tell him, and no otherwise. I will only make a demand. If God should yield unto *us*—not, as unto Abraham, if fifty, forty, thirty, yea, even ten, good persons should be found in a city, for their sakes the city should not be destroyed; but and if he should make us an offer *thus* large—Search all the generations of men since the fall of our father Adam, and find *one* man that hath done *one* action which hath passed from him *pure*, without *any* stain or blemish at all, and for that *one* man's only action, neither man nor angel shall feel the torments which are prepared for both: do you think that this ransom to deliver men and angels could be found to be among the sons of men?"[1]

[1] MacHale, Evidences and Doctrines, 398.

[2] Keenan, Cat. of Chr. Rel., I. 210, 211.

[3] The word *justifications* is used (instead of *ordinances*) like many others in the Popish Bible, apparently only to darken the meaning.

It might seem very wonderful that those saints who have never soiled their white robe of innocence, nor broken any commandment, should yet be continually accusing themselves to their confessors, and demanding that some heavy penance should be imposed upon them, if we did not know, in the first place, their intense love of sufferings, of which presently; and, in the second place, their prodigious humility, which has made some of them go all their days with their eyes bent upon the ground, as fixed as those of their own images or pictures,—nay, more so, for the latter are sometimes moveable when the time is convenient for miracles, as recently at Rimini. But we cannot at all wonder that their reverend confessors, in such cases, have been obliged, in order to content their perfectly innocent penitents, "to enjoin" them "merely a Hail Mary! or some other slight satisfaction."[2] For there is a merit in saying Hail Mary! and especially if it is repeated often enough, a sort of merit of which the Buddhist priests seem to have pretty much the same notion, who expect to win heaven by perpetually repeating the words Amida Buddha (O-me-to Fŭh).[3]

And here it may not be out of place to remark,—although the

[1] Hooker's Works, III. 440. (I have borrowed the quotation.)

[2] Lives of the Saints of 26th May 1839, p. 195.

[3] Medhurst's China, 206-209.

remark might have been made in connection with the other evidences derivable from the Popish books of devotion, as to the ground upon which justification is expected and the hope of heaven founded,—that the forms of devotion are such as to indicate an idea of merit in the frequent repetition of names and prayers. What else is to be thought of all those litanies where the same person,—Jesus, Mary, Winfrid, or any other,—is addressed ten, twenty, or thirty times over, with mere variations of designation, as,—

"Jesus, Son of the living God, Have mercy on us,
Jesus, Splendour of the Father, Have mercy on us,
Jesus, Brightness of Eternal Light, Have mercy on us,"—

and so on?[1] Or what is to be thought of the Beads and the Rosary, inventions for counting up and making sure of the right number of prayers, but that they are intended as means of accumulating merit? What is to be thought of directions for one *Pater* and five *Glorias* to come in at particular places in a course of prayers?[2] or of directions to repeat the name of Jesus ten times at the commencement of each petition of what is called the Psalter of Jesus?[3]

But to return to the saints. We have only further to notice their love of sufferings, and the sufferings which they are said to have inflicted upon themselves. The religion of Christ! We seem to have got back again to the religion of Baal, whose frantic priests "cut themselves, after their manner, with knives and lancets, till the blood gushed out upon them;"[4] or to have gone to the precincts of some idol shrine in Hindostan, on some great day of *poojah*, when the poor heathen may be seen to practise this heathenish way of acquiring merit, and recommending themselves to the favour of their gods.

[1] "From "The Litany of our Lord Jesus Christ." Garden of the Soul, 251.

[2] "Coroncina ad onore del sacro cuore di Gesu," in "Preci Quotidiani," &c., at the end of the *Uffizio della B. V. Maria*. Roma, 1845.

[3] Gahan's Catholic Piety, 482, &c. Garden of the Soul, 268, &c.

[4] 1 Kings xviii. 28.

"All the graces which Christians receive," says the biographer of St Rose of Lima, "being derived from the torn and wounded heart of the Son of God, inspire them with a love of sufferings, and make them practise austerities so frightful, that their innocent excess in the use of them can only be excused by the necessity which baptism imposes, of dying with him on the cross, in order to reign with him in heaven."[1] St Veronica Giuliani had a rapture, in which she saw our Lord with a heavy cross on his shoulders, when he invited her to take a part in that precious treasure. At that instant she felt a strong desire of sufferings, "and it seemed," says she, "that the Lord planted the cross in my heart, giving me to understand the value of suffering. . . . . It appeared as if all sorts of torments were represented to me; and, at the same moment, I saw them transformed into jewels and precious stones, all of which were made in the figure of the cross. During this time I was given to know that God wished pure suffering in me, and then the vision disappeared."[2] For this barbaric nonsense, Cardinal Wiseman must be held responsible. It is he who sends it forth to the English public; it is he who thus represents his own religion; it is he who thus incites the fanatical adherents of his Church to torture and flagellate themselves; it is he who teaches them that they shall thus acquire merit and please God. And who does not see that this representation of the value of a creature's sufferings is inconsistent with the whole scheme of trust in the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ?

Saint Maria Magdalene de Pazzi "had so great a love for the cross, that she wished for nothing more than to be united to Jesus, the suffering spouse of her soul; and hence asked God to prolong her life, that she might be enabled to suffer more and greater things for his sake."[3] And so on. Examples are too abundant.

But the Redeemer's example is despised as well as his doc-

[1] Lives of St Rose of Lima, &c., 27.

[2] Lives of the Saints of 26th May 1839, p. 239.

[3] Kenrick's New Month of Mary, 167-8.

trine. These people torture themselves with their own hands, of which he set them no example. We have seen almost enough, and might perhaps pause, warned by the intimations which these Popish writers themselves give us of the frightfulness of the things they are to describe. A few specimens shall suffice. "The life of these first fathers," we are told of St Alphonsus Liguori and his companions, Cardinal Wiseman being still the responsible editor, "has been justly compared to that of the holy penitents described by St John Climacus in his Mystic Ladder. Their house was small and inconvenient, their beds a mere sack of straw resting upon the floor; and their only food, in general, was a dish of soup, which was both insipid and disagreeable, with a small quantity of fruit. The bread was black and not even leavened, through the inexperience of the lay-brother who made it, and so hard that it was necessary to pound it in a mortar before they could eat it. This miserable food, which they eat kneeling or stretched upon the ground, they rendered still more nauseous, by sprinkling it over with some bitter stuff; and many of them, before eating, licked the floor with their tongue. They disciplined themselves three times in each week." [1] And Cardinal Wiseman wants us to believe that God is well pleased with such practices as these! He holds up to our admiration and imitation a set of poor wretches, licking the floor with their tongues!——St John Joseph of the Cross was remarkable for his love of poverty. "A rough seat and a table, a bed, consisting of two narrow planks, with two sheepskins and a wretched woollen coverlet, a stool to rest his wounded legs upon,"—for it is curious how many of these saints have had ulcers in their legs, a great help, of course, in the acquisition of merit,—"these, with his breviary, formed the whole furniture of his cell." [2] This, also, Cardinal Wiseman recommends to our admiration! Moreover, this St John, &c. "mortified his ears by denying them the gratification of music. He would not even smell a flower." [3] Heroic virtue indeed!

[1] Lives of the Saints of 26th May 1839, p. 15.
[2] Do. 144. [3] Do. 147, 148.

how incalculably meritorious! "Bareheaded in all seasons, he wore under his rough and heavy habit divers hair shirts and chains, which he was careful to vary to keep the sense of torment ever fresh. Besides, he used the discipline to a severe degree; and when, at the age of forty, his superiors obliged him to wear sandals, he placed between them and his feet a quantity of small nails; but the most tremendous instrument of torture which he devised against himself was a cross about a foot in length, set with rows of sharp nails, which he fastened tight over his shoulders, so as to open there a wound which never afterwards closed." [1] And this, according to Cardinal Wiseman, is the way to merit increase of glory and a high place in heaven! These are mere specimens. They might be multiplied indefinitely, and like a naturalist adding to his collection, one feels it difficult to stop, even when sure of having enough.[2] Page after page is filled with the record of the same abominable barbarities. With one extract from the Life of St Rose of Lima, I conclude. "It was no less astonishing that she could find room on her emaciated body, to engrave in it, by her disciplines, the wounds of the Son of God, and that she should have been able to draw from it those streams of blood which she every day caused to flow; with iron chains, and her other instruments of penance, she practised such terrible austerities, that her confessors were obliged to restrict her in the use of them. After she became a nun, she was not content with a common sort of discipline; she made one for herself of two iron chains, with which she gave herself such blows every night, that her blood sprinkled the walls, and made a stream in the middle of the room, so prodigious a quantity did she draw from her veins. *She disciplined herself in this manner seven times;*

[1] Lives of the Saints of 26th May 1839, p. 148.
[2] The following is from the *New Month of Mary*:—"This holy man [the *Venerable* Benedict Joseph Labre] embraced a life of voluntary poverty, and seems to have been destined by Providence to recal to men's minds the poverty of Christ. He eat nothing but the fragments which he received as a mendicant, &c. &c.—[New Month of Mary, p. 94.]

first, for her own sins; secondly, for souls engaged in sin; thirdly, for the pressing necessities of the Church; fourthly, when Peru or Lima were threatened with some great misfortune; fifthly, for the souls in purgatory; sixthly, for those in their agony; seventhly, IN REPARATION OF THE OUTRAGES OFFERED TO GOD." [1] The whole passage is horrible and blasphemous in an extreme degree, but the concluding sentence is particularly important to our present argument. Who does not see that these sufferings are represented as propitiatory?

Are we to believe that these stories are true? or is there nothing in all this but lies? In reference to the doctrinal question now under consideration, it is of no consequence. However, it is of interest upon various accounts. The possibility of falsehood must be admitted. It would manifest a great ignorance of the moral character of Popery to take for granted that all these stories are true; but it would manifest an equal ignorance of it in another character, as a strong delusion, and it would manifest an inconsiderateness of many well attested facts in the history of Popery, as well as of facts in the heathenism both of past and present times, to dismiss all as the fabrications of lying priests. There is no more reason to doubt that many poor wretches, both male and female, have terribly scourged themselves and tortured themselves with iron nails, under the teaching of the Church of Rome, in hope of getting to heaven, than there is to doubt the story of St Simon Stylites, or the reality of the Hindoo swinging pole. The dark places of the earth are still the habitations of cruelty. But what is to be thought of the men who excite the minds of others to aim after merit and perfection by means like these, whilst themselves eat, drink, and are merry,—bnding heavy burdens, and difficult to be borne, and laying them upon other men's shoulders, whilst they themselves will not touch them—no, not with one of their fingers? Do many of the priests of Ireland practise austerities like these? I have heard of their whips, but only of their using them upon the persons of their miserable people, and not of their applying

[1] The Lives of St Rose of Lima, &c., p. 32.

them to their own. I would like to see Cardinal Wiseman's *discipline*. But humility forbids any such exhibition.[1]

Before passing from the Lives of the Saints, as viewed in their bearing upon the great subject now under consideration, let us again advert to that perfect sinlessness which is asserted of so many of them, the instances of which cannot have failed to arrest the reader's attention. I recal attention to this, not in order to insist further on the inconsistency of such a notion with Scripture or with the most fundamental doctrines of Christianity, but to introduce a remarkable sentence respecting it from the Dublin Review. A writer in that leading Popish periodical,—the usual exponent of the opinions and arguments of the Romish hierarchy in these realms,—after referring to Nicole's sarcastic remark about the want of anything in biographies of saints to identify them with our frail humanity, proceeds to say:—

"In the lives of canonized saints, it is rather the mature saint everywhere that is visible, than the man in progress towards his sanctification, yet it is legitimate to wish that we might be allowed to see in the examples of heroic perfection, that are proposed to us as patterns, a little more than biographers usually think well to concede, of the struggles and occasional lapses through which the same heroic perfection has been obtained." [2]

Here the writer seems almost to acquiesce in the sentiment of Nicole which he has quoted; abating, of course, its sarcastic purpose and character. But this is only his Popish subtlety. He would not have any one repelled from the Church

[1] In the Dublin Review for December 1851, in a cleverly-written article, entitled "The Actions of the New Testament," occurs the following sentence:—"If one of the virtues of our Lord was contempt of earthly things, and love necessarily of abjection, it must be reflected upon earth somewhere in His Church; and if this virtue be found only in one among contending parties, it surely will form a moral note, a seal of Christ not to be mistaken." But the weakness of the argument is in the falsehood of the premises. No "contempt of earthly things" was displayed by our Lord, such as it is here attempted to ascribe to him, or such as implies "love of abjection." His *abjection* was mediatorial,—penal,—the endurance of what was necessary to satisfy God's justice for the sins of his people.

[2] Dublin Review, December 1851. (Review of the Life of Father Gentili, Missionary Apostolic in England.)

of Rome by these incredible tales of saintly perfection. It would seem as if he knew of nothing in the Lives of the Saints that exceeded the sort of friendly colouring which any biographer is too much tempted to give to his subject, especially by extenuation and concealment. And yet he did know (it is vain to seek room for a charitable doubt) that there are in the Lives of the Saints statements of a kind utterly unparalleled in any other biographies. I have already quoted examples enough in preceding paragraphs. The reader will perceive, that if there were occasional lapses, as the writer in the Dublin Review suggests, then many of the biographies in question must be a mere tissue of lies, and those who wrote them, and those who edited them, must have been either dupes or liars. It is curious to find a Popish writer expressing a sentiment fraught with such consequences. His subtlety becomes foolishness, when the subject is viewed from another point than that to which he had regard.[1]

It may not be improper, ere we leave this branch of the subject, to devote a little attention to another of the works recently given to the British public under the highest sanction which a

[1] Similar to this is an attempt made to prevent the multitude of pretended miracles from producing a bad opinion of the Church of Rome. I quote from a tale, in which, on a slight fabric of incident and narrative, are wrought, according to a method largely employed by a number of recent Popish writers, a vast quantity of representations and arguments intended to advance the cause of the Church of Rome. "They [the members of that Church] must, as true Catholics, believe in the miracles of the Old and New Testament; but I repeat that the Church forces on no one the belief in any later fact of supernatural intervention." (Geraldine: a Tale of Conscience. By E. C. A. Booker and Dolman, London, 1837. I., 244.) But if this view of the matter be adopted, what is to be thought of the processes resulting in the canonization of saints, and the evidence led of miracles wrought by them? Or what is to be thought of the saints canonized on the ground of that evidence? or of the poor people who flee to their patronage and pray to them? (See the account of Canonization in Wiseman's Introduction to the Lives of the Saints of 26th May 1839.)

Popish book can enjoy. It is a translation of the Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius of Loyola, the founder of the Jesuits, with notes by Father Rothaan, the present chief of that order, described upon the title-page as "Father General of the company of Jesus," and a preface by Dr, now Cardinal, Wiseman.[1] From this very title-page we learn that the leading Papists in this country at the present hour are far from being ashamed of that infamous order which even a pope once found it necessary to suppress, and whose name has justly been made a byeword all over the earth for unscrupulous falsehood and crime.

In examining this volume it is impossible not to be struck with the apparent earnestness of the author in that which he is about. And this certainly corresponds with all that history records of Ignatius Loyola, who, fearfully mistaken as he was in his religion, is not to be classed amongst the mere shallow hypocrites who make it all a cloak for their schemes of personal aggrandizement or sensual pleasure. Loyola was one of the ascetic class of Romanists; he practised the austerities which he recommends, and was familiar with the spiritual exercises of which he drew out so methodical and exact a scheme for others. But these considerations only render the evidence which the book affords the more important for our present purpose.

The first thing that occurs to our observation, with reference to that part of the subject now more particularly before us, is where Cardinal Wiseman in his preface sets forth his admiration of the book. His are no ordinary commendations, and no ordinary reasons are assigned for them. He speaks of the wonderful effects which these Spiritual Exercises have produced, not, indeed, as a volume to be merely perused, but as a directory for the exercises in which a Christian man is to engage—"of the innumerable conversions which they have wrought, of the *spiritual perfection* to which they have led,"—"of the sublimest moral lessons of the gospel, self-denial, renunciation of the world, perpetual continency, and blind obedience, taught as simple

[1] London, 1847.

virtues attainable to any Christian."[1] But the most wonderful thing is the certainty which attends the use of these exercises as means for this end. "A man is presumed," says Cardinal Wiseman, "to enter into the course of spiritual exercises in the defilement of sin, under the bondage of every passion, wedded to every worldly and selfish affection, without a method or rule of life; and to come out from them restored to virtue, full of generous and noble thoughts, self-conquering and self-ruling, but not self-trusting, on the arduous path of Christian life. Black and unwholesome as the muddy water that is poured into the filter were his affections and his soul; bright, sweet, and healthful as the stream that issues from it, they come forth. He was as dross when cast into the furnace, and is pure gold when drawn from it."[2]—"It contains the entire practice of perfection, by making us at once conquer sin, and acquire the highest virtue."[3] Nothing less is spoken of than *perfect virtue*,[4] and we are told that as the first step to its attainment, "the soul is made to convince itself of the true end of its being."[5] The character of this perfect virtue is not without interest for us, although at present we may not dwell upon it—its self-denial and renunciation of the world, so different from what the student of the Bible learns to admire and practise—its still sublimer elements of perpetual continency and blind obedience. But we may be allowed to wonder that, possessing a machine like this of the spiritual exercises, so certainly efficacious in delivering from all defilement of sin and bondage of passion, the members of the Church of Rome should still cause such frequent employment to our policemen, magistrates, and all the functionaries of the law.

The point, however, to which our attention ought now most particularly to be turned, is the certainty with which these spiritual exercises are said to produce their result. Unquestionably, when we examine them, and consider their nature and the awful power put into the hands of the priest, who is to act as *director* to the man who undergoes the exercises in his *retreat*, we cannot

[1] Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius Loyola, Preface, xii.
[2] Ibid., xiii. [3] Ibid., xiv. [4] Ibid., xiv. [5] Ibid., xiv., xv.

but admit that we have before us an engine well adapted for the accomplishment of its purpose—for most thoroughly enslaving the soul, and bringing it, with all its feelings and all its powers, into that blind obedience which is represented as the sublimest attainment of virtue, into that frame in which the man will be ready, not only to say that black is white, upon the Church's authority, as St Ignatius counsels, but to persuade himself that it is so.[1]

But viewing it in reference to its pretended character, as the means of attaining to the highest virtue, what are we to think of this *certainty of result*,[2] ascribed to any work of human authorship, or instrument of human invention? It would seem as if there was something which Jesus Christ left undone, and which it was reserved for St Ignatius to do. Neither Papist nor Protestant ever ascribed any such certainty of result to the reading of the Bible, or the use of any of the means of grace there prescribed by God. However, it is only at the end, when we are told that *grace at length wins the very citadel of the passions*,[3] or from some incidental and complimentary reference to grace, as we pass along, that we discover that grace has anything at all to do with the matter. The whole process seems to depend upon the *director* of the exercises, and upon the spiritual exercises themselves. The medicine is infallible, at least in the hands of a proper *director*, like some of the quack pills extolled in the advertising columns of newspapers. There is no word of the Holy Spirit, or of any work wrought by him; and, in truth, dependence upon Christ is just as little taught. It is a scheme of salvation without Christ. Without Him, and without His spirit, the soul is brought to a hatred and abandonment of sin, and to the love and attainment of virtue, or of what is called virtue. After *the soul has been*

[1] "Finally, that we may be altogether of the same mind, and in conformity with the Church herself, if she shall have defined anything to be black which to our eyes appears to be white, we ought in like manner pronounce it to be black." Spiritual Exercises, 180. See the Rev. Hobart Seymour's account of the Jesuits of Rome, in his work entitled *Mornings with the Jesuits*. [2] Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius Loyola, Preface, xxi.
[3] Ibid., Preface, xxii.

made to convince itself deeply of the true end of its being, as already mentioned, "considerations of the punishment of sin, which lead us gradually to an abhorrence of it, in itself, make the sinner sift and thoroughly unburden the conscience," and so "sin is abandoned, hated, loathed."[1] Thus "the past is remedied; but what is to be done for the future?"[2] Cardinal Wiseman himself answers the question in his analysis of the exercises which he so much esteems. "A rule to guide us, an example to encourage us, high motives to animate us, are now wanting, and the three following weeks secure us these."[3]

Yes, there is much of Christ,—much mention of his passion, many a meditation on the "*mysteries*" of his life and death. But it is Christ always as our model,—Christ exalted to heaven that we may follow him thither. We are to "become familiar with his virtues, enamoured of his perfections," and so on.[4] "Having desired and tried to be like Christ in action," we are next to be "brought to wish and endeavour to be like unto him in suffering. *For this purpose his sacred passion becomes the engrossing subject of the exercises.*"[5] We are to suffer, that we may acquire merit by our sufferings: but the soul is not directed to the merit of the sufferings of Christ. There are, indeed, in the course of the spiritual exercises, one or two expressions by which we may learn that St Ignatius had not quite forgotten that Christ died for our sins; but nothing more than the merest allusion. The subject is never dwelt upon, even when the particulars of Christ's sufferings are urged upon the most attentive consideration. The purpose, as Cardinal Wiseman himself informs us, is entirely different. And so the transformation from the utmost vice to the most perfect virtue is accomplished without any apparent aid from the merits of that obedience, both active and passive, of which Jesus exclaimed, "It is finished." It is *not* by receiving of his fulness and grace for grace, that the soul is *thoroughly reformed, and brought from sin to steady virtue*.[6]

[1] Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius Loyola, Preface, xv.
[2] Ibid., xvi. [3] Ibid., xvi. [4] Ibid., xvi. [5] Ibid., xvii.
[6] Ibid., xxiv.

Cardinal Wiseman's analysis gives a faithful enough view of the nature and purport of these Spiritual Exercises, which bear, moreover, the highest stamp of approbation from the Court of Rome, and exhibit to us the opinions and manner of thinking of one of the most remarkable men, who, in recent times, have promoted the Papal interest, and whom the Roman Church has been able to add to the number of her canonized saints. As opportunity afterwards occurs, reference may be made to the idolatry which appears in the book, its unscriptural morality, and its singular adaptation to the purposes of priestcraft. At present our attention must be limited to what bears upon the way of attaining the favour of God and securing a place of exalted glory in heaven. Here it may be proper again to notice the fact, that, in a few sentences and expressions, the necessity of the pardon of sin is acknowledged, and also the doctrine that Jesus died for our sins,—but these doctrines are not dwelt upon, nor even exhibited in their connection with one another. On the other hand, there is much of human merit. We do not read far till we find it asserted that "a work done by vow is *more meritorious* than one done without a vow," the works in question being particularly those to which men bind themselves in vows of obedience, chastity, and poverty.[1] By and bye we are informed, that if a man seeking spiritual fruit "migrate from his former habitation into some more secret house or cell," then, "by the exclusion of his friends and acquaintance, and of affairs less well ordered for the service of God, *he attains before God no small merit.*"[2] Then come the two ways of extracting merit from evil thoughts already alluded to; the resistance of the evil suggestion being held meritorious,—but, of course, its existence, unless it be harboured and indulged, not being held to infer any guilt.[3] It is less wonderful to be told of merit acquired by well ordered speech,[4] or by sorrow for sins,[5]—which may not unfairly be held as explaining the injunction to pray for pardon of our sins, and explaining it in such a way as to

[1] Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius Loyola, 8. [2] Ibid., 13, 14.
[3] Ibid., 20. [4] Ibid., 23. [5] Ibid., 26.

make the pardon proceed upon another ground than that of the sacrifice made by Christ. But it must be admitted, as in admirable harmony with all this, that one great object of the first part of the spiritual exercises appears to be, to bring the soul to a deep sorrow for sin, and even to work up the feelings to the experience of great distress. St Ignatius is most anxious that his pupil shall attain to intense grief for sins, and that this shall be accompanied with *abundant weeping*.[1] Wherefore there is not only a "contemplation concerning hell;" but, in order the more powerfully to act upon the feelings through the imagination, the person is taught how to form for himself a place or imaginary scene in which he is to suppose himself as engaging in his contemplation or performing his spiritual exercise, a method adopted also with regard to all the exercises, and often to the most grievous unspiritualizing of religion; and in this case he "is to set before the eyes of the imagination the length, breadth, and depth of hell,"[2] a difficult enough thing, it might seem. He is to ask "for an intimate perception of the punishments which the damned undergo,"—"to see, by the imagination, the vast fires,"—to hear "the howlings," to become personally conversant with "the tears, the rottenness, and the worm of

[1] Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius Loyola, 31.
[2] Ibid., 36, 37.

That the reader may see how the imagination is systematically wrought upon, and the feelings by its means, let him consider the following instructions in "The First Exercise," to which he probably never met with anything equal before.

"The first prelude is a certain way of constructing the place [or scene]; for which it must be noted that, in every meditation or contemplation about a bodily thing, as, for example, about Christ, we must form, according to a certain imaginary vision, a bodily place representing what we contemplate; as the temple, or a mountain, in which we may find Christ Jesus, or the Virgin Mary, and the other things which concern the subject of our contemplation.——But if the subject of meditation be an incorporeal thing, as is the consideration of sins now offered, the construction of the place may be such as if, by imagination, we see our soul in this corruptible body, as confined in a prison; and man himself, in this vale of misery, an exile among brute animals."—Ibid. 27, 28.

conscience." The smoke and stench are not to be omitted. The man is to heap horrors upon horrors; and the better to assist him in this whole process, he is to "avoid those thoughts which bring joy, as that of the glorious resurrection of Christ: the very windows are to be shut for exclusion of light; food is to be diminished, and the flesh to be harassed by hair-cloth, ropes, or iron bars, or the application of strokes and blows, or the use of other austerities."[1] A hideous representation of religion certainly: a religious process, however, so opposed to the Gospel of Christ, that the very sound of the Gospel must be carefully kept away from the wretch who is subjected to it,—a process which would be marred if the doctrine of Christ's resurrection were introduced, or the invitation were called to mind, "Come unto me all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest."

It is needless to go farther. Nothing can be more obvious than that this is a way of attaining salvation quite inconsistent with salvation by Jesus Christ, or with the doctrine of pardon and acceptance, free and full, upon the ground of what he has done and suffered. When we advance to the contemplation of the sufferings of Christ, it is only that we may be affected with the love of suffering, and may be moved to imitate a misapprehended example; and we are to ask for "grief, mourning, anxiety, and the other inward pains of that kind, that we may suffer together with Christ suffering for us."[2] We are to "draw *sorrows and pains*" from our meditations on the passion of Christ,[3]—everything being framed on the supposition of our acquiring merit by our performances, and especially by our sufferings. It is strange that with a Trinitarian doctrine as to the persons of the Godhead, there should be combined a developement of religion so essentially based upon the distinctive doctrine of Socinianism. It is another of the inconsistencies of the Church of Rome.

[1] Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius Loyola, 41-43.
[2] Ibid., 86. [3] Ibid., 87.

But perhaps it would scarcely be right to conclude, without informing the reader of a method of prayer,—new, it may well be believed, to all who have not studied in, or at least visited, the school of Rome; and which, if not of use for the acquiring of merit, cannot easily be conceived to have any other recommendation. It consists in pronouncing the words of the Lord's prayer or of some other prayer, pausing after every word to think of its meaning, or for other spiritual considerations. And St Ignatius calls this *going through* the prayer with an "interval of respirations," and speaks quite complacently of "interstices of breathings and words," [1]—the perfection of contemptible mummery! Yet this St Ignatius Loyola was unquestionably a man of more than ordinary talent; and this very book of his Spiritual Exercises contains plain indications of shrewdness and intellectual ability. But the demon of Popish superstition having taken possession even of a noble mind, will degrade it to the vilest crawling in the dust.

It may probably be found interesting to compare with what we have just seen to be the use made of the passion of Christ, in the Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius Loyola, the following remarkable passage of a recent article in the Dublin Review :—

"The very essence of modern Protestantism is to treat this greatest act ['the final act of redemption'] as a mere abstraction. The mind is concentrated on the sole apprehension of an accomplished atonement, and its instrumentality by death. By a process eminently selfish, the price and its purchase are transferred to the individual soul, appropriated by it, and are viewed extraneously to Him whose they really are. There is no contemplation in the Protestant view,—it is one of mere self-application."

Then follows a parable for illustration, of a father who has two sons, spendthrifts: he pays all their debts: one of them is "grateful, indeed, but cold and calculating," "eagerly waiting for the last coin to be told, and then exultingly cries out, 'I am free,' and goes his way;"—the other "watches with intensest gaze every particle of the precious offering, because he

[1] Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius Loyola, 107, 108.

knows what it has cost his father to procure it," and almost loses all sense of his own liberation, in the anguish inflicted by its price."

"He thinks not of himself, for love is not selfish. He goes not away singing, 'I am ransomed, I am free;' but he rushes to his father's feet, exclaiming, 'Thou has purchased me, I am thine.'

"Such we believe to be the true difference between the Protestant and the Catholic modes of looking at our Saviour's passion. The one looks at it with an acquisitive eye, the other with the eye of love. To the Protestant it would have been the same, if the simple act of death had been recorded, and its preliminary and accompanying sufferings had been suppressed. Not one emotion would have been lost to him, any more than, in his system, any advantage. What does the cruel agony in Gethsemane give him? It does not redeem him. What does he gain by the welts and gashes of the Roman scourges? They do not ransom him. What profits him the mock coronation, and its insulting homage? It does not save him. And, then, what can Mary and John do for him at the cross's foot? He declares he does not care for them. What matters it to him, if the seamless garment be diced for or rent? It bears no mystery of faith to him. No; only let him secure that moment when the last breath passes over the victim's lips, and it is enough,—for it is the atonement." [1]

This is eloquent pleading; and with admirable adroitness the advocate of Popery here represents it as in accord, and exclusively so, with all generous sentiments. But to accomplish this, he keeps out of view its really most distinctive features. The "anguish inflicted" on the soul which contemplates the passion of Jesus is merely, according to this representation, the effect of holy and tender feeling. Nay, that passion of the Saviour is spoken of as the *price* of the man's liberation: and against the Protestant doctrine on this subject no objection is brought, for another method was to be adopted of prejudicing the mind against Protestantism in all its parts. But are we to forget the saints whom we have seen in love with sufferings, and torturing themselves for their own salvation and the salvation of others? Are we to forget the great anxiety shewn by St Ignatius Loyola to deepen, even by external appliances and accompaniments, the spiritual gloom and anguish, in order to the production of

[1] Dublin Review, December 1851. (Article entitled "The Actions of the New Testament.")

which the Papist, in his *Retreat*, is required to meditate upon the passion of Christ? When we turn to this view of the subject, we find Popery not so well in accord with the most exalted and generous feelings, and the two representations of Popery not quite to agree with one another. But there is one respect in which they perfectly agree. Whatever profession may be made of esteeming Christ's passion as the price of man's liberation, it is not this which is prominently presented to engage the attention of the soul. No; to dwell upon this great truth would be to incur the reproach of selfishness. All the ingenious pleading of the Dublin Review may therefore be regarded as a sort of apology for those Popish books, or a vindication of them, which set aside, as we have seen, the doctrine of the Atonement. It is not my present purpose to defend Protestantism from such charges as are here brought against it: but the reader must have noted with amazement the unscrupulous falsehood of the representation which is given of it,—a falsehood, without which it could not be represented as in opposition to those generous sentiments, the exclusive property of which is claimed for the religion of Rome. From the falsehood of the representation of the one religion, we may infer the equal falsehood of that which is given of the other. But he is little acquainted with the writings of Protestant authors, and knows little of the sermons which are preached from Protestant pulpits, to whom Protestantism can appear a cold abstraction, indifferent to the agonies of Gethsemane and of Calvary. The writer in the Dublin Review takes care not to adduce any proof that the Protestant theology is opposed to the redeemed sinner's *rushing to his father's feet, exclaiming*, "*Thou hast purchased me, I am thine.*" Of course he ought to have done so, and likewise to have shewn how this is possible for one who does not at the same time sing, "I am ransomed, I am free." But, perhaps, he meant it to be understood that Protestant freedom was a freedom from all obligation to serve God: and probably his words have been so understood by his Popish readers in general. It was only to superadd one falsehood to another, but a falsehood more common; and by the incessant repetition of which, even Papists, who might be thought too well-informed to believe it, perhaps succeed in persuading one another of its truth. This, however, need not engage us any further at present. We may leave Papists to discover from the proper sources—if they care to know—what Protestants really think of all the sufferings of Jesus Christ, and what are their feelings towards him by whose stripes we are healed. Meanwhile, it is important for us to learn, from so good authority, what light account our Popish countrymen are taught to make of the accomplishment of redemption, when Jesus exclaimed in triumph, "It is finished," and bowed his head, and gave up the ghost."

Thus have I endeavoured to bring together, from various sources, evidence that the Popish system, as Popery is taught and practised in this country, and at the present day, is a system of salvation by works. It remains only to consider the mode in which texts of Scripture are dealt with, to make them seem favourable, or, at least, not unfavourable to the Popish doctrine.

It is to be observed, however, that it is all that Papists aim at, to get these texts of Scripture to speak according to the doctrine avowed in their controversial books, systems of theology, and Trent decrees,—disregarding, nay, carefully keeping out of sight the grosser appearance which it has in Lives of Saints, in books of devotion, or in the practices of Italian shrines and Irish stations,—thereby placing their opponents at a disadvantage, by calling them to contend against a religion rather theoretical and ideal than actually existent anywhere in the world. But reserving our right to consider their errors also in all the developement of their practice, we need not shrink from meeting them in argument even upon the ground which they choose.

The limits of the present chapter, already too far extended, preclude anything more than a brief notice of a very few of the attempts made in the most popular Popish books already men-

tioned, to adduce or set aside Scripture arguments. Many portions of the evidence bearing upon the subject of this chapter have necessarily been omitted, and many ramifications of error connected with it have been passed over without observation. The same kind of necessity still continues to be strongly felt.

Turning first, and as almost enough for the present purpose, to Keenan's Controversial Catechism, and to the chapter on justification, we find there three or four texts of Scripture quoted together to prove *that faith alone is not sufficient to justify a sinner*, and *that there are other necessary conditions, without the sinner's compliance with which God will not receive him in grace.* These texts Mr Keenan gives as follows:—"'And when thou shalt seek there the Lord thy God, thou shalt find him; yet so, if thou seek him with all thy heart, and all the affliction of thy soul.' (Deut. iv., 29.) 'But if the wicked man do penance for all his sins which he hath committed, and keep all my commandments, and do judgment and justice, living, he shall live, and shall not die.' (Exod. xviii., 21.) '*If you keep my commandment*, you shall abide in *my love*. . . . . You are *my friends*, if you do the things that I command you.' (John xv., 10, 14.)"[1] Of the first of these texts (Deut. iv., 29), it seems enough to observe, without calling in question the correctness of the translation given by Mr Keenan,[2] that it has no evident reference to what Papists call the *first justification*, and that it is only conclusive against justification *by a faith which is alone*, and not against justification *by faith alone*. Mr Keenan might as well have quoted any text which enjoins earnest prayer. In like manner the extracts from the fifteenth chapter of John's Gospel are ridiculously adduced as bearing upon the subject he has in hand—the reception of the sinner *in grace*, as the Popish phrase is—and are only conclusive against those who deny the necessity of good works on the part of justified men. The texts would have been in point had Mr Keenan's object

[1] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xvii., sect. 1.
[2] From the Douay Bible.

been to prove the incompatibility of living in sin with a state of grace and the enjoyment of the fellowship of Christ, but are not in point to prove that good *dispositions* are required, besides faith, *in order to the reception of justifying grace*, and that faith alone is not sufficient to justify. Again, the texts are conclusive against that faith which is alone, which the Apostle James so strongly condemns; but on the proposition that faith alone justifies they have no bearing whatever.

The other text quoted (Ezek. xviii., 21) demands a little more attention. It brings before us an important difference, frequently recurring, betwixt the Popish and Protestant versions of the Scriptures. "If the wicked WILL TURN FROM all his sins that he has committed," our version has it. "If the wicked man DO PENANCE FOR all his sins which he hath committed," it is in the Douay Bible. In this and the many texts, both of the Old Testament and the New, in which the same expressions are found, it is evident that one or other of the parties must be guilty of perverting the Word of God to make it speak in favour of their own doctrine; and all other considerations apart, it might be argued from the testimony of history, and from the views of morality presented in Popish books, that this was more likely to be done by the translators of the Church of Rome than by those to whom we are indebted for our Protestant versions.[1] Setting aside this question, it may still be conceded that the text quoted by Mr Keenan is not so obviously and utterly foreign to his purpose as the other texts with which it is conjoined. But it will not sustain the weight of his argument, nor would the admission of his DO PENANCE make it bear directly upon the point in reference to which he adduces it,—however it might then favour the Popish doctrine of satisfaction, and so, indirectly, all the Popish doctrines concerning justification. To the arguments

[1] The reader will find the frequent *veniality* of lying asserted in passages quoted from Popish authors in next chapter, On Purgatory. He is also referred to the chapter on Morality. But let him consult Pascal's Provincial Letters.

from this text it is a sufficient reply, that it only sets forth *the necessity of good works*, and not *their necessity in order to justification*. Let the reader turn to the passage of Scripture from which the text is taken, and he will perceive that unless we take this view of it, or suppose it merely to assert the righteousness which is by the law, in order that our souls may be convinced of their impotency to attain righteousness in this way, and so, driven in the utter hopelessness of such endeavours, to take refuge and seek righteousness in Christ,—the conclusion is inevitable, that it sets forth a righteousness and justification without Christ altogether; of which any one may judge for himself whether it accords with the tenor of Scripture. But it is to this, and not to what he infers, that Mr Keenan's mode of interpreting the text inevitably conducts. And further, it is worthy to be observed, that whereas he only speaks of good *dispositions*, required of God as necessary conditions in order to justification, this text, and the texts adduced from John xv., speak of good *works*,—the keeping of all the commandments,—the doing of judgment and justice. So that where the Popish controversialist was careful to put such a face upon his doctrine, that it should not seem to make good *works*, but only good dispositions of the heart go before justification, or the reception *in grace*, he betrays himself in the next breath, and without ever seeming to observe it.

As to the translation DO PENANCE, the discussion of it might be extended to fill a volume,—and, indeed, much has been written upon it, though chiefly with reference to the μετανοεω of the Greek New Testament, and its corresponding noun μετανοια. With what propriety these words are translated in the Popish way, may be inferred from their employment in the Septuagint, when God himself is said to repent,[1] or from such a text as 2 Cor. vii., 10, "Godly sorrow worketh repentance [μετανοιαν] to salvation not to be repented of," where, though the Rhemish

[1] See Fulke, Defence of the English Translations of the Bible, (Parker Soc.), 443.

Testament has *penance*, yet the very absurdity is sufficient refutation. In like manner, many texts may be adduced where the absurdity is flagrant; as, for example, Acts xxvi., 20, where Paul is made to say, concerning what ensued upon his own conversion—"To them first that are at Damascus, and at Jerusalem, and unto all the country of Judea, and to the Gentiles, did I preach that they should do penance, and turn to God, doing works worthy of penance,"[1]—the doing of penance being thus put first of all, as the thing to which unbelieving Jews and Heathen were exhorted by the apostle, even before turning to God, and brought in again in the end as the great distinction betwixt converts and obstinate unbelievers; whereas the μετανοεῖν of the apostle was evidently employed to denote the inward change of the soul,[2] and the επιστρεφειν επι τον Θεον, the change of course and conduct following upon it, well rendered in our version, " . . . . . that they should REPENT and TURN TO GOD." And if, unheeding of its absurdity, we were to admit the Popish translation in Luke xiii., 3, "Unless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise perish,"[3] what consequences would ensue in respect of doctrine? Truly penance is exalted to a high place; and there must be an end for ever of any justification but that which results from men's own exertions, and an end of salvation by grace.

But looking again to the text in the Old Testament, in reference to which this inquiry began, we find that the word in the original Hebrew is one of very frequent occurrence, and whose signification it is not difficult to ascertain. It is the verb שוב, to turn or return,—a verb employed with regard to the most ordinary things, as well as with regard to the turning of a sinner to God. With what audacity is it translated DO PENANCE! Nay, in this very chapter of Ezekiel we find it in the seventeenth

[1] Rhemish Translation.
[2] According to the derivation of the word, from μετα, which implies *change*, and νους, the mind.
[3] Rhemish Testament.

verse, where our translation has—"That hath taken off his hand from the poor," and *the Douay Bible*, (with more verbal exactness, though precisely the same meaning,) has—"That hath TURNED AWAY his hand;" and in the twenty-fourth verse it is again employed, but now with reference to the righteous turning from his righteousness,—as in the twenty-first verse (Mr Keenan's proof text,) it was employed of the sinner turning from his wickedness. The scope of the passage evidently demands that the same mode of translation shall be adopted in both places, but the Popish translators, impudently making it DO PENANCE in the one place, are driven to render it by TURN in the other place,—"But if the just man turn himself away from his justice, and do iniquity."[1]—It does not seem necessary to prosecute this discussion farther.

Returning to Mr Keenan, we find in his Catechism, immediately after that which has just engaged our attention, the question, "Does not the Baptist say, John iii., 36:—'He that believeth in the Son hath life everlasting?'" with the following answer:—"Yes, but St John speaks here of efficacious faith; that is, he who believeth in the Son, so as to believe all that he teaches, and practice all that he commands, shall have everlasting life."[2] Here is a gloss indeed! And the effect of the Popish view of faith, which makes it to be not trust in a person but mere belief of revelation, very plainly appears in this asserting of an amount of belief as necessary for salvation, which would exclude all men from the very possibility of it, unless some limitation may be introduced, by way of allowance for human weakness, or at least for imperfect knowledge of our Saviour's teaching.[3] But not only does Mr Keenan make salvation depend upon our believing *all* that our Saviour teaches, but upon our

[1] Douay Bible. [2] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xvii., sec. 1.
[3] Chemnitzius very well says, "Faith, in giving its assent to the whole word of God, looks to the scope and end of Scripture, that is, Christ in the office of Mediator."—Chemnitzii Examen Concilii Tridentini, (fol., Frankfort, 1609,) 160, *a*.

practising *all* that he commands. Who then shall be saved? This were certainly an *efficacious* faith, which Mr Keenan describes. But it is in fact a mere interpolation which he makes, under pretence of interpreting the words of the Baptist. Do we then hold that a man will be saved although he be utterly regardless of the commands of Christ? By no means, nor even if he wilfully set aside any of them; because we deem this incompatible with true believing. We know the efficacy of a right faith, which worketh by love, but yet is quite a different thing from the love by which it worketh,[1]—that it inclines the soul to the keeping of all the commandments of Christ, making them all to be loved because they are his, and because of their own inherent excellency, in which they are seen to be worthy of him, and felt to be suitable to those new dispositions which characterise the soul of the believing disciple. There is no such thing as a true faith unproductive of good works, and Moehler, like his brethren, utterly mis-states the Protestant doctrine, as to justifying faith, when he puts it in this form: "The seed is sown for heaven, and brings us thither, even when, under unfavourable circumstances, as for instance, the sluggishness of the will, and the like, it bears absolutely no fruit."[2] In short, whilst we assert that *faith alone* justifies, we deny that that faith justifies *which is alone*, or in other words, which "bears absolutely no fruit." And this is the key to the solution of all difficulty in respect of many other texts which Popish writers adduce; as where Mr Keenan tries to do away the force of the evidence from Romans v. 1, by setting over against it 1 Cor. xiii., 1, 2.[3]

It is likewise of great importance, and will suffice for the refutation of many of their arguments, to observe, that there are different kinds of faith, of which only one kind is saving; and that the term *believe* is used in different senses in Scripture. For Papists make continual use of those passages which speak

[1] See 1 Cor. xiii. [2] Moehler, Symbolism, I., 215.
[3] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xvii., sec. 1.

of men as *believing*, who yet cannot be regarded as in a state of salvation, in order to disparage faith and to prepare the way for exalting works into its place in the matter of justification.[1] Into this branch of the subject, however, want of space compels me to refrain from attempting to enter.

We come next to the ordinary Popish evasion of the texts which set aside the *works of the law* in respect of justification. The following are Mr Keenan's question and answer:—"Does St Paul, (Rom. iii., 28), say, 'We account a man to be justified by faith without the works of the law?' True; but St Paul is speaking here of the *Jewish* not of the Christian law, for St Paul cannot contradict St James. Now, St James says, in words about which there can be no dispute, (ii., 22, 24), 'Seest thou that faith did co-operate with his works, and by works faith was made perfect? . . . . do you see, that by works a man is justified, and not by faith only?' and (ver. 26,) he adds, 'For even as the body without the spirit is dead, so also faith without works is dead.'"[2]

Leaving the statements of the Apostle James to be afterwards considered, and merely adverting to the absurdity of the mode of argument here practised, where an assumed meaning of one passage of Scripture is made to determine (without further investigation) the sense of another, let us proceed to inquire whether the above quoted words of Paul will bear the interpretation which Mr Keenan and other Papists give of them. It is very evident, that whatever law the Apostle speaks of in these words, it must be the same law which he has already been speaking of in the passage from which they are taken. There is certainly nothing in the words themselves to limit their reference to the Jewish law, or to any law in particular. And, indeed, in a previous verse of the same chapter, we find the Apostle apparently using the same word both in a restricted and in an unrestricted sense: "But now the righteousness of God without the law is

[1] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xvii., sec. 1.
[2] Ibid.

manifested, [*χωρὶς νόμου, without law,*] being witnessed *by the law* [*ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου,*] and the prophets;"[1] the Greek article being employed in the latter instance, where the Jewish law or revelation is intended, but omitted in the former, as also in the verse now more particularly under consideration,[2] and generally throughout the whole of this passage; the Apostle thus giving the greatest possible latitude to his assertions, and excluding from the matter of justification all works of any law that ever was given by God to any of the human race. And this agrees with the conclusion, to which we are necessarily brought by an examination of the passage, apart from all mere verbal criticism. For the general scope of the passage is very plain, the opposition of justification by faith to justification by works; and the illustration derived from the case of Abraham in the following chapter, and the Apostle's reasoning upon it, are entirely opposed to the notion that works of any kind can contribute to the justification of those to whom righteousness is imputed as it was to Abraham,[3] besides being obviously fatal to the opinion that the law whose works are set aside is the *Jewish* law, which, in whatever sense the term may be used, had certainly no existence in the days of Abraham. Moreover, when we look back to what precedes, we find the law of which the Apostle speaks and reasons, to be a law *by which is the knowledge of sin*,[4] which certainly cannot be the ceremonial nor the civil law of the Jews: we find that it is a law transgressed in the commission of theft, adultery, sacrilege and idolatry,[5] which certainly can be no other than that moral law, written on the hearts of our first parents in Paradise, and afterwards solemnly delivered from Mount Sinai, of which it was a great and peculiar privilege of the Jews to enjoy this perfect revelation, but which never had been, and never could be abolished, being unchangeable as the attributes of God. By this law the Gentiles therefore were bound, as well as the Jews, and we find the Apostle speaking of the Gentiles,

[1] Rom. iii. 21. [2] *χωρὶς ἔργων νόμου.* Rom. ii. 21, 22. [3] Rom. iv. 23-25.
[4] Rom. iii. 20.

equally with the Jews, as under the curse and guilty before God.[1] "We have before proved both Jews and Gentiles, that they are all under sin."[2] "Therefore by the deeds of the law [of law] there shall no flesh be justified in his sight."[3] And it has well been asked, "Why should Paul affirm that they [the Gentiles] could not be justified by a law which was never obligatory upon them?"[4] Or if we go forward in our examination of the Epistle, we find the Apostle declaring that the law of which he speaks, is a law which is not made void but established by faith,[5]—a law whose righteousness is to be fulfilled in us,[6]—a law, the doing of which is the rule of righteousness and of life;[7] all which is wholly foreign to the idea of the Jewish law, as by that term is intended anything peculiarly Jewish, or anything else than that moral law of universal and perpetual obligation, of which the sum is contained in the ten commandments.[8]

But Popish evasions are not soon at an end. Expedient after expedient is found, to avoid an obvious conclusion. We are told that "unless our works spring from the grace of Jesus, they avail nothing to salvation;"[9] and so, that those works are set aside by the Apostle Paul, under the name of works of the law, which are done without faith, and through natural power alone;[10] and that to these he opposes, as the very ground of justification, "faith in the Redeemer, and the good works emanating from its power."[11] Yet nothing can be plainer, than that by *works of the law*, the Apostle means those very works which the law commands; and the law commands not mere outward works, but works proceeding from faith and the love of God.[12] But, says Moehler, "*the works of the law*, ἔργα τοῦ νόμου, St Paul accurately distinguishes everywhere from *good works*, ἔργα ἀγαθὰ, καλά; as indeed in their inmost essence they are to be dis-

[1] Rom. iii. 19. [2] Rom. iii. 9. [3] Rom. iii. 20.
[4] Hodge on Romans, *in loco*. [5] Rom. iii. 31. [6] Rom. viii. 4.
[7] Rom. x. 5. [8] Owen on Justification, ch. xiv.
[9] Keenan, Catechism of the Christian Religion, II., 6.
[10] Moehler, Symbolism, I., 240. [11] Ibid.
[12] Davenant de Just., c. xxvi.

tinguished from one another: for the former are wrought without faith in Christ, and without his grace; the latter with the grace, and in the spirit of Christ. Hence" (he adds,) "St Paul never says that man is saved not through *good* works, but through faith in Christ! This marvellous opposition is a pure invention of the sixteenth century."[1] We must bear in mind, what the language of the Popish controversialist seems always purposely framed to make us forget, that the *opposition* is not between good works and faith in respect of salvation absolutely, as if good works were pronounced useless,—but between good works and faith in respect of justification solely. And this will be found agreeable to the language of the Apostle Paul, who is erroneously alleged to distinguish between *good works*, and *works of the law*, but who uses the latter phrase, rather than the former, when he treats of justification, for the very obvious reason of the connection which the law has with his subject; it being impossible to consider good works otherwise in reference to justification, than as they are or are alleged to be the fulfilling of the law. It is something worse than a mere arbitrary demand, therefore, which is made when we are asked to point out any place where the Apostle uses this exact expression, *good works*, opposing works to faith in the matter of justification. More reasonably may we demand that our adversaries should shew us a passage in which the Apostle unites *good works* with faith, as contributing to justification. But if the Apostle does not use this expression, he uses what may even be reckoned a stronger one, when he sets aside *works of righteousness*,[2] in order to assert God's mercy in saving us, and our justification by grace. In like manner, in the Epistle to the Ephesians,[3] when he speaks of "good works, which God hath before ordained, that we should walk in them," he speaks of salvation as a state into which we have already entered through the mere grace of God,

[1] Moehler, Symbolism, I., 240.
[2] Tit. iii. 5.—"Works of justice." *Rhemish Transl.*
[3] Eph. ii. 8-10.

before these good works begin to be wrought, to which as his workmanship, we are created in Christ Jesus; and this salvation antecedent to the doing of any good works, he connects with that faith which is the gift of God.

It is important also to observe that the Jews understood by the *law* that entire rule of obedience which was given them at Mount Sinai, including all the commandments, statutes and ordinances of God, so that moral good works in the highest sense, must have been included under the phrase, *works of the law*, in the sense in which its terms were familiar to the Apostle and to those of his time:[1] and so we find the term law used in the cxix. Psalm, and elsewhere throughout the Old Testament; for example, in that notable place which the Apostle also quotes in his Epistle to the Galatians, "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them,"[2] a text which effectually cuts of all reasonable hope of acceptance with God on the ground of any works done by us, and leaves no other ground for us to rest upon than the finished work of him who "hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us,"[3] and for whose righteousness' sake God is well pleased.[4]

Protestant writers on this subject have generally made much use of the fourth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, and of the illustrative case of Abraham there adduced by Paul, which Popish writers find it convenient as much as possible to avoid. This argument is very succintly and clearly stated by Zanchius. "In the fourth chapter of Romans," says this reformer, "by the example of Abraham he confirms the doctrine that men are justified and saved by the mere free grace of God; . . . . . all obedience of ours and renewal of our souls being excluded from the matter of justification. For when he denies that Abraham was justified by works, what works, I would fain be told, does he exclude from justification? Evil works? But who has ever contended that a man can be justified by evil works?

[1] Owen on Justification, chap. xiv. [2] Deut. xxvii. 26; Gal. iii. 10.
[3] Gal. iii. 13. [4] Is. xlii. 21.

Indifferent works? But neither was there ever any dispute concerning these. Therefore he excludes good works. But what good works? Good works which he had? or good works which he had not? Does he mean good works which he had not, that the sense may be, Abraham was not justified by good works because he had no good works? But this is not the sense of the Apostle, and nothing to his purpose. For the scope of the Apostle was to demonstrate, that not even Abraham, although a most holy and faithful servant of God, had anything in himself of which he could ever glory; but that all of which he could glory was without him, and belonged to God, namely, the free grace of God offered in the covenant, and what God had revealed concerning righteousness and salvation to be obtained through Christ. Yea, he grants, that Abraham had many good works of which he could glory before men; but nothing of which he could glory before God, save God himself, and his favour, grace, and love."[1]

We have seen that Mr Keenan takes refuge in the Epistle of James. And this is the chosen stronghold of Popish controversialists in general,—from which it is most necessary that they should be driven. One important preliminary step is the full consideration of those passages in the writings of Paul, the meaning of which they would summarily determine by placing over against them one or two verses from their favourite passage of James,—though the meaning which they derive from these verses is contrary to the plain import of many in Paul's writings and to the main scope of whole chapters and epistles. Proceeding now to the consideration of the passage in James, we also may well take for granted that there can be no contradiction betwixt one passage of Scripture and another; and we may further take for granted, (which it does not suit Papists in dealing with this subject, to advert to,) that it is quite possible we may find the same terms to be used in a different sense from what we

[1] Zanchii Opera, II., 348.

have found them to bear in a different place of Scripture, and as employed in an entirely different argument. Paul discusses the subject of justification, arguing against those who would have their own works recognised in relation to it; James does not discuss the subject of justification, but arguing against those who denied the necessity of good works in the life of faith, he shews the worthlessness of that faith which is alone, whose impotence to save appears in its not producing those fruits of righteousness which pertain to salvation in the present state of being. And, although the reference to justification is merely incidental, it might stagger the proudest Papist, and cause him to suspect some error in his interpretation of his chosen texts, to find the Apostle in that same chapter which contains them, making this declaration, "Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all."[1] Who can hope to be justified by the works of this law? This certainly is the same law which saith, "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them."[2]

There is a substantial agreement amongst evangelical Protestants, as to the interpretation of the concluding part of the second chapter of James. A minute examination of the passage would be foreign to the present purpose, and is precluded by the limits of this work. What Witsius says, is brief, and may here be quoted. "The scope of the Apostle is to show, that it is not sufficient for a Christian to boast of the remission of his sins, which indeed, is obtained by faith only, but then it must be a living faith in Christ: but that besides, he ought to labour after holiness, that, being justified by faith only, that is, acquitted from the sins he had been guilty of, on account of Christ's satisfaction, apprehended by faith, he may likewise be justified by works, that is, declared to be truly regenerated, believing and holy; behaving as becomes those who are regenerated, believing and holy. Thus our father Abraham behaved, who, having

[1] James, ii. 10. [2] Gal. iii. 10.

been before now justified by faith only, that is, obtained the remission of his sins, was afterwards also justified by his works. For when he offered up his son to God, then God said to him. 'Now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, from me.'[1] And James insists upon it, that this latter justification is so necessary to believers, that if it be wanting, the former ought to be accounted only vain and imaginary."[2]

It is well remarked by Owen, that if the intention of the Apostle James, in referring to Abraham, "were to prove that we are justified before God by works, and not by faith, because Abraham was so, the testimony produced is contrary, yea, directly contradictory, unto what should be proved by it; and accordingly is alleged by Paul to prove that Abraham was justified by faith without works, as the words do plainly import."[3] But all is simple and perspicuous enough, if James be regarded as merely declaring what kind of faith has nothing to do with justification before God. Without explanation of this kind, the statements of James and Paul seem contradictory; and Papists do not solve the difficulty—nor can they whilst they perversely hold, in the face of most abundant evidence, that only one kind of faith is spoken of in Scripture, and that—a mere belief of all revelation, or of all the doctrines of the Church.

Another favourite stronghold of Papists is in the frequent promises contained in Scripture of a reward to those who faithfully serve God; as in the text, Matt. v. 12: "Be glad and rejoice, for your reward is very great in heaven."[4] And this, Dr Cunningham says, is "the only plausible thing which Papists have to allege on this subject."[5] But the Scripture itself distinguishes betwixt a reward that is of debt and a reward that

[1] Gen. xxii. 12.
[2] Witsius on the Covenants, Book iii. ch. viii. sec. 25.
[3] Owen on Justification, chap. xx.
[4] Rhemish Transl.—Quoted by Keenan, (Controv. Cat. ch. xvii., sect. 2,) along with Prov. xi. 18; James i. 12; and 2 Tim. iv. 7.
[5] Note to Stillingfleet's Doct. and Pract. of Ch. of Rome, ch. vi.

is of grace. "Now to him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt."[1] And the whole Popish doctrine of the merit of good works is overthrown, if the reward may not be reckoned as of debt,—which view the Apostle expressly sets aside in the case of Abraham. The encouragement which God gives his people in his promises is encouragement to hope in him, and not in themselves: but they are cheered and animated amidst trials by the expectation of a reward of grace, more than sufficient to compensate them for all. Thus Moses "had respect unto the recompense of the reward,"[2] and Christ encourages his persecuted disciples to rejoice, because great is their reward in heaven.[3] But when the Apostle speaks of eternal life, he speaks of it as the free gift of God, [χάρισμα,] and not as when he speaks of death, which he calls the wages of sin, [ὀψώνια,]—where the antithesis of the verse gives strength to the argument which we derive from it. "For the wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord."[4]

The parable of the labourers in the vineyard[5] is sometimes cited by Papists in proof of their doctrine that eternal life is the wages or reward due to good works. But nothing can be imagined less favourable to their cause. For it is scarcely possible to avoid the consideration, that "if this reward, whatsoever it be, were rendered according to merit and according to justice, as a just and deserved reward; then there would have been a due proportion observed between the labour and the reward: so that a greater reward should have been given to the greater labour, and a less to the less."[6] And so obvious is this, and so contrary to the Popish way of viewing the parable, that the Jesuit Maldonat, not one of the least eminent of Popish authors, has recourse to the most contemptible subterfuge that ever controversialist invented, in order to get quit of the difficulty,—supposing, or rather endeavouring to suppose, that they who were called at

[1] Rom. iv. 4. [2] Heb. xi. 26. [3] Matt. v. 12.
[4] Rom. vi. 23. [5] Matt. xx.
[6] Downame on Justification, Book viii., ch. v., sect. 7.

the eleventh hour, and so wrought but one hour, laboured as much as the first, who laboured all the day, and therefore deserved as great a reward as they.[1] It is needless to point out how contrary this is to the whole sense and scope of the parable.

The subject to which this chapter has been devoted might well have occupied the whole volume. It has been brought thus prominently forward and so much attention bestowed on it, as has been already said, because of its importance. But, after all, many parts of it have been but slightly touched upon; and many things have been necessarily omitted. One thing, however, I may with confidence assert, that the Papists have been made to speak for themselves; and the view given of their doctrine and arguments has been given from their own writings. It is a favourite cry of theirs, that they are wronged because of our ignorance of their doctrine.[2] In a Popish tale, to which reference has been already made, and which seems to enjoy a considerable amount of acceptation amongst British Papists, a *liberal* Protestant is made to say, "Ah yes! the Catholics are never allowed to know their own creed; we Protestants always supposing ourselves better acquainted with it, doubtless by supernatural intervention, as we never read or listen to what they have to say for themselves."[3] But we *have* read and listened to what they have to say for themselves. We have also taken the liberty of comparing one thing with another: and if we must abhor their doctrine, we are compelled to no less abhorrence of the method in which they often attempt to disguise it. It is not difficult for them to find portions of their liturgy, free from that gross self-righteousness which we charge against their system and worship as a whole, or to quote unexceptionable verses or even hymns against us as proof that we calumniate them.[4] But what of this, when other things can be found, as we have seen,

[1] Downame on Justification, Book viii. chap. v. sec. 9.
[2] See Keenan, *passim*. [3] Geraldine, a Tale of Conscience, I. 108.
[4] See Geraldine, I. 262-265.

so conclusive? It is easier for us to explain their inconsistency and to point out the origin of it, than for them to justify it. No intelligent Protestant expects to find self-righteousness or idolatry in every separate part of the Popish service. But it is as a whole that it must be judged.

Reference has been made to the fact, that in their more solemn moments, and at the approach of death, even Popish theologians and controversialists have sought their ground of confidence, not in the merits for which they had contended, but in those of Jesus Christ.[1] Cardinal Cajetan is well known to have expressed, in his later years, sentiments on the subject of justification so similar to those of the Reformers, that he attracted by them the very unfavourable regard of his fellow Papists. Owen[2] produces a very remarkable testimony even from Cardinal Bellarmine. It had been well that Bellarmine had never said anything incongruous with this—"By reason of the uncertainty of our own righteousness, and the danger of vain-glory, it is the safest course to repose our whole trust in the mercy and kindness or grace of God alone." To this the attention of all Papists may be earnestly invited. And the following are found amongst many similar sentences in the last will of Cardinal Hosius, who presided at the Council of Trent under Pope Pius IV. "I am not worthy that Thou shouldest behold me with the eyes of Thy majesty; but as it is most worthy that for the sake of Christ's death and passion, Thou shouldest not only look upon me, but crown me also, it is therefore that I come unto Thee, most dear Father, and that without any merits, but the inestimable ones of Thy Son, Jesus Christ, my Lord and my Redeemer. I bring Thee the merit of that death, wherein alone I place all my hope and my confidence; that is my righteousness, my satisfaction, my redemption, and my propitiation. The death of my Lord is my merit."[3] How different from much that we have had to con-

[1] Page 65. [2] See Owen on Justification; Works (new ed.), V., 32.
[3] Quoted by Mr Allix; Gibson's Preservative against Popery, X., 370. (Lond. 1848.)

template! How unlike the prayer, "Give me strength, O my God, to expiate my offences!"[1]

This chapter may be concluded with a reference to Moehler. "If *Faith* be taken in an objective sense," says that author, "that is to say, as an establishment instituted by God, in Jesus Christ, in opposition to Mosaism, or any human and arbitrary system of religion, and the modes of thinking, feeling, and acting, which such prescribe, then the Catholic can without restriction assert, it is by faith alone man is able to acquire God's favour."[2] We shall know, then, what to think when, at any time, Papists seek to recommend themselves as holding the doctrine of justification by faith. We shall know to regard them as paltering with a double sense of words. We shall know that justification by faith is, with them, the very opposite of that doctrine which brought peace to the distressed soul of Martin Luther, as it has brought peace to many a distressed soul both before and since, and which Luther proclaimed as the very *articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesiæ*—the mark of a standing or falling church—the first test of a spiritual life or death.

[1] Garden of the Soul, 100.
[2] Moehler's Symbolism, I. 211.

CHAPTER II.

PURGATORY.

MORTAL AND VENIAL SIN—PRAYERS FOR THE DEAD—LIMBO—INDULGENCES.

THE doctrine of purgatory is utterly at variance with the first principles of evangelical religion. It is founded upon the most unscriptural views both of sin and of justification. But it is a most essential part of the Popish system of priestcraft, indispensable to the working of that complicated scheme of imposture by which the nations have been deceived, and multitudes kept in horrid bondage during all their days of earthly life, retained in the dominion of Satan, until at last they were sent down to perdition with a lie in their right hand. It gives the priest a hold upon the consciences of men which enables him to work upon them for his nefarious purposes, and to extort from them what price he pleases, especially in the near prospect of death, for benefits which he pretends to confer in the world beyond the grave. It enables him to work upon men's fears; and it enables him to work, with baseness, if possible, still greater, upon the tenderest affections of bereaved relatives.

Cardinal Wiseman, indeed, expresses great astonishment that any such imputations should be brought against the doctrine of purgatory. "It seems to be fancied in some way or other," says he, "that it is an instrument either for benefiting the clergy, or for enabling them to work on the fears of the people; that the terror of purgatory is somehow a means of strengthening the arm of the Church over its subjects; but in what way, it is impossible for any Catholic, who knows our practice and belief,

possibly to conceive."[1] It may rather be wondered that he should find any difficulty in conceiving what has been so often set forth in plain words, for he can be acute enough when he pleases; or that he should forget, or suppose us capable of forgetting, what sums are paid, and what legacies are left to pay for masses for the dead.

It is commonly the interest of the priest to lull and pacify men's consciences, which he accomplishes but too well by his distinction between mortal and venial sins,—by his exaltation of the efficacy of sacraments, and his doctrine of the meritorious character of good works,—by his appliances of penance, and indulgences, and extreme unction,—by his doctrine of purgatory, and of the relief to be obtained by means of masses for the soul. It would not do that the conscience should ever be so thoroughly awakened that he could not hold it in check and control. For then, his prey might escape; his whole system might be found insufficient, unsatisfactory. A conscience enlightened as to the guilt of sin, burdened with a sense of sin, is not to be satisfied with services and sacraments, auricular confession and priestly absolution, penances, pilgrimages, and indulgences. Even flagellations and tortures are not always a medicine of sufficient power. The blood of Christ alone is a balm to heal this wound: the doctrine of justification by faith is alone capable of satisfying the soul. And that doctrine once apprehended, the captive is free; and the errors of Popery must, one after another, be renounced and rejected.

But on the other hand, it is not the interest of the priest that the consciences of men should be so completely lulled to rest, as never to have any awakenings, or any trouble on account of sin, any uncomfortable thoughts of death and judgment, or any miserable dreams. In that case, no one would want any of his costly wares. He could not sell, if there were none who cared to buy. And wherever Popery has wrought, in any country, that effect of driving multitudes into infidelity, which is at present to be witnessed on so extensive a scale on the Continent

[1] Wiseman, Lectures on the Principal Doctrines, &c., II., 53.

of Europe, there has always been a dull trade in the markets of the spiritual Babylon. In France, for many years, the principal frequenters of cathedrals and confessionals and shrines, have been the most uneducated and unintellectual of the population. But when Popery can succeed in keeping consciences just alive, and nothing more,—not quite asleep, and yet not quite awake,—the field is all her own. And to this state of things, and to the production or perpetuation of it, her doctrine of purgatory is adapted.

But although purgatory is so important a part of the Popish system, strangely little is said of it in a great number of Popish books; and it is remarkable how little of the general belief and teaching of the Church is expressly set forth in its most acknowledged standards. There is an obvious reason for this. The doctrine of purgatory was closely connected with some of those monstrous abuses which were the immediate occasion of the Reformation. The Council of Trent avoided giving any great prominence to those things which were offensive not only to Protestants, but also to many Romanists, who desired a sort of reformation, and that at least a face of moral decency and respectable sobriety should be put upon their Church. There is no subject respecting which the decrees of the Council are more reserved and guarded than that of purgatory. But if many of the grosser errors have found no place in these decrees, yet neither have they been condemned, though notoriously and universally prevalent; nor have they given occasion to any of those anathemas, which the fathers of that Council so much delighted to fulminate, whilst what is actually said with reference to purgatory, is consonant and agreeable rather than opposed to them. The example of caution, set by the Council of Trent, has been followed, more or less perfectly, by many modern Popish writers. We must not, therefore, frankly accept what they thrust before our eyes as a correct and complete representation of the doctrine of their Church upon this subject. We know them too well to do so.

The practice of prayer for the dead does not necessarily imply the reception of the doctrine of purgatory, and has largely prevailed without it; although, logically, the Papists may be more consistent who found the practice of prayer for the dead upon the doctrine of purgatory. The one error prepared the way for the other, preceding it in the growth of corruption; and the subjects are so treated in Popish theological and controversial books, that even when they are announced as separate, they are really united into one. The arguments employed in favour of the one cannot be examined without reference to the other. They shall here, therefore, be considered together. The Popish distinction betwixt mortal and venial sins must also be considered along with them.

The following is the article respecting purgatory and prayers for the dead in the creed of Pope Pius IV.:—

"I constantly hold that there is a purgatory, and that the souls therein detained are helped by the suffrages of the faithful."

This corresponds with the decree of the Council of Trent from which it is abridged,[1] which speaks of *sound doctrine* without very precisely defining it: only it asserts that "there is a purgatory, and that the souls there detained are helped by the suffrages of the faithful, but principally by the acceptable sacrifice of the altar," and insists upon the maintenance "of the sound doctrine concerning purgatory, which has been delivered by the holy fathers and the sacred councils."[2] This does not tell us much, but it shews very evidently that a great deal more is somewhere and somehow to be learned; and it entitles us, even if we were not otherwise entitled, to inquire what it has been the custom of the Church of Rome to teach, and what the people have been encouraged to believe; and to charge the Church with that doctrine. We find nothing in the decrees of the Council unfavourable to those doctrines or opinions of which Tetzel made such unscrupulous use to draw money out of the pockets of the people, as, for example, at Zwickau, in the memorable

[1] Conc. Trid., Sess. xxv., Decret. de Purgatorio. It is given at full length by M'Gavin, Protestant, No. lxxv.

[2] As translated by Berington and Kirk, p. 374.

case of the soul in the cemetery,—a story not more illustrative of the rascality of the man than of the nature of the opinions prevalent amongst those upon whom he imposed.[1]

Popish theologians, indeed, tell us, that these things only are necessary to be believed concerning purgatory, or are matters of the Church's faith,—that there is a purgatory, and that the souls therein detained are helped by the suffrages of the faithful, especially by the sacrifice of the altar.[2] These things alone, they say, the Church has authoritatively decided, and they refuse to go beyond these in disputing with "heretics"; but they have no objection to go very much beyond these in teaching their own people. For Perrone says, that whatever relates to the position of purgatory, or the duration or nature of its pains, has not been decided, and is not part of the Catholic faith; for example, the question, whether there is any local purgatory or not, and, if so, where it is situated, and whether souls remain in purgatory for a long or for a short time, and whether the purgatorial fire be material or metaphorical only. But he goes on to say, that some of those things which have not been determined by authority, cannot, however, be rejected without temerity, because the common doctrine of theologians is sufficiently well known concerning them, from which it is highly wrong for a Catholic to depart without the very weightiest reason, and, above all, because of the sense of the Church itself concerning the bitterness of the pains with which souls in purgatory are tormented.[3] And Dens does not hesitate to say, that the ordinary purgatory is a place in the neighbourhood of hell; and that it is to be held, as it has been the constant opinion of the Latin Church, that

[1] See D'Aubigné, Hist. Ref., B. iii., ch. 1. In the decree of the Council of Trent concerning purgatory, there is indeed a warning, "that whatever may tend to encourage idle curiosity and superstition, or may savour of filthy lucre, be prohibited as scandalous impediments to virtue." (Berington and Kirk's translation, as above). But this is very vague and indefinite, and no doubt purposely so. How weak in comparison with the anathemas directed against the holders of Protestant opinions!

[2] Dens, Theol., VII., 350. Perrone, Praelect. Theol., I., 834.

[3] Perrone, Praelect. Theol., I., 834, 835.

the fire of purgatory is a material fire similar to the fire of hell;[1] whilst he proves the severity of the torment by the solicitude which the Church has shewn in urging her children to works of satisfaction and to the purchase of indulgences,[2]—which last consideration being present to his mind, he might perhaps be a little better able to conceive the gainfulness of purgatory to the Church than Cardinal Wiseman professes himself to be. There seems to be no reason why, in dealing with this subject, we should limit ourselves to what the Church sets forth as matter of necessary faith; which, in truth, would merely be to allow ourselves to be imposed upon by one of the basest tricks which her Councils and Doctors ever practised. We may extend our view to all that they teach; surely, at least, to all that they affirm it to be wrong for a member of the Church to reject. And we cannot but hold the Church responsible for the expressions in her own prayers, as, for example, in the *Litany for the Dead*, where we find these petitions:—

"From the pains of purgatory, so justly inflicted upon unexpiated sins, deliver them, O Lord,

"From the torments incomparably greater than the bitterest anguish of this life, deliver them, O Lord,"

And,—

"That it please thee to hasten the day when thy faithful shall be delivered from the mansions of sorrow, we beseech thee, hear us,

"That it please thee to shorten the time of their expiation, and to admit them speedily into thy heavenly sanctuary, we beseech thee, hear us,

"That it please thee, through the prayers and good works performed in thy Church, to receive them into thy eternal tabernacles, we beseech thee, hear us."[3]

It may suit the convenience of Popish disputants to call atten-

[1] Bellarmine says, that if there be not a real fire in purgatory, "there will be some punishment yet more horrible, such as God can prepare, who wills in this to shew his power"; and elsewhere he quotes Cajetan with approbation, as saying that the punishment there "is the very same punishment of sense which the sinner ought to have suffered in hell, eternity alone being excluded from the account." (Quoted by Clarkson, Sermon on the Doctrine of Justification dangerously corrupted, &c.)

[2] Dens, Theol., VII., 353, 354.

[3] Key of Heaven, 266, 269.

tion mainly to the decree of the Council of Trent *Concerning Purgatory*, and to dwell upon the things therein asserted as the sole matters of the Church's faith on this subject; but we ought not to forget that the Council had previously adopted the following canon:—"If any one shall affirm that the guilt [*reatus*] of eternal punishment is so forgiven, as that there remains no guilt [*reatus*] of temporal puuishment to be paid either in this life or hereafter in purgatory, before there can be any entrance into the kingdom of heaven, let him be anathema."[1] And this exhibits the principle on which the whole doctrine is framed, which is also further illustrated by another declaration of the same Council, that the sacrifice of the mass is offered *for the dead in Christ not yet fully purged.*[2] So that the faith of the Church unquestionably includes the doctrine of temporal punishment endured by souls in purgatory, and of the acceptance instead thereof, of satisfactions made by men still remaining on the earth, or of the translation of souls from purgatory to heaven by the prayers or other *suffrages* of the living, and by the sacrifice of the mass.[3] And all this must be believed under pain of damnation, for so the Church of Rome holds with regard to all that is of her faith or doctrine; and Bellarmine asserts it with regard to purgatory in particular, saying, "They must go directly to hell who do not believe purgatory."[4]

When we consult the Popish works most generally circulated in this country, to discover what is believed and taught respecting purgatory, we meet at once with statements of the doctrine, and with arguments in support of it. It seems best to view them in the connection in which they are presented.

In Bishop Challoner's "Grounds of the Catholic Doctrine," the chapter "Of Purgatory"[5] begins with a statement of the doctrine in words derived from the decree of the Council of

[1] Conc. Trid., Sess. vi., can. 30. [2] Ibid., Sess. xxii. cap. 2.
[3] See Stillingfleet, Rational Account of the Grounds of Protestant Religion, (fol., London, 1665), 638.
[4] Quoted by Stillingfleet, Doct. and Pract., ch. xxiii.
[5] Grounds of Catholic Doct., chap. vii.

Trent; after which it seems to occur to the learned Bishop, that perhaps it may be necessary to give some information concerning the place in which souls are detained, and in which they still need help from mortals remaining upon earth. The work of instruction, therefore, proceeds by means of the following question and answer:—[1]

"What do you mean by purgatory?

"A middle state of souls which depart this life *in God's grace, yet not without some lesser stains or guilt of punishment, which retards them from entering heaven.* But as to the particular place where these souls suffer, or the quality of the torments which they suffer, the Church has decided nothing."[2]

Here we come at once to the distinction between mortal and venial sins, upon which this doctrine of purgatory so much depends. Of this we shall presently see more; and perhaps, to the mind and heart of the enlightened Christian, the worst extravagances in honour of the Virgin, or follies of rag and bone worship are not more abhorrent, than the light manner of speaking about sin, which is the necessary result of such doctrine. —To go on with Bishop Challoner.

"What sort of Christians then go to purgatory?

"1st, *Such as die guilty of lesser sins, which we commonly call venial:* as many Christians do, who either by sudden death or otherwise, are taken out of this life before they have repented for *these ordinary failings.* 2dly,

[1] I take the liberty of marking by difference of type, what particularly claims the attention of the reader.

[2] Dens defines purgatory thus: "A place, in which the souls of just persons deceased liable to temporal punishments, *suffer what is sufficient*, [satispatiuntur.]" Then follows an admirable remark on the choice of the word *satispatiuntur*, because souls in purgatory can neither MERIT, nor *satisfy* FOR *the penalty*, but only can satisfy IN the penalty, (Dens, VII. 349, 350.) Keenan defines purgatory as "a *state* of suffering, where souls not sufficiently pure to enter heaven, will be detained for a time until they cancel the debt of temporal punishment due to the justice of God." (Cat. of Chr. Rel., II. 60.) He cautiously avoids even calling it a *place.* Bergier, in his Dictionary of Theology, calls it "a place or rather a state, in which the souls," &c. (Dict. de Théol., V. 405.) But Delahogue, in his Treatise on the Sacrament of Penance, a Maynooth text-book, unhesitatingly calls purgatory a *place*, and this in his statement of the faith of the Church. (Tract. de Sac. Poen., p. 305.—Dubl. 1825.)

Such as having been formerly guilty of greater sins, have not made full satisfaction for them to the divine justice."

The reader will note how all this reflects upon the docrine of justification. He may perhaps also remark how the very mode of expression is affected by the views of doctrine entertained. It is not *repented of* these failings, but *repented* FOR them. But let him particularly observe how lightly sins are here spoken of, —*ordinary failings*. This is not the language of the Church of God, but of the irreligious world.

The Bishop proceeds as follows:—

"Why do you say that those who die guilty of lesser sins go to purgatory?

"Because such as depart this life before they have repented of these *venial frailties and imperfections* CANNOT BE SUPPOSED TO BE CONDEMNED TO THE ETERNAL TORMENTS OF HELL, *since the sins of which they are guilty are but small*, which even God's best servants are more or less liable to. Nor can they go straight to heaven in this state, because the Scripture assures us, Rev. xxi., 27, "There shall in no wise enter in thither any thing that defileth." Now every sin, be it ever so small, certainly defileth the soul. Hence our Saviour assures us, that we are to render an account 'even for every idle word.' Matt. xii. 36."

Here the truth breaks out. When the Papist writes of justification he is on his guard, and he cloaks over his doctrine and encircles it all around with a hedge of nice distinctions; but when he writes of purgatory, he lets us see more openly what he really thinks about justification. Nothing can be more evident than that the sentences just quoted embody the doctrine of justification by works. Nothing can be more pertinent than the inquiry after reading these sentences, What, then, is the use of the blood of Christ?

However, let the reader here again particularly note how sin is spoken of, in language calculated to keep the conscience from being very much disturbed, and yet not to allow it altogether to rest. But what pleasant doctrine for a sinner desirous of going on in his sins! His sensual indulgences and his tricks of trade are but *venial frailties and imperfections*, for which it *cannot be supposed* that he will be condemned to the eternal torments of hell! And, then, if purgatory be still an undesirable place, a few masses, at

no great expense, may help to get him out. Or, perhaps, he may be so fortunate as not to go into it, at least with any considerable account outstanding. I have seen a little Spanish catechism, in which are set forth, for the instruction of the young, nine different things sufficing for the pardon of venial sin,—the hearing of mass, saying the general confession, a bishop's blessing, holy water, saying a pater noster, &c.[1] Besides all which he may obtain an indulgence. Luther is reprobated by Popish theologians for doing away the necessity of painful works. But what are we to think of all this?

Bishop Challoner's next question and answer are as follows:—

"Upon what then do you ground your belief of purgatory?

"Upon Scripture, tradition, and reason."

He says nothing of the fourth branch of argument employed by his Church,—*apparitions*. "Bellarmine derives his arguments in support of purgatory," says Dr Cunningham, "from four sources,—Scripture, the fathers, reason, and apparitions of persons who have been in purgatory, and have afterwards appeared in dreams or visions to give an account of it. Of course, modern authors omit the last head of argument, although it is just as solid as any other which they can adduce, and is in perfect keeping with the character of fraud and imposture which is stamped upon the whole subject."[2]

We have already seen something of the so-called argument from reason, and we shall pursue that branch of the subject before proceeding to examine the arguments from Scripture and tradition. Bishop Challoner thus states it in the question and answer concluding the chapter from which quotations have been made. It will be seen that, in effect, he merely repeats what he has already said; yet it seems worth quoting, as an exhibition of the argument in complete and regular form, and because of the strong expression which it gives to the unchristian sentiment concerning the levity of some sins.

[1] Catecismo de la Doctrina Cristiana, &c. Por el Padre Gaspar Astete. Con Licencia. (Sevilla, 1824.) p. 31.

[2] Notes to Stillingfleet, Doct. and Pract., 290.

"How do you ground the belief of purgatory upon reason?

"Because reason clearly teaches these two things:—1*st*, That all and every sin, how small soever, deserves punishment. 2*dly*, *That some sins are so small, either through the levity of the matter, or for want of full deliberation in the action, as not to deserve eternal punishment.* From whence it is plain, that besides the place of eternal punishment which we call hell, there must be also a place of temporal punishment for such as die in lesser sins, and this we call purgatory."[1]

Here it is proper to observe, amongst other things, that the whole doctrine respecting the punishment of sin is ascribed to reason. There is a most unholy boldness and irreverent independence in this sort of reasoning, although the *true* doctrine must certainly be perfectly *reasonable*. Moreover, the premises here laid down as the foundations of the argument in favour of purgatory are merely asserted as the conclusions of reason, without the exhibition of any argument in their support. The ultimate data are left to conjecture; and it is very easy to see that they cannot lie within the proper province of reason, but must belong to that of revelation.

It may interest the reader to see a little more of the doctrine prevalent upon this subject amongst our Popish countrymen, as it may be learned from their most approved and popular books. It will soon appear that the little catechism from which I have quoted has not been unfairly selected for that purpose.

Bishop Milner is indeed more cautious than Bishop Challoner. But the following extract from the End of Controversy will show the substantial agreement between them."[2]

"I have proved by various arguments that a temporary punishment generally remains due to sin after the guilt and eternal punishment due to it have been remitted. Again, we know from Scripture, that 'even the just man falls seven times,'—Proverbs xxiv., 17, and that men 'must give an account of every idle word that they speak.'—Matthew xii., 36. On the other hand we are conscious that there is not an instant of our life in which this may not suddenly terminate, without the possibility of our

[1] Challoner, Grounds of Cath. Doct., ch. vii., *ut supra.*

[2] I take the liberty again of marking, by a different character, the expressions to which I would particularly call the reader's attention.

calling upon God for mercy. What, then, I ask, will become of souls which are surprised in either of those predicaments?"

The blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth from all sin. God is well pleased for his righteousness' sake. But to continue our extract—

"We are sure, from Scripture and reason, that nothing defiled shall enter heaven.—Rev. xxi., 27. Will, then, our just and merciful Judge make no distinction in guiltiness, as Bishop Fowler and other rigid Protestants maintain?"

Here we must pause. The doctrine of a distinction in guiltiness, and consequent difference in the degrees of punishment, is held by Protestants, and in perfect consistency with their doctrine that there are only two states in the future world, eternal states, one of joy and another of woe. The Shorter Catechism, so familiar in Scotland, teaches that "some sins in themselves, and by reason of several aggravations, are more heinous in the sight of God than others"; a doctrine perfectly consistent with its other statement that "every sin deserveth God's wrath and curse, both in this world and in that which is to come," and perfectly consistent with the doctrine that eternal punishment is deserved by every sin,—for difference of degree in punishment does not necessarily imply difference of duration. But this Popish bishop finds it convenient to misrepresent the doctrine of Protestants upon this subject, and in a foot-note he boldly refers to Calvin, as well as to Bishop Fowler; though on consulting the place cited,[1] it proves to contain nothing about the matter, whilst it is evident enough, from other places, that Calvin held no such doctrine as that ascribed to him; nay, he denounces it as a calumny against Protestantism, that it adopts the paradox of the Stoics concerning the equality of sins, and turns upon his Popish adversaries with a question concerning the sins which they call mortal, whether there are not, even amongst them, different degrees of heinousness.[2] So impossible is it to depend upon a single reference or quotation in a Popish controversial book. The re-

[1] "Calv. l. iii. c. 12." I am sorry I have not had opportunity of examining the other reference.

[2] Calv. Inst. l. iii., c. iv., sec. 28.

ference to Calvin in this case is an inexcusable falsehood. We shall have other instances of the same kind to contemplate, and they might be indefinitely multiplied.

The last sentence above quoted, from the End of Controversy, gives occasion also for consideration of the absurdity of the pretence that purgatory is for the removal of defilement, if by that term anything else be intended than guilt merely. "Popery is convicted," it has been well observed, "of the most flagrant inconsistency and the grossest immorality, on its own ground, in respect of the sanctifying part of the process. The half of the doctrine is, that these purgatorial fires are necessary for cleansing the spirit of the defilements which still attach to it; and yet they hasten with all their might to deliver it by masses from the requisite purification!" [1]

But let us proceed again with the interrupted quotation from the End of Controversy.

"Will he condemn to the same eternal punishment *the poor child who has died under the guilt of a lie of excuse*, and the abandoned wretch who has died in the act of murdering his father? To say that he will is so monstrous a doctrine in itself, and so contrary to Scripture, which declares that God 'will render to every man according to his deeds,' Rom. ii. 6, that it seems to be universally exploded. The evident consequence of this is, that *there are some venial or pardonable sins*, for the expiation of which, as well as for the temporary punishment due to other sins, a place of temporary punishment is provided in the next life, where, however, the souls detained may be relieved by the prayers, alms, and sacrifices of the faithful here on earth." [2]

This is evidently the same doctrine taught, as we have already seen, by Bishop Challoner. But there is an insidious falsehood in the way of conducting the argument, to which that simpler prelate seems never to have attained. In the sentence which declares that the doctrine *seems to be universally exploded* that God will condemn *to the same eternal punishment* the parricide and the poor child who has died under the guilt of a lie of excuse, two things very distinct are confounded, and it is not too

[1] The Mass; by William Anderson, LL.D. (Glasgow, 1851), p. 57.
[2] Milner, End of Controversy, Letter xliii.

much to say, are wilfully, knowingly, and dishonestly confounded,—the *degree* of punishment and the *duration* of punishment. Moroever, the general assertion of the sentence cannot be understood in its proper meaning, nor can the dishonesty in which it was conceived be thoroughly apparent until we compare it with an assertion made a little before. "It is well known that the disciples of Calvin, at Geneva, *and, perhaps, everywhere else*, instead of adhering to his doctrine in condemning mortals to eternal torments WITHOUT ANY FAULT ON THEIR PART, now hold that the most confirmed in guilt and the finally impenitent shall be saved." There is a vast amount of falsehood compressed into the words, "*and perhaps everywhere else*," which the "*perhaps*" by no means does away,—falsehood worthy of the man who could immediately go on to quote Dr Priestley as an expositor of Protestant doctrine. But the falsehood in the very statement of Calvin's doctrine is most audacious.

The authoress of *Geraldine, a Tale of Conscience*, improves the argument just quoted, by a nice little story of a poor child who died under the guilt of a lie of excuse about the taking of some sweatmeats; dwelling very pathetically upon the distress of the parents, which there was nothing in their Protestantism to soothe, and shewing what relief they obtained when a Popish priest was called in, and set before them the doctrine of his Church. Of course it is taken for granted that Protestantism knows nothing of degrees of guiltiness; and the connection is not precisely that in which a Popish writer might be expected to dwell upon the fires of purgatory and the close vicinity of the place to hell.[1]

[1] Geraldine, II., 324, &c.—The authoress of Geraldine, indeed, in her anxiety to accommodate Popery to the tastes of all classes of persons, represents two of her model characters as expressing their belief that there is only spiritual torment in purgatory. We have seen how Peter Dens treats this opinion. (See p. 118.) But the more refined lady Papist can go a great way along with Peter Dens, and at least approve of his doctrine as good for the common people, who are not refined. "'It is very well,' said Geraldine, 'that the bulk of mankind, supported by such high authority [St Augustine] should take this view of the subject, which

It may not be out of place here to shew, from Peter Dens, how Popery deals with the consciences of children, guilty of such things as the stealing of sweatmeats, or money wherewith to buy them. He supposes the probability that a child's conscience may be in the very great mistake of deeming such a petty theft to be a mortal sin.

"A boy of ten years confesses with fear and anxiety that he is a thief, and has stolen a shilling, without any intention of stealing more. The confessor inquires, 'Do you think you have done very wrong [*magnum malum*] and sinned mortally?' The boy answers, 'Yes, I have done very wrong; but I do not know whether the sin was mortal or venial, for I never heard this.' Confessor: 'Did you think that on this account alone you would go to hell; and did you suppose, before your stealing, that all who stole one shilling must therefore go to hell?' The boy answers, 'Yes, because all thieves go to hell.' Confessor: 'You have no doubt sinned mortally against conscience; but learn now, that the theft of one shilling is not of itself a mortal sin: it is however offensive to God, and therefore it is not allowable to steal, not even one farthing.'"[1]

By such instructions in morality, all men may judge whether a boy's conscience will be made more tender or more callous,—whether he will profit by them to be deterred from stealing, or to be encouraged in it.

Pursuing our inquiries further, and turning to Mr Keenan to see in what form he presents the argument from reason and the necessity of a purgatory for the expiation of trifling offences, we find him more cautious and reserved than either of the authors whom we have already consulted. Yet he really deals with the subject in the same way, as may be seen by the following questions and answers:—

"What does St John say (Apoc. xxi., 27,) of heaven?

"'And there shall not enter into it anything defiled.'

"What do you conclude from this?

must produce by far the most lively terror to the vulgar mind,'"—that is, should believe, however erroneously, that the fire of purgatory is the same in quality with that of hell. (Geraldine, III., 151.)—The morality implied here is eminently characteristic of Popery, and illustrates the doctrines with which it is associated. And as for doctrines, here there is license to pick and choose: it is a matter of taste rather than of truth.

[1] Dens, I. 380, 381.

"That there must be some place for the purification of souls after death; because the Scripture assures us that even *the just man* falls seven times; and can any one in his senses suppose that many will not die without expiating these faults? With these they cannot enter heaven, which receiveth nothing defiled; they cannot be sent to hell, for they are according to Scripture, JUST. Therefore, there must be a third place, where these failings of even the just man will be expiated."[1]

Here we see the same views as before, of sin and of its expiation. And although the language is not so gross as Challoner's or even Milner's, concerning the trifling character of many offences, yet the *failings* of just men are very tenderly spoken of.[2]

With this also may be compared what Mr Keenan says in his chapter *On mortal and venial sin.*

"What say you to *Matth.* xii., 37, where we are told we must render an account for every idle word?

"That these idle words must be venial sins, as we have to *account* for them, but not mortal or damning sins, since otherwise it were better we had no tongues, FOR IF IDLE WORDS ARE SOUL-DESTROYING SINS, THE WORLD IS IN THE MOST DESPERATE OF ALL POSSIBLE CONDITIONS."[3]

No thought of the blood of Christ seems to occur. And such is Popish theology as taught even in Scotland.

Idle words must be *venial* sins, Mr Keenan tells us, because *we have to account for them;* and so say all the theologians of Rome. But according to the proper meaning of the word which they have thus perverted in their theology, it should rather, upon

[1] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xxi., sec. 2.

[2] "There are some sins of their own nature light and venial," says Gother, another of the great champions of Rome; employing, in support of purgatory, the argument now under consideration. But I refrain from making much reference to Gother's *Papist Misrepresented and Represented*, because the republication of Stillingfleet's answer to it has made it better known to many readers than most other Popish books. (See Stillingfleet, Doct. and Pract. ch. xxiii.)

"Not perfectly freed from the blemish of some defects which we call venial sins," is the expression of Berington and Kirk in their *proposition* concerning purgatory. I may here remark that on this subject their propositions are framed with as much reserve and caution as the Tridentine decree itself. (Faith of Catholics, 354.)

[3] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xviii.

this alleged ground, be argued that they cannot be *venial*, that is, *pardonable*.[1]

But this argument in favour of purgatory as a place necessary for the expiation of *venial* sins, is not so prominently brought forward, nor in general so grossly expressed in works intended for Scotland, and which might be expected frequently to fall into the hands of Protestants, as it usually is in other Popish publications.

The following extract is from "The Old Fashion Farmer's motives for leaving the Church of England and embracing the Roman Catholic Faith," printed "for the Catholic Book Society,"[2] and intended apparently for circulation amongst the more ill-informed of the middle classes in England.

"Now you are to observe that we believe there are some souls who depart this life so pure, as to be translated immediately to heaven; and others who die in their sins, without repentance; these descend into hell: and we believe that *there is a third sort, that have neither lived so wicked as to deserve hell, nor yet so good and perfectly pure as to be immediately admitted to the state of bliss;* but are to pass through a purging fire, where, by some means known to God, *they make that full satisfaction for their sins which they neglected here*, and then are admitted into heaven. I will here give an instance, to make what I have said appear more plain:—*Suppose a man to have died suddenly, who has behaved like a true Christian in all respects, performing whatever the Christian religion requires; this man, no doubt, goes straight to heaven;* and suppose a man to die suddenly, in the action of adultery or murder, without time for repentance, this man certainly must go to hell. But then, suppose a third man to die suddenly *with* A LIE OF SMALL CONSEQUENCE *in his mouth*, or in the action of *cheating his neighbour of a penny;* what now is to become of this man, *provided he has been a good man in every other respect?* Now, to heaven he cannot go, because nothing that is defiled shall enter therein; *nor to hell, for surely the justice of God will never condemn him to so great a punishment for so slight an offence*, therefore to some intermediate state he must go, till God's justice be fully satisfied, which is what we call by the name of Purgatory."[3]

[1] Calvin very happily says, "Edictum est sine exceptione Dei judicium, sanctorum delicta venialia esse, non ex suâpte naturâ, sed quia ex Dei misericordiâ veniam consequuntur." (Inst., l. ii., c. viii., sec. 59.)

[2] Derby, 1846. (T. Richardson & Son.)

[3] Old Fashion Farmer, 39, 40.

Such is Popish theology as it is taught in England.—— It is impossible to resist quoting another sentence. Speaking of the justice of God as demanding the punishment of every idle word, this Popish theologian softens down that awful doctrine thus:—

"Yet reason tells *us that such small offences do not deserve eternal punishment in hell, because if they did, few or none would escape it,* by reason that all are apt to do something impure, or to speak something that he should not," &c., &c."[1]

This may be compared with the last quotation from Mr Keenan. And it may be contrasted with those plain sentences of Scripture, "The wages of sin is death,"[2] and "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law to do them."[3] But Papists have no idea of the exceeding sinfulness of sin. Cardinal Wiseman speaks of Moses and Aaron as having "*slightly transgressed*" God's commands, in those things by which they incurred his dipleasure, and of "*their trifling sin*" as being forgiven.[4] And he states an argument for purgatory just as we have already seen it. On account, however, of the prominent position which he occupies amongst our Popish countrymen, it may perhaps be as well to quote his words.

"We are assured in the New Law, that 'nothing defiled shall enter' into the heavenly Jerusalem. Suppose, then, that a Christian dies, who has committed some slight transgression; he cannot enter heaven in this state, and yet we cannot suppose that he is to be condemned for ever. What alternative, then, are we to admit? Why, that there is some place in which the soul will be purged of the sin, and qualified to enter into the glory of God. Will you say that God forgives all sin at the moment of death? Where is the warrant for that assertion? This is an important point of doctrine; and if you maintain that God at once forgives sins on any occasion, you must allege strong reason for it. If you find nothing of such a doctrine in his revelation," &c.[5]

[1] Old Fashion Farmer, 45. [2] Rom. vi. 23. [3] Gal. iii. 10.
[4] Wiseman, Lectures on the Principal Doctrines, &c. II., 43.
[5] Ibid., II., 57.

The only peculiarity here is in these last sentences, intended to set aside the doctrine that sins are forgiven at once. They are answered by every text which proclaims forgiveness.

It is very evident that this argument from reason is the great argument for purgatory,—that this is in fact the foundation upon which the whole doctrine is built, and that the arguments from Scripture are merely supplementary. Indeed, Berington and Kirk acknowledge that the evidence of Scripture in support of purgatory is *comparatively weak*,—but as the Scriptures are not their Rule of Faith, they represent this as a circumstance of no moment.[1] Cardinal Wiseman expresses himself to the same effect, though more guardedly, urging that the Church of Christ is constituted the depositary of his truths, and saying that "it is on this authority that the Catholic grounds his belief in the doctrine of purgatory; yet, not so, but that its principle is laid down, indirectly at least, in the word of God,"[2]—availing himself, it will be perceived, of the *Doctrine of Developement.* The Popish theologian is very independent of Scripture. He can explain it by tradition, or add to it by tradition: and if his tradition and Scripture seem to be at variance, his power of interpretation is such that they are soon reconciled, or he can bring in the authority of the Church to settle the dispute. He can reason for himself, as in the present case, from first principles,—which he assumes, no matter how: and then, the point being established by his reasonings, he may pay the Bible a compliment by looking out a few texts from the Old and New Testaments, in which his darkened and bewildered vision sees some sort of resemblance to his tenet, or from which he can ingeniously twist new arguments for its support.

Because this is certainly the great argument for purgatory, and because the exhibition which it affords of Popish theology is so striking, it may perhaps be proper to continue the examination of it for a little: that Protestant readers may be fully informed, from the books most in use amongst Papists themselves in this country, what it is that they are taught, and what it is that they believe. We have already had frequent occasion to refer to Challoner's Catholic Christian Instructed, a book in great repute and extensive circulation. The following are a few choice extracts from the chapter *Of Prayers for the Dead, and Of Purgatory.*[1]

[1] Berington and Kirk, Faith of Catholics, Introd. xxvii.
[2] Wiseman, Lectures on the Principal Doctrines, &c., II., 53.

"Some there are, *though I fear but few*, that have before their death *so fully cleared up their account with the Divine Majesty*, and washed away all their stains in the blood of the Lamb, as to go straight to heaven after death."

Here we have an instance of a familiar, business-like way of speaking, by which, in reference to such a subject, it is impossible not to be shocked. The mention of the blood of the Lamb is incongruous enough; however, it appears that the washing therein is something positively meritorious on the part of the man himself, and useful to him in *clearing up his account with the Divine Majesty.*

. . . . "But besides these two kinds, there are many Christians who, when they die, are neither so perfectly pure and clean as to be exempt from the least spot or stain, nor yet so unhappy as to die under the guilt of unrepented deadly sin," &c., &c.

Again,—

"How few are there that depart this life perfectly pure from the dregs and stains to which we are ever subject in this state of mortality! And yet, *God forbid that every little spot or stain should condemn the soul to the everlasting torments of hell!* Therefore, there must be a middle place for such souls as die under these lesser stains."

And in the next paragraph he speaks of "*little transgressions.*"

The distinction betwixt mortal and venial sins, which forms so convenient a foundation for the doctrine of purgatory, is thus laid down by Mr Keenan.

"That some sins rob the soul of justice and spiritual life, and render it deserving of hell; whilst others do not deprive the soul of justice, but only weaken both justice and charity."[2]

[1] Challoner, Cath. Christ. Instr., ch. xiv.
[2] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xviii.

And in another work he describes venial sin as "that in which there is only a little culpability, which is less unworthy of pardon, and which, consequently, does not kill the soul."[1] The idea of sins being more or less *worthy* or *unworthy of pardon* is perhaps original; it is certainly monstrous. But what sins they are which are destructive of justice (or *righteousness*), and what are only somewhat prejudicial, and of little culpability, this author does not proceed to state. It is evidently necessary that the boundaries should be marked, that men may avoid the danger of perdition, although they may indulge themselves in *little* transgressions—"small and very pardonable offences," as they are called in an *Abridgment of Christian Doctrine*, circulated in Ireland.[2] Some of the Popish books seem to determine the line of demarcation with wonderful precision; but there must be some doubt after all, for Mr Keenan twice mentions idolatry as a mortal sin,—once, when to prove that some sins kill the soul, he quotes the text, "Neither idolators, nor adulterers, nor drunkards, &c., &c., shall ever enter the kingdom of God,"[3] (the *ever* being, as the reader will remark, an interpolation,[4]) and once when he undertakes a commentary upon Ezek. xviii., 20, "The soul that sinneth shall surely die," where he says—"The prophet is speaking of enormous crimes, such as theft, idolatry, &c." But turning to Dr James Butler's Catechism, we do not find idolatry mentioned as one of the "chief mortal sins, commonly called capital and deadly sins," which are there declared to be seven in number, and to be "pride, covetousness, lust, anger, gluttony, envy, and sloth."[5] There seems to be some discrepancy here as to the sinfulness of idolatry, which is not removed when we turn to Mr Keenan's own Catechism of the Christian Religion, and find him enumerate these *seven capital*

[1] Keenan, Cat. of Chr. Rel., I., 160. See also Dens, VII., 362, &c.

[2] An Abridgment, &c. *Permissu Superiorum.* (Dublin, printed by Richard Grace, *N. Y.*) p. 109.

[3] 1 Cor. vi., 9-10.

[4] It is not in the Rhemish Testament. But it suits Mr Keenan's argument.

[5] Butler's Cat., Lesson xii. See also Key of Heaven, 158.

sins as the "seven principal heads to which all other sins may be reduced," and yet without mention of idolatry.[1] But, I suppose it will be said that the seven *chief mortal sins* are not to be regarded as including all the mortal sins. Yet what is the poor Papist to think, who takes the *Key of Heaven* for his guide-book in religion, and who reads there of the SEVEN DEADLY SINS, without explanation that they are only the *chief*, or that any other sins are *deadly* or mortal? And as these are at all events the *chief*, they must all be held worse than idolatry. The Church of Rome, therefore, reckons anger or sloth worse than idolatry; and it is hard to understand how Mr Keenan comes to speak of it amongst *enormous crimes*, however it might suit the immediate convenience of his argument.

Even Dens takes care not to give any precise statement of what are mortal and what are venial sins. He tells us that it is very difficult to discover, and very dangerous to define;[2] and no wonder, for he shows various ways in which mortal sins may become venial, and venial sins may become mortal; all which must contribute to keep the more power over men's consciences in the hands of the priest, their confessor. But as a general rule he assigns much importance to the quantity of matter concerned, so that it is a mortal sin to steal a gold coin, but only a venial sin to steal a copper one;[3] which seems also to be quite Mr Keenan's opinion, for he says it is mortal sin when *the law of God is violated in any serious matter*, but it is only venial sin when we fail to observe it *in very small matters*.[4] And some Popish doctors have gone so far as to show that in certain circumstances even perjury and murder may be mere venial sins.[5]

But a difficulty arises out of this rule, that sins are venial

[1] Keenan, Cat. of Chr. Rel., I., 165.

[2] Dens Theol. VII., 365.

[3] Ibid., 369 and 376.

[4] Keenan, Cat. of Chr. Rel., I., 168.

[5] Clarkson, The Doctrine of Justification dangerously corrupted in the Roman Church; quoting Dominicus a Soto. See also Pascal's Provincial Letters, Letter XIV.

when the *matter* is small. The theft of an apple, or other fruit, would seem to be venial on this ground; but our first parents were cast out of Eden for such an offence. The difficulty might prove insuperable for any minds except those of the theologians of Rome,—who, in this particular case, determine that the *matter* was great, in respect of the trial of obedience which was made to depend upon it,[1]—though they seem not to think the offence would have been at all serious as a mere transgression of the commandment of God.

Dr Lingard frames the argument from reason somewhat differently from the authors whom we have already consulted, and perhaps more ingeniously.

"Nothing can be more certain," he says, "than that God will render to every one according to his works. Hence, if it be true that 'the soul passing out of the body goeth straightways to heaven or to hell,' it will follow that there must be a certain amount of Christian virtue, the possession of which will secure to the soul the happiness of heaven, and the want of which will consign it to the misery of hell. Place, then, this amount as low in the scale as you please, still it is evident that there will be thousands of men whose moral worth, though it may actually fall below that point, will, nevertheless, approach into close proximity to it. Must, then, these go straightways to hell? Can it be consistent with the justice of God, where the difference in point of desert is so very trifling, to make the difference in point of retribution nothing less than endless happiness for the one, and endless misery for the other? A moment's consideration will show that the supposition is absurd; and that God to fulfil his declaration in the Scripture, must treat this third class of departed souls in a very different manner from the other two."[2]

Here we have, as the basis of the argument in favour of purgatory, the Popish notion of judgment according to works, in which it is evidently taken for granted that justification must be upon the ground of the good works of the person justified. We Protestants have also our doctrine of judgment according to works, but it is different from this;—good works being esteemed the fruit and evidence of that faith which worketh by love to the glory and praise of God, so that judgment according to works is as consistent with justification by faith as it is with justice

[1] Dens Theol. I., 370. [2] Lingard, Catechet. Instr., 43, 44.

itself. Nor do we admit the possibility of any trifling difference between the two great classes which we acknowledge,—between the believer and the unbeliever, the man who does good works and the man who does them not. Unbelief itself we regard as a sin of the greatest magnitude; and we see a vast difference between the man who with the mind serves God, and the man who lives after the flesh, refusing that service. Nor, according to our doctrines, can we ever feel called upon to settle the question as to the amount of moral worth or Christian virtue, which *secures to the soul* the happiness of heaven.

But it is time that we proceed to consider some of the other arguments employed by Papists in support of their doctrine of purgatory. That which has already been considered is indeed obviously the main one,—and deserving, therefore, of greatest attention. But we must not overlook the arguments from Scripture and tradition.

The argument from tradition need not occupy us long. Although Popish theologians ascribe to it a very great importance, it is even with themselves subsidiary to the argument from reason, already considered; and has evidently been vamped up, because the conditions of the case, according to their own principles, demand that they should have an argument from tradition, and appeal not only to the authority of living pope or modern council, but to the universal consent of the fathers: whilst in rejecting the authority of tradition, and embracing the inspired Scriptures as the only rule of faith, we of course sweep away the very foundation upon which such an argument is based. But if it were in its own nature of more value than it is, the argument from tradition is not so decidedly in favour of the Papists upon this point as they would have us to believe. Passages may be found in the writings of some of the fathers, which seem to favour the doctrine of purgatory—though the full *developement* of the doctrine was left for more recent times, and they often express themselves in language wholly opposed to it; whilst it is to be observed that opinions favourable to prayer for

the dead, were held by many at a very early period, who yet knew nothing of those other errors which the Popish Church has condensed into its doctrine of purgatory; and that many believed in the existence of an intermediate state of separate souls, in whose views on this subject and those of the Papists, there is little else in common.[1]

That prayer for the dead was practised in the early Church long before the doctrine of purgatory was heard of, and by men whose views were otherwise quite at variance with that doctrine, has been commonly asserted by Protestants ever since the Reformation. Not only have they denied the authority of tradition, but they have demonstrated that the opinions of the fathers were very different from those in support of which they are quoted.[2] Cardinal Wiseman seems to be quite ignorant of all this, and adroitly ascribes to the Puseyites, as if it were a new invention of theirs, what they have only copied from more consistent antagonists of the Church of Rome. "It has been said by divines of the English Church,"—and in a note he debates the point against Dr Pusey,—"that the two doctrines which I have joined together, of prayers for the dead and purgatory, have no necessary connection, and that, in fact, they were not united in the ancient Church."[3] Thus Popery is ever having recourse to shifts and tricks of argument, such as the sincere lover of truth would by no means employ in its cause.

Without prosecuting at present any examination of the passages adduced in support of purgatory from the fathers,—the interpretation put upon the words,—the accuracy or inaccuracy, fairness or unfairness of the quotations, and the genuineness or spuriousness of the text in the places quoted,—all of which are interesting questions, and would be found to afford some insight into Popish morality as applied to the conduct of an argument;

[1] See Dr Cunningham's Notes to Stillingfleet, Doct. and Pract., 293–295.

[2] Calv. Inst., lib. iii., cap. v. sect. 10;——Zanchii Opera, II., 386-389; &c., &c.

[3] Wiseman, Lectures on the Principal Doctrines, &c., II., 65.

let us here only take notice of two or three very curious things which may be found in modern Popish books, arising out of the extreme anxiety to turn into an argument for purgatory, whatever might seem favourable to the notion of any sort of intermediate state of souls departed from this world.

Not the least remarkable of these is the attempt to identify purgatory with *limbo* or the *limbus patrum*. This, however, is quite different, both from the Popish purgatory and from the intermediate state already referred to, in which a number of the fathers supposed the souls of believers separated from their bodies, to await in happiness the resurrection of the dead, in order to enter into what is properly called heaven,—a notion which really has nothing in common with the doctrine of purgatory, "a place or state of *punishment* in the other life, where *some* souls *suffer* for a time, before they can go to heaven."[1] The *limbus patrum* enters into the Popish creed as purgatory does. It is, or rather was, for it exists no longer, a place of happiness in which the souls of those who died before Christ were retained, awaiting his death and resurrection; because heaven was not open to any of the human race, according to this Popish doctrine, until after the death and resurrection of Christ. And so it is said, in the Litany for the Dead,—

"Blessed patriarchs, who were filled with joy, when the Desired of Nations put an end to your captivity, pray for the souls of the faithful departed.

"Blessed prophets, who, after patiently awaiting the arrival of the Messiah, were at length consoled by a visit from him in person, pray for the souls of the faithful departed.

"Blessed saints, who at the glorious resurrection of our Saviour, were translated from limbo to the visible presence of God, pray for the souls of the faithful departed."[2]

The doctrine concerning it is thus stated in Dr James Butler's Catechism, in which also will be found the definition of purgatory just given; and nothing can be more obvious than that they are quite distinct, and, indeed, Dr Butler keeps them so.

"Where did Christ's soul go after his death?

"It descended into hell.—*Apostles' Creed.*

[1] Definition in Butler's Catechism, Lesson xiii.

[2] Key of Heaven, 267.

"Did Christ's soul descend into the hell of the damned?

"No; but to a place or state of rest called *limbo*. Acts ii. 24, 27; Psalm xv. [xvi.] 10."[1]

The Scripture proof here is admirable. The reader may consult these texts, and see what he can find in them about *limbo*. However, the Popish Bishop gives us further information:—

"Who were in limbo?

"The souls of the saints who died before Christ.

"Why did Christ descend into limbo?

"St Peter says, *to preach to those spirits that were in prison;* that is, to announce to them in person, the joyful tidings of their redemption. 1 Pet. iii. 19."

Here, again, the mode of using Scripture may astonish us. But this is the common Popish gloss upon the text; although Peter says nothing about Christ's preaching *in person* either in limbo or elsewhere,—but that *by the Spirit* "he went and preached unto the spirits in prison, which sometime were disobedient, when once the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was a preparing,"—words which plainly intimate the period of this preaching, ("while the ark was a preparing,") and ascribe it to Christ, who sent forth his spirit, before he himself came in the flesh, and preached by the lips of Noah, "a preacher of righteousness," and by the lips of all the other holy men of old who "spake as they were moved of the Holy Ghost."

But refraining at present from any further commentary upon Dr Butler's account of *limbo* and Scripture evidence of its existence, we come to compare what he says on this subject with what is said by Mr Keenan and some other writers. Dr Butler, as has been shewn, keeps it quite distinct from purgatory; and unless black is to be called white, and rest or happiness identified with punishment, this must be deemed the doctrine of his Church. But Mr Keenan is not so consistent with himself, and in his anxiety to get an argument for purgatory, bids bold de-

[1] Butler's Cat., Lesson viii.

fiance to common sense. *In his chapter on purgatory* he writes as follows:—

"Did any one ascend to heaven before our Saviour?

"No; for in St John iii. 13, Christ says: 'No man hath ascended up to heaven, but he that came down from heaven.' [!!!]

"Where, then, were all the just souls of the Old Testament until Christ's ascension?

"They were not in heaven, they were not in hell; therefore they were in some middle place or state."[1]

It will be observed here that this controversialist takes care not to mention the name of *limbo*. He leaves his readers to suppose that he has produced an argument in favour of purgatory; when, in reality, what he had written relates, as he must be well aware, to an entirely different subject. But he goes farther than this:—

"What is the meaning of that passage, 1 Pet. iii. 19, which says that Christ 'went and preached unto the spirits in prison?' Where were these spirits?

"They were not in heaven, for there they would require no preaching; they were not in hell, for there preaching could be of no use to them; therefore they were in some middle state where the preaching of Christ could avail them, *and this is what Catholics call purgatory.*"[2]

And this is NOT what "Catholics" call purgatory. Purgatory is a place of punishment,—of expiation, as the quotations already made have sufficiently shewn, and although Mr Keenan cautiously avoids any such definition, and merely calls it "a middle state between hell and heaven,"[3]—yet his own reasonings upon the necessity of a place of expiation beyond death assume what his brethren more plainly assert. For example, in addition to what has already been quoted from him, let us take the following comment upon 1 Cor. iii. 13 and 15, where Paul speaks of men's works being tried by fire:—

"What on this do you remark?

"There can be no pain, or suffering, or fire in heaven; nor is the fire of hell for salvation, but for damnation; therefore this fire, which worketh unto salvation, must be in purgatory."

[1] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xxi., sect. 2. [2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., ch. xxi., sect. 1.

This is what "Catholics" call purgatory. But now here is a wonder surpassing transubstantiation, if this purgatory and the other, or limbo, are the same. For then this fire must be a place of happiness and rest.

It is perhaps worthy of notice how Mr Keenan here improves upon his original, Scheffmacher. Scheffmacher had quoted the passage from 1 Cor. iii., and made use of it for an argument in favour apparently of purgatory, but he had afterwards incautiously and inaptly introduced mention of limbo, or rather of the limbos;—for besides the *limbus patrum*, there is a *limbus infantum*, for infants dying unbaptised, though this seems to be rather an *opinion* than a *doctrine*, many good Papists consigning them without scruple and at once to hell. But Mr Keenan takes care not to allude to the limbos. Scheffmacher had done it in making remarks upon the text that says "As the tree falls, so it shall lie," saying that this passage *has no more force against purgatory than against the limbos*.[1] Mr Keenan gives his explanation of the same text, avoiding the limbos. And Bishop Coppinger, in his *translation* of Scheffmacher's Catechism, deals so freely with this part of it as to condense two questions into one, and keep out the limbos.[2] It is very evident that Scheffmacher had fallen into a mistake. He had named the limbos inopportunely.

Mr Keenan is by no means singular in identifying the *fire* of purgatory with the *rest* of limbo. Bishop Challoner does the same thing in his observations on 1 Pet. iii., 18-20. The "prison," he says, "could be no other than purgatory; for as to the spirits that were in the prison of hell, Christ did certainly not go to preach to them."[3] But perhaps he had *forgotten* limbo.

It would be easy to multiply instances of this sort; but I refrain. I deem it more interesting to take notice of two very peculiar views of purgatory, for one of which we are in-

[1] Scheffmacher, Cat. de Controv., ch. ix., sec. 2.
[2] Coppinger, Translation of Scheffmacher's Cat., p. 78.
[3] Grounds of Cath. Doct., ch. vii.

debted to Mr Keenan, and for the other to Dr Milner. The living controversialist thinks it might be designated paradise, and the late eminent bishop finds a place for it in Abraham's bosom! That this is no misrepresentation the following extracts will satisfy the reader:—

"Did not Christ say to the *good thief*,[1] 'This day thou shalt be with me in paradise?'

"Yes; *but it is not clear that by paradise is here meant heaven, and not purgatory*, and even if this were clear," &c., &c.[2]

Thus writes Mr Keenan.—The following is from Dr Milner:—

"What place, I ask, must that be, which our Saviour calls *Abraham's bosom*, where the soul of Lazarus reposed, Luke xvi., 22, among the other just souls, till, by his sacred passion, he paid their ransom? Not heaven, *otherwise Dives would have addressed himself to God instead of Abraham*," [It is a wonder he did not rather find here an argument for prayer to the saints] "but evidently a middle state, as St Augustin teaches. Again, of what place is it that St Peter speaks . . . 1 Pet. iii., 19. It is evidently the same which is mentioned in the Apostle's creed, 'He descended into hell;' not the hell of the damned, to suffer their torments, as the blasphemer Calvin asserts, but the prison above mentioned, or *Abraham's bosom;* in short, a middle state. It is of this prison, according to the Holy Fathers, our blessed Master speaks, where he says, 'I tell thee thou shalt not depart thence till thou hast paid the very last mite.' Luke xii., 59. Lastly, what other sense can that passage of St Paul's Epistle to the Corinthians bear . . . 1 Cor. iii. 13, 15. The prelate's diversified attempts to explain away these Scriptural proofs of *purgatory*," &c.[3]

Here, in the first place, Abraham's bosom is evidently made to be *limbo*, though limbo is not named, and then it turns out to be purgatory; it is at once a place of repose and of expiation,—nay, of fire. And this place for payment of the last mite,—this place of trial by fire is—*Abraham's bosom!* The only bosom

[1] The reader will attend to this interesting expression. Does it bear on morality in the same way that *penitent thief* does?
[2] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xxi., sect. 2.
[3] Milner, End of Controv., Letter xliii. "The prelate" is Bishop Porteous.

I ever heard of, that seems at all like it, is that of a certain figure of the Virgin anciently kept in the halls of the Inquisition, from which, when she embraced those who were committed to her kindness, knives and lancets sprung out,—a hellish invention of torture.[1]

Here, also, it is to be observed that the reference to Calvin is as impudently false, as it is, in expression, malignant. Reference is made to book and chapter of his institutes,[2] with an air of accuracy and confidence which makes the lie more base: but it is only necessary to consult the book and chapter named, in order to be satisfied that Calvin makes no assertion of the

[1] It is easy to see how the Bishop fell into this absurdity, from his dishonestly attempting to identify purgatory with limbo, with which, according to other Papists (see Dens, VII., 348-349) both Abraham's bosom and the paradise promised to the penitent thief are the same.

The reader will be interested by the following account of these places, which I take the liberty of borrowing from a valuable compilation of documents recently published, entitled "Romanism as it exists at Rome," by the Hon. J. W. Percy. It is an extract from a common manual, the "Christian Doctrine."

"Hell is the lowest and deepest place of the world, that is, the centre of the earth; and thus Scripture, in many places, contrasts heaven with hell, as the highest place with the lowest. But in this depth of the earth there are four, as it were, very great caverns; one for the damned, which is the deepest of all; and thus it is fit that the proud demons, and the men their followers, should be in the lowest place, and as far from paradise as can be found. In the second cavern, which is somewhat higher, are those souls who suffer the pains of purgatory. In the third, which is also a little higher, are the souls of those children who have died without baptism, the which do not suffer the torments of fire, but only the perpetual privation of eternal happiness. In the fourth, which is the highest of all, were the souls of the patriarchs and prophets and other saints, who died before the coming of Christ; for although those holy souls had nothing to be purged of, nevertheless they could not enter the blessed glory before Christ, by his death, had opened the gates of life eternal. On this account they remained in the highest part, called limbo by the holy fathers, or the bosom of Abraham, where they suffered no pain; but rather enjoyed a sweet repose, waiting with great joy the coming of the Lord." (Romanism at Rome, No. xv.)

[2] "Instit. l. ii. c. 16."

kind alleged by the Popish bishop; signifying his opinion that the words of the ancient creed, "He descended into hell," were meant to refer to the extremity of Christ's agony, when he bore our sins in his own body upon the tree. His, says the basely calumniated reformer, was not the mere death of the body,—he had to endure the wrath of God, "wherefore it was necessary that he should even contend as in close combat with the hosts of hell and the horror of eternal death." The chastisement of our peace was upon him, upon account of our sins he was bruised by the Father; as the substitute for sinners, he had therefore to come into their place: and "it is no wonder that he should be said to have descended into hell, since he endured that death, which is inflicted on sinners by an angry God."—— Afterwards Calvin further explains himself as speaking with reference to the torments of Christ's soul, and says that no more dreadful abyss can be imagined than that of a sense of desertion by God and alienation from God.[1]

In thus stating Calvin's opinions, I would not be held as adopting them to their full extent in respect of the origin of that clause of the creed to which they relate, or its meaning according to the intention with which it was inserted,—although his *doctrine* is too plainly scriptural, to be rejected by any save those who reject the true gospel of God. My object, however, has merely been to exhibit in his proper colours, the Romish bishop and controversialist, from whom the false accusation was quoted.

We have already had occasion to notice in passing, some of the Popish interpretations of Scripture texts connected with the defence of purgatory. It still remains for us, however, to look at a few of the Scripture arguments alleged in its behalf.

Beginning with Mr Keenan, we find him (or Scheffmacher, whom he here follows,) bringing forward one text, as he says, from the Old Testament; but this proof from the Old Testament turns out to be a passage from the second book of

[1] Calv. Inst., lib. ii., c. xvi., sec. 10, 11.

Maccabees,[1] clear enough certainly in favour of *prayer for the dead*, though giving no further countenance to the doctrine of purgatory,—but, of course, of no weight as an authority with those who do not admit the second book of Maccabees to be canonical. And the reference to this passage is therefore followed by an attempt to establish the canonical rank of the book, by reference to the opinion of the fathers, and particularly of Augustine. Into this question it is impossible here to enter. But notice may be taken, and it seems enough for the present purpose, of an attempt to remove an objection brought against the canonical authority of this book, and that upon the evidence of the book itself,—an objection which may well be held fatal to the Popish view, and sufficient in itself to counterbalance the opinions of a whole host of fathers. The following question and answer are from Mr Keenan :—

"Does not the author of Machabees make an apology for the errors it contains?

"Yes; for errors of *style*, but not for errors in fact or doctrine."[2]

The reader may consider within himself how well an apology for errors of style accords with the idea of inspiration. "Which, if I have done well, and as it becometh the history, it is what I desired, but if not so perfectly, it must be pardoned me."[3] How would it sound to prefix to these words, the words "As the Holy Ghost saith"? But what of inspiration, when there is an authority perpetually resident in the Church, which is at least equal to it? There are few errors which Popery does not patronise; and none which it is not ready to patronise for the sake of their patronage.

It may here be noticed in passing, that Mr Keenan improves a little on Scheffmacher in his reference to St Augustine. For Scheffmacher quotes that father as saying, "The Jews do not recognise the books of Maccabees as canonical, but the Christian

[1] 2 Macc. xii., 46.
[2] Keenan, Contr. Cat., ch. xxi., sect. 1.
[3] 2 Macc. xv. 39.

Church acknowledges them as such."[1] Mr Keenan suppresses the first part of the sentence, and makes the second more emphatic. "The Church of God has always acknowledged the Machabees as a canonical book."[2] He probably saw the inconvenience more clearly than the Jesuit of last century, of permitting the fact here mentioned regarding the Jews to come prominently before the reader's mind; as it might occur to some that the canon of the Jews was that which received the sanction of our Lord, and which is supported by the whole authority of the New Testament.

Mr Keenan adds to this part of Scheffmacher another proof "from the Old Testament," but he confines himself to a mere reference to the text. "See, for another argument on this subject of Purgatory, Gen. xxxvii. 35."[3] The text is as follows—"And all his sons and all his daughters rose up to comfort him, but he refused to be comforted; and he said, for I will go down into the grave [Popish version, *hell*] unto my son mourning. Thus his father wept for him." It would be curious to know how the argument for purgatory is wrought out of this verse. Can it be otherwise than by the dishonest identification of purgatory with limbo?

Of course, Papists in general are very much in the habit of referring to the passage in the second book of Maccabees, and lay great stress upon it. It is needless to occupy much time in shewing this, and yet our present purpose demands that it should be made to appear that this is their great and trusted argument *from the Old Testament*. Turning, therefore, to Milner's End of Controversy, the reader will find him commencing his argument for purgatory in the following manner :—

"To begin with the Old Testament, I claim a right of considering the two first books of Machabees as an integral part of them, because the Catholic Church so considers them, from whose traditions, and not from that of the Jews, as St Augustin signifies, our sacred canon is formed."[4]

[1] Scheffmacher, Cat. de Controv., ch. ix., sec. 1.
[2] Keenan, *ut supra*. [3] Ibid.
[4] Milner, End of Controversy, Letter xliii.

A convenient way of arguing! The doctrine of the Catholic Church is proved by the tradition of the Catholic Church. Why not reduce the argument to the simpler form; The Catholic Church holds the doctrine of purgatory, therefore it is true? But it is not true that the Catholic Church holds the doctrine of purgatory, unless the word Catholic be intended to mean Popish, which use of it is incorrect and calculated to deceive. And it is not true that the Catholic Church, properly so called, receives, or has received, the books of Maccabees as canonical. The Vaudois or Waldenses rejected, from the earliest periods, both the "purgatory dream" and the apocryphal books.[1] But this is Dr Milner's argument, by which the doctrine of purgatory is to be "demonstratively evinced" from the Old Testament. And he makes use of no other argument from the Old Testament.[2]

It is a melancholy thing to find Popish lecturers and writers, like Cardinal Wiseman, referring in support of their argument from the second book of Maccabees, to the countenance which this and other apocryphal works receive from Protestants, and especially from the Church of England. "It is allowed, at any rate, by all, to contain sound, edifying doctrine," says Cardinal Wiseman, "for even the Church of England allows, and even directs it to be read for instruction; whence one may conclude that she does not suppose it to contain doctrines opposed to the religion of Christ."[3] Cardinal Wiseman knew very well that

[1] See the ancient documents in the appendix to the first volume of Blair's History of the Waldenses.

[2] Dr Lingard also, in his *Catechetical Instructions on the Doctrines and Worship of the Catholic Church* (p. 120), brings forward this apocryphal verse to prove that it is lawful to pray for the dead. And having fortified it, in a note, with a New Testament argument of the most fanciful kind, (from Paul's prayer for Onesiphorus, 2 Tim. i. 18,) he adds:—

"But . . . . we know from the ancient liturgies, and the ancient writers, that before the Reformation there never existed a Christian Church which did not pray for the dead."

A glance at the Waldensian documents, unquestionably more ancient than the period of the Reformation, and some of them probably dating from the twelfth century, is enough to show the falsehood of this statement.

[3] Wiseman's Lectures on the Principal Doctrines, &c., II. 55.

he went too far in saying *By all*,[1] but it was a convenient mode of expression. But the argument which he thus puts, though it touches not the merits of the question, has a very awkward bearing upon the members of the Church of England. True, the book is not allowed to have authority to establish any doctrine; but if unsound, why should it be authoritatively recommended? When will the Church of England be purged from these relics of Popery?

This second book of Maccabees is chargeable with other errors besides that of which Papists make so much in their arguments; and we have a very ready and unanswerable argument against them in its speaking favourably of suicide, commending Razias, who, we are told, "struck himself with his sword, choosing to die nobly rather than to fall into the hands of the wicked, and to suffer abuses unbecoming his noble birth."[2]

What has now been said might have sufficed upon this topic, were it not that Dr Challoner in referring to Judas Maccabeus and the second book of Maccabees, happens to tell us that "these books" of Maccabees, "by many councils and fathers, are ranked amongst the Divine Scriptures."[3] Curious words when compared with what we have already seen. For either this bishop has made an unaccountable mistake, or the other bishops and learned theologians are egregiously wrong in their confident assertions as to the consent of the Church in acknowledging the canonicity of the book from which they quote. From all which it would appear that Popish bishops and priests would need to have good memories.

Arguments from the New Testament in favour of purgatory are produced in greater number than from the Old Testament. But when their nature is investigated, it will appear that the number of such arguments might be indefinitely multiplied.

[1] See a similar statement in Perrone, Praelect. Theol., I. 841.

[2] 2 Macc. xiv. 41, 42. Perrone attempts to defend this passage by a Jesuitical quibble. "He praises him for doing it *bravely*, not for doing it piously!!!" —Perrone, Praelect. Theol., I. 842.

[3] Challoner, Cath. Christ. Inst., ch. xiv.

Mr Keenan's first proof from the New Testament is Matth. xii. 32., "Whosoever speaketh a word against the Son of Man, it shall be forgiven him; but whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come." And in reasoning from this passage, in which he professes to follow Augustine, he begins in this offensive style—"That some sins are forgiven in the next world, otherwise this passage of Scripture would be nonsense." And this forgiveness, he argues, must be in some third place, as it can neither be in heaven nor in hell.[1] And so argues almost every Popish writer who touches at all upon this subject.[2]

But what if the mention of the world to come should be understood with particular reference to the day of judgment? Nothing, indeed, can be more obvious than the meaning of the passage,—the strongest possible assertion that there is no forgiveness of the sin against the Holy Ghost. Nothing can be more ridiculous than to infer from it that some sins, not forgiven in this world, are forgiven in the world to come. This thread will bear no portion of the weight that is hung upon it.

Bishop Milner professes to derive this argument, and perhaps truly, from the ancient fathers, for many of them were far enough gone in error to require it, and their interpretations of Scripture are often as fanciful and as silly as any that have ever been devised in later times.

Still more, if possible, do Popish controversialists favour and use an argument derived from the third chapter of First Corinthians, "And the fire shall try every man's work, of what sort it is, &c."[3] We have already seen how Mr Keenan employs this argument,[4] which has the countenance of the greatest names amongst the theologians of Rome, and is reiterated in all, or almost all, the books circulated amongst Papists in this country,

[1] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xxi., sect. 2.
[2] Milner, End of Controv., Letter xliii. Challoner, Cath. Chr. Instr., ch. xiv.; &c., &c.
[3] 1 Cor. iii. 11-15. [4] See p. 141.

wherever the subject of purgatory is introduced,[1] the reasoning being always very much in the same strain, that there can be no trial by fire in heaven, whatever may be the case as to paradise or Abraham's bosom, that the fire of hell is not for salvation, and that therefore this passage of Scripture must relate to purgatory. But the author of the Protestant's Trial by the Written Word sets forth this argument in a way even more interesting than others.

"Certain it is, he says, "that by the *wood, hay,* and *stubble,* are signified some sins or other of Christians, *which do not merit eternal damnation, because the Apostle assures us that the persons guilty of them will be saved;* for which sins nevertheless they will be punished in the other world; because, the same apostle declares they shall pass through fire, and whether this fire be understood of a material elementary fire, or a metaphorical one, that is, the affliction of the mind, great sufferers certainly must these souls be whilst they are passing through that fire, wherein their work will be burnt, though at length their persons will be saved, not without pain and difficulty. . . . Some lesser sins, then, according to the Apostle's doctrine, Christians die guilty of, *not deserving eternal damnation,* which nevertheless, are punished in the other world with fire, whatever that fire be; which is the genuine doctrine of purgatory maintained by Roman Catholics."[2]

And in beautiful consistency with this doctrine, he afterwards reasons on the texts which declare a judgment according to works, and an account to be given for every idle word.

"For who of a thousand can say, at the time of their death, that they have *by penance entirely cancelled every sin* they had committed, of thought, word, or deed?"[3]

But these quotations, in fact, just bring us again to the contemplation of that horrible Popish doctrine concerning sin and satisfaction, with which we have already sufficiently occupied ourselves. And when this was before us, the Popish mode of reasoning from texts relative to judgment for every idle word and judgment according to works was already exhibited. We need not therefore enter into this again. But it must be observed how gross the doctrine is in these quotations now made,—and how unhesitatingly the author assumes not only that sin is

[1] See End of Controversy, Letter xliii; Cath. Christ. Instr., ch. xiv.; Old Fashion Farmer, 41, &c., &c.
[2] Protestant's Trial, p. 40. [3] Ibid., p. 41.

to be *cancelled by penance*, and that some sins *do not merit* eternal damnation, but that if they did merit it they could not but infallibly be visited with it; as his proof that they do not merit it is the Apostle's assertion that those who are guilty of them will be saved.

As for the passage in 1 Cor. iii., on which these Popish reasonings are founded, it is very obvious that it relates not to a trial of persons but of works—whatever men may build upon the true foundation laid in Zion, which is Jesus Christ. And that it shall be better for a man to build that which is good and precious upon this foundation, than to build upon it what is worthless and vile, the Apostle very clearly and strongly declares: yet every man who builds upon this foundation shall be saved. It is the doctrine of Scripture that God accepts the works as well as the persons of his people,—not as meritorious, but for Christ's sake: but those works only which are good can be accepted of God. Papists are pleased to assume in their argument, that if a man's work is burned, he himself must suffer from the fire. He *suffers loss*, the Apostle says: but he does not say that the fire touches him, and the supposition is gratuitous and unwarrantable. A man may stand by and see his house burned. Besides, it is obvious enough that the term fire in this passage is to be understood metaphorically, according to the scope of the passage, which represents all possible "work" built by believers upon the foundation which God has laid, under emblems of two different classes, one consisting of things indestructible by fire, and the other of things readily consumed by it. To insist that the term *fire* is to be understood literally, is to adopt a principle of interpretation which would make the gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, and stubble to be literal also, and render the whole passage worse than meaningless. Moreover, the Apostle does not say that the fire shall purge every (or any) man or his work, but that it "shall try every man's work, of what sort it is."[1] And this is as far as possible re-

[1] "Apostolus non ait, *cujusque opus ignis purgabit:* sed *probabit.* Non igitur purgatorius est ignis, sed probatorius." Zanch. Opp., II, 383.

moved from the idea of a purgatorial fire, accomplishing the expiation of unremitted sin, and fulfilling the required amount of temporal punishment. And upon another account this passage of Scripture may rather be employed to refute the doctrine of purgatory than to sustain it, as the Apostle here affirms that every man's work shall be tried by this trial of fire; and Papists do not hold that every man passes through the fire of purgatory, but only some men, those who are not already in a condition for an immediate entrance into heaven, into which, however, some not only enter at once, but carry with them a stock of superabundant merits to be disbursed for the good of their more necessitous fellow-creatures.

It does not seem necessary to follow out this examination of Popish proof texts any farther. It remains only to allude, and that briefly, to the mode of refuting arguments derived from Scripture against this doctrine. Bishop Challoner, on the text[1] which tells us of the tree falling where it lies, "if it fall toward the south, or toward the north," first tells us that it is no way evident that this text has relation to the state of the soul after death; which, if he had paused there, might have been, if true, a sufficient reply to any argument deducible from that text,—but amusingly enough, he proceeds to say, that even on this view of it, it only proves "that when once a soul is come to the south, or the north, that is, to heaven or hell, its state is unchangeable."[2] So that we would be compelled to understand the text as not only of the tree's falling, but of some journey accomplished afterwards, perhaps on the back of some saint who carries his head below his arm.——On the words, "Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord, for they shall rest from their labours,"[3] Mr Keenan first exclaims, "Yes, thrice blessed we say," as if he could actually improve the text whose weak expression is not adequate to his rapture: and then he tells us that "this text only alludes to martyrs and such as die free from all sin and

[1] Eccl. xi. 3. [2] Challoner, Cath. Christ. Instr., ch. xiv.
[3] Rev. xiv. 13.

debt of temporal punishment, and such, of course, require no purification: they really die in the Lord."[1] And Bishop Challoner, on the same text, after interpreting it in the same way, proceeds to speak of others as *dying but imperfectly in the Lord.*[2] Such is the respect which Papists shew for Scripture; zealots us they sometime profess to be for its exact and literal interpretation. Such are the monstrous glosses which they invent for its plainest texts. Nothing can be more gratuitous than the assumption that the text above quoted refers only to those to whom Mr Keenan, after good example of higher authorities, is pleased to limit it: there is no more unwarranted invention of men than the notion of any person's dying imperfectly in the Lord.

If it were proper here to enter into the argument against purgatory, farther than we are necessarily led by the Popish authors whose arguments have been exhibited, much use might be made of a class of texts which have scarcely as yet been referred to, —texts which set before us the hopes of the Christian in such a way as to exclude the very notion of a purgatory intervening betwixt our present state on earth and the final joy of heaven. It has well been remarked, that "if there was in the time of Christ and his apostles such a place as purgatory, it must have been a place of little *note* and of little *use*,"—for nothing is said about it, and we hear of no one going to it.[3] The argument against the whole doctrine is very simple and conclusive from the beginning of the fifth chapter of Second Corinthians, where the Apostle speaks not as of himself alone and other eminent believers, but as of all true members of the Church of Christ. "For we know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven: . . . For we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened: not for that we would be unclothed, but clothed

[1] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xxi., sect. 2.
[2] Challoner, Cath. Christ. Instr., ch. xiv.
[3] Nevins, Thoughts on Popery, No. 43.

upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life. . . . Therefore we are always confident, knowing that, whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord: . . . We are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord."—The same argument arises in like manner out of 1 Thess. iv. 13-18, concerning which Bullinger has the following observations:—"When Paul the Apostle exhorted the Thessalonians to moderation in lamenting for the dead, the time being then very fit and most convenient to give commandment concerning offering of prayers for the souls of the dead, if he had thought them any whit profitable and necessary; yet, notwithstanding, he maketh no manner mention of them, yea rather, he simply teacheth what they ought to believe touching the souls of the faithful being separated from their bodies, namely, that they live in everlasting blessedness with Christ, waiting and looking for the resurrection of their bodies."[1]

But it is enough merely to have indicated this class of arguments against the Popish doctrine. It is not necessary to attempt any further exhibition of them, or even the briefest enumeration of the texts from which they are derived.

I may take notice, however, of a curious evasion, very illustrative of the genius of Popery. It naturally occurs as a strong argument against purgatory that the Scripture proclaims the state of departed believers in Christ to be a state of rest.[2] The Papist not only here intrudes his invented distinction betwixt dying perfectly in the Lord and dying imperfectly in the Lord; but lest this should not be quite satisfactory, he has another way of shuffling out of the difficulty. They rest, says Peter Dens, from the toils and pains of this life; although their rest cannot be said to be perfect, by reason of the torments which they endure, and therefore the Church prays that a place of rest may be granted to them.[3] Delahogue also expresses

[1] Bullinger, Decades, (Parker Soc.) IV. 396.
[2] Rev. xiv. 13.
[3] Dens, Theol., VII., 352-3. Peter Dens indeed, does not seem to be

himself to this effect, that the souls in purgatory "may well be said *to sleep in a sleep of peace*, inasmuch as they are safe from all temptation and danger, and secure of their own eternal bliss, whilst yet that peace does not exclude present though temporary torments."[1] And many Popish writers insist not a little upon the willingness of the souls in purgatory to suffer all that is requisite, and the consolation which they have amidst all their sufferings from the sure prospect of future glory—which, of course, they never knew until they went to that place of expiatory torment. But here is a marvel at least equal to that of the belief in transubstantiation, that men can believe a sleep of peace and a state of rest to be full of torments like the torments of hell!

The following sentences from the Life of a Popish Saint afford an illustration of the doctrine of purgatory, and of other parts of Popery. It is to Cardinal Wiseman that the British public are indebted for it. St John Joseph of the Cross is summoned to his mother's deathbed, and when he has arrived—

"She would not suffer him to deprive her for a moment of his dear company, feasting her maternal eyes, while death yet waived his dominion over them, upon the holy fruit of her womb, and never ceased recommending herself to his prayers. Her death ensued, full of hope, and calm, in the presence of her beloved; and stifling the swelling emotions of sensible grief, this incomparable son followed her remains to the church, and offered up for her soul the sacrifice of propitiation. Who shall adequately conceive his feelings during the celebration of that mass? how the tide of grief would break in upon the current of solemn ideas with which his mind was then possessed? or how his mind's eye beheld the matron's supplicating figure, catching the holy accents as they fell from his lips; her countenance brightening as the sacred mysteries advanced, and haply at the close her grateful spirit ascending to the seats of bliss, there to exercise the privileges of heaven first in his behalf, by imploring a boon for her son and deliverer."[2]

Even through the inflated nonsense of this style, it can be seen

aware that the difficulty arises from any text of the true Scriptures, but he meets with it in an apocryphal book,—Wisd. iv., 7.

[1] Delahogue, Tract. de Sac. Poen., 317.

[2] Lives of Saints of 26th May 1839, p. 130.

how the doctrine of purgatory is connected with the idolatry of Rome, by the exaltation of the wretched mass-priest into a DELIVERER.

I may be excused for mentioning here, as a further illustration of the same doctrine in its practical bearings, certain prayers which I find commended to the use of the faithful in an Italian book of devotion, though I have never seen the like in any one published in this country. But I suppose that what is sanctioned by competent authority at Rome can scarcely be condemned by a cardinal or priest anywhere. The faithful are exhorted, and urged by various motives suited to each particular case, upon certain days of the week set apart for these particular devotions respectively, to make special prayer for the soul that is nearest to issuing from purgatory—and for the soul that at present, according to justice, ought to be the last to issue from purgatory—and for the soul most rich in merit of all that are in purgatory—and for the soul in purgatory that was most devoted to the Most Holy Sacrament—and for the soul in purgatory for which he who makes the prayer is under the greatest obligation to pray—and for the soul in purgatory that was most devoted to the Most Holy Virgin: whilst, for the Lord's Day, it is recommended that generous regard should be had to that soul which of all others is left most destitute of particular suffrages. And these prayers are framed in such a way that in each of them particular reference is made to some particular suffering of the Lord Jesus Christ, which alone would seem to be made the ground of pleading with God, all being adjusted in order to a sort of effect upon the mind, like the parts of some poetic composition, and without reference to the simple sublimity of doctrinal truth. "O Lord God Almighty! I pray Thee, by the precious blood which Thy Divine Son Jesus did shed in the garden." . . . "O Lord God Almighty! I pray Thee, by the precious blood which Thy Divine Son Jesus did shed during His sore scourging." . . . And then follow the blood shed through the painful crowning with thorns—the blood shed on the streets of Jerusalem in the bearing of the cross—the blood

which flowed from the side of Jesus, &c.—in each instance as the separate ground of supplication for the liberation of some of these souls from purgatory.[1]

Are these devotions not used in this country as well as in Italy? And if not, we may surely ask, why not?

It would not be proper altogether to overlook, as a feature of the existing Popery of this country, the Purgatorian Societies which have been formed in various places, to secure the purchase of masses for the souls of their members after death, or for the souls of near relatives. These societies are very precise in their regulations, and appear to be conducted in a most business-like manner. The rules of the society, "instituted July 1st, 1813, and held in Saint James's Chapel," Dublin, provide for additional advantages, in respect of the number of masses said for their souls, to those who have served the society in certain official capacities, and that "every subscriber, without distinction, shall be entitled to the benefit of one mass each, provided that such member or subscriber shall die a natural death, be six months a subscriber to the institution, and be clear of all dues at the time of their departure."[2] Spiritual benefits are treated as mere temporal commodities might be. "That fire of purgatory," said Bullinger, three centuries ago, "is nothing else in very deed than a traffic or merchandise of most covetous men, whereby craftily and cunningly they purge the purses, not the souls, both of rich and poor."[3]

Societies for other *religious* purposes have also not unfrequently a provision that masses shall be said for the souls of their members, or of those who contribute liberally to their funds—an encouragement to liberal contribution. "In the Catholic Directory for 1842 it is announced that 'monthly masses will be made for such benefactors as will aid in paying off the debt

[1] *Preci Quotidiane ed Esercizi di pieta*, pp. 43-46; at the end of the *Uffizio della B. V. Maria*, &c., already quoted.

[2] See the rules in M'Gavin's Protestant, No. lxxvii., and in Elliott's Delineation of Roman Catholicism (Lond. 1844), p. 299.

[3] Bullinger, Dec. IV., 395 (Parker Soc.)

on the chapel and schools' situated in Wade Street, Poplar; and in addition to this privilege, that 'mass shall be said every quarter for those who are interred in the burial-ground.'"[1]

It were easy to multiply illustrations of the working of the doctrine of purgatory, in the odious practices and scenes to which it gives rise. The *canting of the corpse*, described in M'Gavin's Protestant,[2] is only in its form and circumstances grosser than the provision for payment of masses to relieve from purgatory by the Purgatorian Societies just noticed;—the priest, for the replenishment of whose pocket no society has cared, taking care of himself in a way better suited to the rudeness of a country district in Ireland, by standing up, and calling like an auctioneer, "Who gives for the soul of the faithful departed?"—"Who will give more . . . ?"—"Will nobody give more . . . ?" And so on, with intermingled benedictions of those who present him with sixpences and shillings for the pious purpose. And perfectly in harmony with this, are the accounts given by most trustworthy authors, of the scenes enacted in Ireland, when priests assemble to chant High Mass for the soul of some person of fortune sufficient to secure that privilege,—the sumptuous dinners and the copious potations which ensue.[3] But instead of bringing together such descriptions from Protestant authorities, however good, I prefer to exhibit Popery chiefly from its own books and documents, and by extracts, in regard to which misrepresentation cannot reasonably be alleged.

But this is certain and obvious, that the most precious things

[1] See Elliott's Delineation, 301.

[2] No. lxxx. It is the fashion with some Popish writers, when a reference has been made to M'Gavin, to set aside his evidence by designating him a *convicted liar*, alluding to the action of damages brought against him for defamation, and in which he was defeated. But it is one thing to fail in making out a story to the satisfaction of a court, and another thing to be convicted of having maliciously invented it. M'Gavin's character as a man of truth and probity was never in the slightest degree affected by the result of that action. The men who speak of him as a convicted liar rather brand themselves than him.

[3] Wylie on the Papacy, 352.

are openly sold,—that the rich obtain great advantages over the poor,—that half-a-crown is represented as going farther than a shilling by means of the religious rites for which money pays, towards securing the most inestimable benefits to a poor suffering soul. This also is undeniable, that the priests of Rome exhibit themselves as most hard-hearted men, in refusing to emancipate souls from purgatory by saying abundant masses for them, without a price paid down for every mass. The charge has been brought against them times without number, and pressed home with all the power of argument and of eloquence. The wonder is that they can listen unabashed, or that the members of their Church should not perceive in this single fact the character of the whole system of which they have been made the victims.

Gother, indeed, says, that "as for such as have no relation or friends to pray for them, or to give alms, or procure masses for their relief, they are not neglected by the Church, which makes a general commemoration of all the faithful departed in every mass, and in every one of the canonical hours of the divine office."[1] But all this may be very true, without in the least affecting the question as to the character of the Church and its priests;—for special advantages are represented as resulting to those who are able to pay, or whose friends pay for them, from the masses thus procured to be said with a reference to their souls in particular. "The priest first nominates those for whom he intends especially to apply the sacrifice,"[2] it is said in the *Abridgment of the Christian Doctrine:* and in the *Christian Doctrine* itself, as set forth in Italy, it is taught that the mass, and prayers, and the other good works, although in some measure they are common to all, nevertheless they profit much more those, for whom they are made in particular, than the others."[3] Nay, Saint Alphonsus De Liguori, that saint in so high repute

[1] Gother's Papist Misrepresented and Represented, sect. 21.
[2] Abridgment of the Christ. Doct., p. 128. (Dublin, Printed by Richard Grace.)
[3] Percy's Romanism at Rome, p. 15.

with our British Papists and so highly commended amongst them as a theologian,—after making a nice distinction, in that true Popish fashion, which seems fitted only to fill the mind with perplexity and bewilderment, betwixt the mass as a sacrifice and the mass as a suffrage instituted by the Church,—declares that in the character of a suffrage the efficacy of the mass is certainly finite, and when it is applied to a greater number, it is so much the less useful to each, and of course is most beneficial when intended for one person alone.[1] And in accordance with this are the inscriptions on marble slabs and framed papers in the churches and chapels at Rome, which inform their readers that such or such a pope has deigned to grant to such or such an altar, that whatsoever priest shall celebrate mass there, "for the soul of whomsoever of the faithful defunct, the same soul, by virtue of the merits of Jesus Christ, of the most Blessed Virgin, and of all the saints, shall be liberated from the pains of purgatory."[2]

Bishop Challoner instructs the ordinary members of his Church that at the memento for the dead, they are to "represent to the Eternal Father this victim, which takes away the sins of the world, in behalf of all the faithful departed in the communion of the Church, and particularly of their relations, friends, &c., and those who stand most in need of their prayers, or for whom God is most pleased that they should pray."[3] It is difficult, indeed, to conceive how it is to be made out, as to the priest, that God is most pleased that he should pray for those for whom he is *paid* to pray.

"Year after year," says Mr Godkin, a converted Papist, "it was my lot to listen to a priest appealing to his congregation on behalf of the 'suffering souls in purgatory.' *On All-Saints' Day*, their woes were painted in colours so dark and dismal,—the case of a recently departed father, mother, brother, or child, was brought out and dwelt upon in terms so pathetic and harrowing,

[1] Liguori, Theologia Moralis, IV., 111 (Paris, 1845.)
[2] Percy's Romanism at Rome, Nos. v., vi., vii., &c.
[3] Challoner, Cath. Chr. Instr., 124.

—that the people wept aloud. The peroration of this discourse was always an appeal to the purse; it would be barbarous to resist it; and most of them gave in their names as subscribers to the pious list."[1]

Although Papists represent some men only as going to purgatory when they die, whilst some go direct to heaven, and some are consigned hopelessly to hell, yet it would be curious to know for whom a Popish priest ever refused to say masses, upon proper payment made, in order to the release of his soul from purgatory, or for whom he ever thought it unnecessary that they should be said.

But if we consider what Papists represent the mass to be, it cannot but be deemed a most audacious as it is a most wicked piece of imposture, by which, in order that the price of many masses may be secured, a limitation is put upon the efficacy of each. It occurs also, as a difficulty not to be got over, that the alleged sacrifice of the mass is represented as being applied for deliverance from the temporal punishment of purgatory, whilst the sacrifice of Christ upon the cross itself is not represented as so applied, but as leaving Christ's people subject to temporal punishment still. And with regard to this last point, it has been very pertinently asked, for what Christ suffered temporal afflictions, if temporal punishment is not remitted to us in virtue of his sufferings?[2]

The doctrine of intention has come incidentally before us in some of the extracts which have been made. All depends on the intention of the priest,—on his *applying* the *sacrifice* to the proper person. Without this, the mass will not avail for the deliverance of that person's soul from purgatory. Nor is the sacrament a real and valid sacrament without the intention on the part of the priest, of at least doing what the Church does. So says the Council of Trent.[3] It is held to be a great offence in

[1] Godkin's Guide from the Church of Rome to the Church of Christ, p. 99. (Belfast, 1845.) For an instance of a still more odious method of working upon the feelings of bereaved relatives, as practised in Ireland, see Kirwan's Letters to Hughes, Letter II.

[2] See Poole's Dialogue. [3] Conc. Trid., Sess. vii., can. xi.

Popish priests to apply the mass otherwise than as they ought to apply it. But how fearful the doctrine which lodges such a power of more than life and death in the hands of a fellow-sinner! There has been at least one instance of an Irish priest, vexed in conscience on the approach of death, leaving a considerable legacy to another priest to be expended on masses for such *intentions* as he himself had neglected to discharge.[1] But what a prolongation of suffering did his heartless negligence occasion, according to Popish theology, to the poor souls whose friends he deceived when he took their money! And are we to suppose that every conscience is necessarily awakened like his? On what slender threads the Papist's hope depends! Amidst what a multitude of uncertainties is he doomed to remain, anxiously turning from one to another, but still brought back to seek further assistance from his priest!

Protestant authors have frequently made use of an argument against the Popish doctrine of purgatory, founded upon the fact of its having been a doctrine of ancient heathenism; and passages from Homer and Virgil have been adduced in evidence, —passages so exactly accordant with the very notions and practices of Papists, as to give great poignancy to the sarcastic remark of Archbishop Wake, "that were but their poems canonical it would be in vain for the most obstinate heretic here to contend with them."[2] "It must then be confessed," he adds, with more particular reference to the opinions of Plato, "that our adversaries in this point have at least 400 years' antiquity, not only against us, but even beyond Christianity itself." We have already seen that by the confession of Papists themselves, and in particular of the most distinguished advocates of Popery in this country, the evidence from Scripture in support of purgatory is rather scanty,—so that they appeal from Scripture to tradition, and fall back upon the authority of the Church. This deserves to be considered in connection with the wonderful clear-

[1] Wylie on the Papacy, 353.

[2] Wake, Discourse of Purgatory; in Gibson's Preservative, XI., 2.

ness and preciseness of the passages in the twelfth book of the Odyssey, and the sixth book of the Æneid.

But it is curious to see how Popish authors meet the argument which is thus brought against their doctrine. The existence of the doctrine of purgatory amongst the heathen is to be ascribed to a tradition of the primeval religion![1] "I care not for the imputation of a Pagan origin," says Dr MacHale, "for what were the universal doctrines of Paganism but fragments of truth originally revealed to man, dislocated and deformed by those by whom they were continually broken?"[2]

It is an ingenious evasion, and nothing more. For such traditions of the primeval religion are mere traces of the original doctrine, in midst of sad error and corruption,—whilst in Scripture the truth is gloriously brought to light. But in this case, the alleged tradition has preserved the doctrine far more fully and exactly than it is to be found in Scripture. A case really parallel would be found in the use of images, for which the Church of Rome might fitly quote the worshippers of Jupiter and Juno, or of Vishnu and Kali, ascribing the universal prevalence of the practice to a tradition of the primeval religion, rather than to hell's activity and man's corruption.

It is wonderful how courageously Popish writers come forward to advocate the doctrine of purgatory as favourable to the interests of morality. Bellarmine exclaims loudly against the denial of it, as removing a restraint from the commission of sin! "Is not this rare cant?" says Archbishop Wake in reply, "to hear those who have taken away the fears of hell, with a demure countenance exclaim against us as wicked, in throwing off so great an engagment to piety, as, if you will believe it, they esteem purgatory to be?"[3]

But recent Popish authors do not seem so fond of repeating and insisting upon this argument of Cardinal Bellarmine, as of

[1] Perrone, Praelect. Theol., I., 847.
[2] MacHale, Evidences and Doctrines, 464.
[3] Wake, Discourse of Purg.; Gibson's Preservative, XI., 28.

recommending purgatory to the tender sensibilities and generous affections,—a still more arduous task, it might seem, than to persuade men of its being favourable to morality. "The doctrine of purgatory will not be deemed the less entitled to our belief," Dr MacHale begins, "because it so fully accords with the finest feelings of the human heart."[1] And he goes on to speak of the mind loving to commune with a departed friend, and of the warm interest felt in his destiny. Strange mode of argument which fixes upon nothing really pertaining to the doctrine which it is meant to support! for the Papist does not suppose that our communion with departed friends must cease when they have entered heaven, although he supplements and perverts the Scriptural doctrine on that subject. Nor can it be very gratifying, surely, to those feelings which move us to take a warm interest in the destiny of our friends, if we are made to believe it as most probable that they may all have a considerable time to spend in flames and torment before they at last find admittance into heaven. Yet Dr MacHale represents it as *most consolatory*, and winds up with a peroration so extraordinary, that it is impossible to refrain from quoting it. It is thus that he strikes the balance betwixt Popery and Protestantism. "In the relative estimation of *two religions which adopt or reject* THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS, one may be compared to the condition of savage life, where all live in a state of sullen independence, neither assisted by the aid, nor ministering to the wants, of each other; while the other resembles society in the fullest tide of civilization, bringing together regions the most remote, and people the most dissociated; spreading the benefits of its commerce through every tribe and nation, and pouring over the barrenness of one country the superfluous riches of another."

The benefits of its commerce! Yes! now we may see how Popish priests find purgatory so consolatory. Dr MacHale has unintentionally betrayed the secret. The *superfluous riches* will explain it all.

Perrone also endeavours to represent purgatory as of an agree-

[1] MacHale, Evidences and Doctrines, 464.

able aspect.[1] Delahogue addresses himself to the same task in the treatise already mentioned as a Maynooth text-book.[2] Milner insists upon it in his End of Controversy.[3] "O! how consoling," (he exclaims) "are the belief and practice of Catholics in this matter, compared with those of Protestants!" But the main point with him is this, that "as to any farther communication with the deceased, when the grave closes on their remains," Protestants "do not so much as imagine any." And what communication do Papists maintain with the deceased? Dr Milner does not speak of apparitions; but we can help our departed friends in various ways, and there is "an intercourse of kind and often beneficial offices." It belongs still more clearly to his doctrine that there is *much need* of these beneficial offices. We Protestants are not very unreasonable in taking consolation from the thought that our departed friends have *no need* at all.

Cardinal Wiseman, on this subject, expresses himself like his brethren. "As a practical doctrine," this doctrine of purgatory, he tells us, "has an influence highly consoling to humanity, and eminently worthy of a religion that came down from heaven to second all the purest feelings of the heart." He expatiates on the tie of affection, which refuses to surrender its hold, when the object of affection dies, but follows the departing spirit in its flight. He waxes still more sentimental and poetic. "Cold and dark as the sepulchral vault, is the belief that sympathy is at an end, when the body is shrouded in decay; and that no further interchange of friendly offices may take place between those who have laid them down to sleep in peace, and us, who, for a while, strew fading flowers upon their tomb."[4] And, with the variety arising from his style and illustration, he presents the same argument,—appeals to the sensibilities in the very same way with Milner and MacHale. It may be, that he finds persons who are so lost amongst his illustrations and the tender associations which he anxiously labours to call up, that they

[1] Perrone, Praelect. Theol., I. 841.
[2] Delahogue, Tract. de Sac. Poen., 320.
[3] Letter xliii.
[4] Wiseman, Lectures on the Principal Doctrines, &c. II., 68.

never observe what is the real point in debate,—which is, whether it is more pleasant to think that Christians, when they die, go at once to heaven, or that they go to the suburbs of hell, (or at least into torment,) for an unknown period, before they come to that place of rest, glory, and joy.

Cardinal Wiseman says, "Sweet is the consolation to the dying man, who, conscious of imperfection, believes that even after his own time of merit is expired, there are others to make intercession on his behalf."[1]——Sweet must be the consolation, surely, of thinking that he has yet a heavy debt to pay, and must pay it to the uttermost farthing, unless his friends pay part of it for him; whilst even in that case it may, perhaps, be many days and years ere their suffrages and his torments united have accomplished all the payment! It is a beautiful developement of the Popish doctrine of justification. How different their consolation, who, sensible not only of imperfection but of much sin, can take up the Redeemer's words, "It is finished!"

Closely connected with this subject of purgatory is that of indulgences. It is the alleged *temporal* punishment of sin for which purgatory is adapted, and it is for this also that indulgences are provided,—although ignorant or simple Papists may be excused who fall into the mistake of supposing that the whole punishment due to sin is remitted, for the language employed in granting indulgences seems eminently calculated to mislead in this particular,—and Protestants who see a certain rate or price of indulgence set down for certain crimes ought not to be very severely censured if they imagine the indulgence to be a permission beforehand to commit these crimes.

Neither Protestants nor Papists can forget the connection between the too audacious sale of indulgences and the Reformation of the sixteenth century. Since that period, Rome has been more cautious, and has not sent out another Samson or Tetzel. The Council of Trent was cautious, and avoided saying too much on the evidently dangerous subject. The theologians and con-

[1] Wiseman, *as last quoted.*

troversialists of our own and other countries have sometimes been too cautious, as in their anxiety not to state anything which might bring their Church's doctrine into disrepute, they have contradicted one another concerning the real import and efficacy of indulgences,[1] some representing them as mere remissions of canonical penances, whilst others ascribe to them a far higher value. The former is Bossuet's assertion, in which he is followed by Gother,—though how either of them could believe that this was the meaning of the popes who granted indulgences, or the doctrine of their Church with regard to them, it is so hard to imagine, that we are compelled to the simpler explanation of supposing them to have intended to deceive Protestants, and to elude, when they could not rebut, Protestant arguments.

Mr Keenan is exceedingly adroit in his management of this difficult subject. He gives a more correct definition of indulgences than Bossuet or Gother, making them extend to the remission of all temporal punishment due to sin; but then he proceeds to argue as if temporal punishment meant nothing else than canonical penance, and not only refers to St Paul and to the Council of Ancyra, but also, in his own refined and gentlemanly way, to the *cutty stool* of Scotland, and the commutation of the ecclesiastical censure for a pecuniary fine,[2]—a corruption of discipline very far removed in its character from the Popish sale of indulgences, but sufficiently offensive to any right-minded Christian, and which is now probably nowhere known but as a tradition of the past.

Mr Keenan defines an indulgence thus:—

"It is a remission of the temporal punishment due to venial sin, and also to mortal sin, after the eternal punishment has been remitted."[3]

Then, after telling us that sins are not remitted by indulgences, "*but by the sacraments of baptism and penance*," he goes on to prove that "when the sinner is properly disposed," the Church has power to remit temporal punishments, for, "when the

[1] See Dr Cunningham's Notes to Stillingfleet, Doct. and Pract., ch. viii.
[2] Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xix. [3] Ibid.

applicant or sinner is properly disposed, the Church has power to remove every obstacle to his admission into heaven;" for, says he, "a debt of temporal punishment due to God's justice is a temporary obstacle, therefore the Church has power to remove it;" arguing from Matth. xviii., 18, that "the powers of the Church over sin and its punishment are not in any way confined or restrained, provided always that the sinner have the proper dispositions, and if the Church has power to remit the sin itself (as beyond all doubt she has) she has surely power to remit the *temporal punishment* due to sin."

Large powers, it would seem! But their magnitude is the great boast of the Popish priesthood. And now no wonder if the poor Papist should go to the priest instead of going to God. But it is rather wonderful, after all this, to find the argument immediately assuming such a shape that canonical penances and ecclesiastical censures alone seem to be taken into account,—although, even in this view, it is to no purpose that we are referred to St Paul; and it only excites a smile of contempt when we are told—though it is a favourite Popish argument, and elaborately wrought out by Cardinal Wiseman—that he "granted an indulgence to the incestuous Corinthian, by the remission of the temporal punishment to which he had subjected that public sinner." However, we are afterwards told that canonical penances were inflicted by the Church as a temporal punishment due to sin, and that "this, as inflicted by his Church, is accepted by God either as the whole or a part of what his justice demands, for whatever his true Church does, is done by himself;" where a principle is laid down which evidently extends to purgatory as well as to canonical penance, the priests of the Church being at the same time invested, in all that relates to the pardon of sin, with all the power of the Godhead.

The power of granting indulgences, Cardinal Wiseman says, "is included in the commission given by Christ to his Apostles, to forgive or to retain sin." And again, after much to the same effect, he has this strong sentence—"A tribunal WHICH HAS THE POWER OF FORGIVING GUILT, AND SUBSTITUTING A SMALLER

SATISFACTION TO THE MAJESTY OF THE OFFENDED, must surely have the comparatively insignificant authority still further to modify, or even to commute, the satisfaction which it has imposed."[1] It may well be admitted.

It is to be remarked that Mr Keenan takes care not to say, in his Controversial Catechism, that the pains of purgatory are remitted by an indulgence, or that souls can be released from purgatory by indulgences; although he says that the temporal punishment of sin "may be inflicted here or in purgatory, and if not discharged here, it must be discharged hereafter."[2] In his Catechism of the Christian Religion, he explains his views more fully. In ancient times, it seems, when severe penances were imposed, the satisfaction due to God was to a great extent paid thereby; "but now that penances so light are imposed, much of the temporal punishment must remain due to God, and it is this temporal punishment which is remitted by an indulgence."[3] The way to heaven, therefore, must be smoother now than in the ancient times, to those, at least, who gain indulgences. How strangely this contrasts with Mr Keenan's indignation against Luther, for his alleged smoothing of the way! And as to souls in purgatory, Mr Keenan states that an indulgence can be granted in their favour, though he proceeds to say that it is "in a very different manner from that which regards the living,"—for the Church grants an indulgence to the living, "*by way of absolution*, that is, in virtue of her jurisdiction over them," but to the dead it "can be applied only by *way of suffrage*."[4] However, this distinction may well be deemed of little practical importance, as the effect seems to be equally great in the one way and in the other. And abundant evidence might be produced to show that popes, in granting indulgences, have not always so nicely regarded the limits of their jurisdiction. Their power would seem to be complete enough, if we may judge from the

[1] Wiseman, Lectures on the Principal Doctrines, &c., II., 72, 73.
[2] Keenan, *ut supra*.
[3] Keenan, Cat. of Chr. Rel., II., 62. [4] Ibid, II., 66.

privileges bestowed upon churches and altars, in Rome and elsewhere, of which the following is a mere ordinary illustration—

"Every mass celebrated at this altar liberates a soul from purgatory."[1]

And similar concessions are made in connection with rosaries, scapulars, and other trumpery of superstition. Moreover, Peter Dens and other theologians tell us that an indulgence for the dead is an act of jurisdiction over the treasures of the Church;[2] and the difficulty which here presents itself is covered up amidst new and nice distinctions.

Bishop Challoner says—

"The treasures of the Church, according to divines, are the merits and satisfactions of Christ and His saints, out of which the Church, when she grants an indulgence to her children, offers to God an equivalent for the punishment due to the divine justice."[3]

Mr Keenan says, that when the Church grants an indulgence "she applies to the living, by mode of absolution, the infinite satisfactions of Christ, and the merits of His saints, to compensate for what we owe to divine justice."[4] "There exists in the Church," says Delahogue, "a treasure from which indulgences are derived, which is composed, in the first place, of the merits and satisfactions of Christ, and in the second place, of the merits and satisfactions of the saints."[5] Dens gives the same account of the matter, with more particular mention of the Blessed Virgin.[6]

We shall not follow these writers in their attempts to establish the Church's right to meddle and deal with this alleged treasure. We shall rather turn to their explanations of some of the terms which are employed in designating the different kinds of indulgences which the Popes are pleased to grant.

[1] See Percy, Romanism at Rome, pp. 2, 3, &c.
[2] Dens, Theol. VI. 439, 441. See also Delahogue, Tract. de Sac. Poen., 357.
[3] Challoner, Cath. Chr. Instr., ch. x.
[4] Keenan, Cat. of Chr. Rel., II., 65.
[5] Delahogue, Tract. de Sac. Poen., 340.
[6] Dens, Theol., VI., 417.

The following questions and answers are from Bishop Challoner :—

"What is meant by a *plenary indulgence?*

"That which, when duly obtained, releases the whole punishment that remained due upon account of past sins.

"What is meant by an indulgence of seven years, or of forty days?

"By an indulgence of so many years or days is meant the remission of the penance of so many years or days, and consequently of the punishment corresponding to the sins, which, by the canons of the Church, would have required so many years or days of penance," &c.[1]

And so he goes on to show that an indulgence of a thousand years or more would just be to be explained in the same simple and easy way, although, of course, in this latter case the person could not live long enough to fulfil his penance, and therefore would have so much the more need of the application of some portion of the treasures of the Church on his behalf.

Similar explanations we have from other writers.[2] It seems strange enough, therefore, that indulgences should ever have been granted for periods far exceeding the term of human life, as for periods of a thousand or ten thousand years, or even longer, of which abundant examples are easily produced. It would really seem as if the popes themselves had fallen into the *vulgar error* against which Peter Dens guards his readers, of supposing that the term specified in the indulgence was a term of purgatorial suffering from which release is granted, not of mere canonica penance corresponding thereto.[3] Their language has at all events been sufficiently calculated to encourage that opinion. And the truth of the matter appears to be, that by a plenary indulgence was originally meant an entire remission of sins, and that the other meaning was only an invention of more recent times, to meet the exigences of controversy.[4]

It is to be observed that our modern Papists of this country,

[1] Challoner, *ut supra.*

[2] Keenan, Cat. Chr. Rel., II., 63.

[3] Dens, Theol. VI., 419. Mr Hobart Seymour, in his Mornings among the Jesuits, falls into this error.

[4] See Tayler, Popery, its Character and Crimes, 178.

at least in their writings, are generally careful to avoid any very strong expressions as to the efficacy of indulgences, and to guard themselves against being supposed to teach that these confer the remission of sins, or secure the soul from the pains of hell. Even Dr James Butler says, that "sin must be remitted *by penance*, as to the guilt of it, and as to the eternal punishment due to mortal sin, before an indulgence can be gained,"—and that the Church grants indulgences "to such only as are in a state of grace, and are sincerely desirous to amend their lives, and *to satisfy God's justice by penitential works,*"[1] amongst which ere long, *alms-deeds* come to be mentioned, so that the satisfaction of God's justice may yet be ascribed, in part at least, as in the days of Tetzel, to the payment of money into the coffers of the Church. However, we have here a very obvious attempt to screen the doctrine of indulgences from that odium which has so often been cast upon it. But these reservations and abatements from the efficacy of indulgences are mere verbal reservations,—a flimsy disguise for the actual enormity. How ridiculous they seem when the sale of indulgences is considered, and the tax-tables of the Roman chancery and penitentiary! And it is not only with the language of controversial theologians that we have to do, but with the language of popes granting indulgences. This may surely be thought as fair an exhibition of the doctrine in question, and of the true character of Popery, as that either of the subordinate vender of indulgences, on the one hand, whose interest inclined him in one way, that he might make the most of his wares, or of the theological writer, on the other hand, whose interest inclines him in another way, that he may make the most of his cause. The following are the words of the Bull of Indiction by Leo XII., for the Jubilee of 1825.[2]

"We proclaim the arrival of the year of expiation and pardon, of re-

[1] Most Rev. Dr James Butler's Cat., Lesson xxviii.

[2] "What do you mean by a jubilee indulgence? Plenary indulgence granted by the Pope every twenty-five years to all those who visited the four principal churches of Rome. It was at first granted only every century, then every fifty years," &c. (Keenan, Cat. of Chr. Rel., II., 63.)

demption and grace, of remission and indulgence. . . . . If those estates which had been sold, and the goods which had been rendered the property of another person, were all restored in the year of salvation, we now, through the infinite liberality of God, receive the virtues, merits, and gifts, of which we had divested ourselves by the commission of sins. . . . We are now absolved from the debt of our sins, and by the divine compassion we are delivered from their punishment.

. . . . "We proclaim and publish the universal and great jubilee to commence in this holy city, from the first vespers of the next Eve of the Nativity. . . . . During this year of jubilee WE MERCIFULLY IN THE LORD GRANT AND IMPART THE MOST PLENARY AND COMPLETE INDULGENCE, REMISSION, AND PARDON OF ALL THEIR SINS, to all the faithful in Christ, of both sexes, who are truly penitent and have confessed, and who have likewise refreshed themselves with the holy communion,—provided (if Romans, or inhabitants of the city) they shall have devoutly visited these churches of the city, that of the blessed Peter and Paul, of St John Lateran, and that of St Mary Major, at least once a day for thirty days," &c.[1]

Nothing can be more evident than that these words are calculated to suggest the highest ideas of the value of the indulgence granted, as extending to the entire removal of all sin, and deliverance from punishment. Nor would such impressions probably be weakened, but rather confirmed, when afterwards the Pope was heard to declare, that if the persons who should obtain these jubilee indulgences should die as true penitents in the love of God, before they should have rendered satisfaction for their sins of commission and omission, "yet their souls are already expiated by the fire of purgatory, so that an entrance lies open for them into the eternal country, into which nothing that is defiled and unholy can enter." And such is the ordinary tenor of the language employed in granting indulgences. Nay, Boniface VIII., the inventor of the jubilee, promised in his Bull of Indiction, "not only full and larger, but even the fullest pardon of sins."[2] The attempt which Popish disputants make to represent sins as pardoned in the sacrament of penance or otherwise, before an indulgence comes into operation, is quite at variance with this language. In the city of Rome itself may be

[1] See the whole Bull in Elliott's Delineation, 355-358.
[2] Tayler, Popery, its Character and Crimes, 178.

seen, over the gateways of churches, and in conspicuous places within them, inscriptions and framed papers announcing the indulgences there to be obtained, with their conditions. These inscriptions proclaim "Indulgence plenary, perpetual, daily, for the living and the dead." From them it appears that upon certain conditions appointed, generally including some of the most puerile and contemptible nature, some pope or other has been pleased to "grant mercifully in the Lord the plenary indulgence and remission of sins." In the church of St John Lateran a framed parchment tablet conveys, or very recently did convey, the information that "by incontestable tradition, St Sylvester I., Pope, conceded remission of all sins to those who should visit this most holy Arch Basilica, which indulgence was confirmed by Gregory II., after having consecrated this church, restored after its destruction by heretics. Besides," the same tablet further bears, "Boniface IX., Pope, said, 'If any one shall come to our Lateran Church for the purpose of praying, of piety, or of pilgrimage, let him be purged of every stain of sin.' This plenary indulgence, as it appears from ancient documents, was annexed to the following days," &c., &c., &c.[1]

How, I would ask, can the terms in which these indulgences are granted be reconciled with the assertion made by so many Popish authors, that an indulgence is not a remission of sins? "By an indulgence," says Mr Keenan, "we mean, not the remission of past or future sins, but the remission of the whole or

[1] Percy's Romanism at Rome, 16, 18, 33, 34. These inscriptions in the churches of Italy would seem to be sufficiently authentic in the estimation of the greatest Popish dignitary in Britain, as may be inferred from the following note regarding the *pardon of Asisium*, in a volume of which he is the editor—the very word *pardon* here helping to explain the word *indulgence*. "The Perdono of Asisi, kept on the second of August, is so called from the plenary indulgence which Almighty God himself ordered St Francis to give to all who should visit the church of Asisi, or any of the Franciscan churches, upon that day. The autograph of St Francis, containing his publication and grant of this indulgence, is still exposed to view in the sacristy of the great church at Asisi, to which an incredible number of pilgrims resort very year." (Lives of Saints of 29th May 1839, p. 208.)

part of the temporal punishment," &c.[1] "It is no pardon for sin of any sort, past, present, or future," says Cardinal Wiseman in like manner, "It is no more than a remission by the Church, in virtue of the keys, or the judicial authority committed to her, of a portion, or the entire, of the temporal punishment due to sin."[2] Here, surely, it may be proper to apply the rule and argument of Peter Dens. Indulgences, he says, "have all the worth that their terms bear [*tantum valeant, quantum sonant, sive pronuntiantur*], for otherwise the granting of indulgences would involve fraud, and the Church, or the ecclesiastical superior, proclaiming or pronouncing indulgences, would be found guilty of lying or falsehood, *which is absurd*, as St Thomas saith."[3] It will not mend the matter to tell us, as Cardinal Wiseman does, that "the phrase forgiveness of sins, which occurs in the ordinary forms of granting an indulgence," applies merely to *outward* guilt, or absolution and forgiveness in the face of the Church, and to refer to the connection of indulgences with the old penitential canons which have fallen into disuetude.[4] The language is, in that case, only fitted to deceive. Moreover, the most approved theologians will be found to maintain that an indulgence is efficacious for the remission of temporal punishment, not only before the Church, but before God [*in foro Dei*;[5]] which principle being applied to the term remission of sins, must surely lead to a conclusion different from the assertion of Cardinal Wiseman.

Allusion has been made to Dr Wiseman's elaboration of the argument from the case of the incestuous Corinthian, and it seems proper to return to it,—it affords so remarkable an illustration of the mode of reasoning in which that theologian excels. It is too long to be quoted without abridgment; but a few extracts may suffice.[6]

[1] Keenan, Cat. of Chr. Rel., II., 61.
[2] Wiseman, Lectures on Principal Doctrines, &c., II., 71.
[3] Dens, Theol. VI., 435.
[4] Wiseman, Lectures on Principal Doctrines, &c., II., 83.
[5] See Delahogue, Tract. de Sac. Poen., 335,
[6] See Wiseman, Lectures on Principal Doctrines, &c., II., 73-75.

He quotes 1 Cor. v., 3-5. He then goes on :—

"Several remarks present themselves naturally upon the perusal of this text. First, a punishment is here inflicted of a severe character. . . . Secondly, this punishment, whatever it may have been, was remedial, intended to reclaim the sinner, and by the injury of the body, to rescue the soul from eternal loss."

From one gratuitous assumption to another the Popish doctor thus proceeds, laying the foundation of his argument. First, you have only to admit that the discipline exercised in this case was properly of the nature of punishment. Secondly, you must interpret the delivering to Satan for the destruction of the flesh as signifying some injury to be done to the body, in order to the salvation of the soul. These points being established, in the simplest and easiest manner, you come to the third point to be noted in this argument. And here the practice of the Church of Rome is made evidence in favour of the doctrine of the Church of Rome, or one Popish doctrine receives support from another, itself equally in need of it.

"Thirdly, the act here described was not within the terms, strictly so called, of remission or retention of actual guilt; inasmuch as it was performed and the punishment inflicted by the whole congregation, with Saint Paul at their head, but only in spirit, that is, sanctioning by his authority and concurrence all their acts. But the sacramental forgiveness or retention of sin has never been considered a congregational act, or one to be performed by the body of the faithful, nor even by any pastor of the Church, however dignified, at a distance. Hence, we must conclude that a penance of some sort was imposed upon the incestuous Corinthian, intended for his amendment," &c.

Here we have the very rules which govern the Popish priest in the exercise of those powers which he impiously arrogates, gravely made the basis of an argument concerning the nature of this transaction in the apostolic age at Corinth, and the conclusion thus reached is made part of what professes to be a *Scripture* argument in favour of penance and indulgences. In the haste of this argument, it is indeed admitted that penance was imposed by the *congregation* at Corinth, and not by a priest in the

exercise of his priestly authority. But it was necessary that the argument should be made out in any way, in order that something like penance and something like an indulgence might seem to have been in the Apostolic Church at Corinth. Dr Wiseman, having quoted 2 Cor. ii., 5-10, represents the penitent as receiving indulgence. But he says—still building assumption upon assumption, and pretending that it is argument—

"Evidently therefore, the entire transaction is not a ministerial one, affecting the forgiveness of the crime, for that could not be in the hands of the flock. But no less is it evident that the term of punishment is abridged and the sentence reversed before the completion of the awarded retribution is arrived; and this was in consequence of the very great sorrow manifested by the penitent, which was considered an equivalent for the remaining portion. This is precisely what we should call an indulgence; or a remission of that penance enjoined by the Church in satisfaction of God's justice. But it is likewise manifest that such a relaxation must have been considered perfectly valid before heaven. For as the punishment was inflicted that his soul might be saved, it would have been an endangering of that salvation to remove the punishment, unless the same saving effects would ensue after its relaxation."

Does Rome grant indulgences only in cases where penitents are in danger of being swallowed up with over much sorrow?

But I refrain from any further analysis or examination of this remarkable argument, as set forth by Dr Wiseman. The coolness with which he makes one assumption after another probably never was surpassed. But amongst all these assumptions, essential to the success of his argument, the principal place must be assigned to the doctrine of purgatory and of the endurance of temporal punishment in purgatory, if the account have not been cleared off by sufficient penance in this world.

Besides "this striking example in the word of God," as he is pleased to term it, Cardinal Wiseman's argument in favour of indulgences consists of little more than an appeal to tradition. "The inquiry into the grounds of this belief and practice," he himself says, "will necessarily assume an historical form."[1] I

[1] Wiseman, Lectures on Principal Doctrines, &c., II., 72.

shall not follow him in his historical investigation, beyond the "clear instance" from the New Testament.

We might suppose that he who had succeeded in obtaining an indulgence might keep himself easy,—at least for a while, and about any punishment due for his past sins. But this is one of our Protestant misapprehensions. For, says Mr Keenan, when the Church grants an indulgence, *she does not dispense with* the practice of mortification and penance.

"No; in that case an indulgence would be a curse and not a blessing. The sinner, having done what he could to gain an indulgence, has many reasons for the practice of continual penance—1st, We are told in Scripture that we can never be absolutely certain whether we be worthy of love or hatred. The sinner can never be certain that he has gained the full extent of an indulgence, which requires so much purity of heart and hatred for sin; and hence he should never cease to do penance, lest he may have to suffer severely in the next world, what he might so easily expiate in this."[1]

We need not trouble ourselves with the other reasons.

But has the sinner, then, derived no benefit from his visit paid to some particular church on some specified feast-day,—or his recital of the litany of the Blessed Virgin, or some other litany, at some appointed time,—or his having climbed the holy stairs, or kissed some holy image? It would seem that there may still be a doubt, even if the indulgence were plenary; and Bellarmine acknowledges that indulgences may want their effect in particular persons, and therefore, he says, "all prudent Christians do so receive indulgences as withal to satisfy God themselves for their sins."[2] Yet Papists are much exhorted to lay up for themselves treasures in this particular way; for it would appear that even if the indulgence do not quite answer their expectations, they may be pretty sure of finding it worth something when they come to their great reckoning. And by means of this treasure of holy indulgences, according to a work on this subject, formally authorised by the "Sacred Congregation of Indulgences

[1] Keenan, Cat. of Chr. Rel., II. 64.
[2] Quoted by Stillingfleet in Gibson's Preservative, X., 342.

at Rome," we can, "with the least inconvenience to ourselves," entirely pay all the temporal punishment which remains due to the Divine Justice."[1]

It is rather staggering to find this uncertainty, however, hanging, after all, over the effect of indulgences, and does not seem very easy to be reconciled with such instructions as the following, taken from a catechism already quoted :—

"What is the effect of a plenary indulgence?

"Such, that whoever has the happiness to gain a plenary indulgence is as free from spot and debt as he was after baptism. Hence, if he gains it at the hour of death, his soul, upon leaving its body, will be immediately admitted into heaven."[2]

But every difficulty admits of simple explanation, on one supposition—that all is an imposture, and that the design is still to keep a man, even after he has done what was required for gaining an indulgence, in most absolute spiritual thraldom and dependence on the priest, still striving to gain indulgences, submitting to penances, and tormented with the fear that after all he may have a very long time to spend in purgatory.

We are apt to be perplexed, also, when examining into the Popish doctrine of indulgences, to discover how little is set down as *of faith* in this matter. We may take the statement from the little catechism just noticed, although the same may be found in many a book of theology.

"What does faith oblige us to believe concerning indulgences?

"These two things: 1. That the Church has received from Christ the power of granting them; and, 2. That the use of them is highly advantageous and salutary to the faithful."[3]

But if this were all, it might be hard to tell what an indulgence is. And the arguments in support of these doctrines of

[1] See Seymour's Mornings with the Jesuits, ch. xii.

[2] Instructions for the Sacrament of Penance; Edin., 1834.

[3] Instructions for the Sacrament of Penance; or see Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xix.

faith are derived from other doctrines, which, if called in question, a Papist is ready to declare to be not of faith at all,—this distinction serving a mere purpose of argumentative jugglery.

Berington and Kirk have certainly embodied more in their *proposition* concerning indulgences than the doctrines of faith above mentioned.

"The guilt of sin, or pain eternal due to it, is not remitted by that dispensation of mercy, which, in the Catholic Church, is called an indulgence; but such temporal punishment only, as, in the order of divine justice, may remain due after the guilt has been remitted."[1]

Here the *doctrines of faith* are merely implied, and other things altogether are expressly asserted.

Delahogue is more attentive to the limits of faith: but on the proposition that "indulgences remove in God's account [*in foro Dei*] the debt of temporal punishment remaining after sin has been remitted," he says that Father Antoine declares it to be *of faith*, and that others assert it to be the next thing to a doctrine of faith [*fidei proximum*]; but for his own part, he thinks it enough to prove that it is very certain and what it would be dangerously rash to deny.[2]

It may be interesting to the reader to see a few specimens of the offers of indulgences held out to his Popish fellow-countrymen. They are fitly connected with the contemptible puerilities of the rosary and the scapular. "The holy pontiff, Pius IX." having, by a rescript dated 25th of June 1847, authorized all

[1] Berington and Kirk, 349. Perone *defines* an indulgence much in the same way, introducing, however, also, *the application of the treasure of the Church.* (Praelect. Theol., II. 389.) Dens gives even greater prominence to the treasure of the Church. (Theol., VII. 417.) And yet, if it suit a purpose, these things are not of faith! The Church has not decided them. And, her book being intended for the conversion of Protestants, the authoress of Geraldine could say that an indulgence "*is not the transfer of the overplus goodness or justification of the saints in heaven, through the ministry of the pope.*" (Geraldine, II. 251.)

[2] Delahogue, Tract. de Sac. Poen., 335.

the priests of the congregation of the Mission, called that of St Lazarus, to bless and distribute the Scapular of the Passion, was also pleased to grant the following indulgences :—

"1*sly*, Every Friday an indulgence of seven years, and seven forty days, to all persons who, wearing this scapular, shall approach, with the proper dispositions, to the sacraments of penance and the eucharist, and recite five times the Our Father, Hail Mary, and Glory be to the Father, in honour of the passion of our Lord.

"2*dly*, An indulgence of three years, and three forty days, on whatever day of the year, with humble and contrite hearts, they should meditate for half an hour on the sacred passion.

"3*dly*, An indulgence of two hundred days for kissing with compunction the scapular, at the same time repeating the versicle, '*Te ergo quæsumus famulis tuis subveni quos pretioso sanguine redemisti.*' 'We beseech thee, O blessed Jesus! to save thy servants, whom thou hast redeemed with thy precious blood.'"

A prayer to Jesus,—if the versicle be merely *repeated*,—answered by the pope with an indulgence of two hundred days!

But the holy father has gone further, in the midst of his earthly troubles (a sort of temporal punishment from which he might as well try to relieve himself), and has granted, on 21st March 1848,

"A plenary indulgence every Friday to all the members of the society of the Scapular of the Passion, who, being truly penitent, and having confessed and communicated, shall during some time meditate devoutly upon the passion of our Lord, and shall pray for peace among Christian states, for the extirpation of heresy, and for the exaltation of our holy mother the Church."[1]

This is perhaps nearly enough. But indulgences in abundance are connected with other scapulars also; for there is considerable variety of that kind of small ware to be obtained in the proper quarters, even in the towns of England and Scotland. Concerning the Blue Scapular of the Immaculate Conception, it

[1] Devotions, Indulgences, and Advantages of the Scapular of the Passion, with Meditations for every day. By the Rev. Thomas Grimley. Second Edition. Permissu superiorum. (Dublin; Richardson and Son.) Sixty-four pages, printed with *red* ink,—because blood is red, and its subject is the *passion*. To such miserable and odious trifling with all holy and awful subjects does Popery descend.

is declared, that "those who confess and communicate on the day they receive the holy scapular, may gain a plenary indulgence; as also on the day of the feast of the Immaculate Conception of Most Holy Mary," and so on. I would conclude at once, if it did not seem proper to exhibit on the same authority, the following monstrous specimen of audacity, worse if possible than that already given in which the Pope interposes betwixt the suppliant and the Saviour to whom he prays.

"At the moment of death, although unable to communicate, by being truly contrite of heart, and invoking the Most Holy Name of Jesus, a plenary indulgence can be gained, as appears from the perpetual brief of Clement XI., of happy memory, dated 22d of May 1710.[1]

We need not wonder that there are ways and means by which the wearers of the blue scapular may attain to "all the indulgences of the Seven Basilics of Rome, of Portiuncula, of Jerusalem, and of St James of Galicia." Popery may now sometimes be seen partially to remove the mask which she was long wont to wear in Britain, and to exhibit those haggard features which revolt the traveller in Naples or in Rome.

It is not requisite that I should pursue this subject farther, or set down any of the indulgences connected with rosaries and such things, or even with the scapular worn by "the Ancient Confraternity of our Blessed Lady of Mount Carmel," or with the processions of that confraternity, which, it may be observed, is also a Purgatorian Society, providing by regular payments on the part of its members, for a proper number of masses to be said for their souls after they are dead.[2]

Peter Dens gives a list of a number of indulgences, which he

[1] Little Crown, in honor of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, composed by St Andrew Avellino, C. R. For the use of those who are invested with the Blue Scapular of the Immaculate Conception, as worn by the Theatines, at Rome. Translated, &c. Second edition, (Dublin, 1849.) Twelve pages, printed with blue ink, because the sky is blue, and virginity is celestial, and this *devotion* relates to the Virgin Mary.

[2] The following is a sufficient sample of the rules:—

"Members but one year subscribing, or less, shall be entitled to have all

says are both easy and useful; and he informs us that Pope Benedict XIV. annexed many indulgences to various good works, "which doubtless may give great encouragement to piety, if they are propounded to the people." The reader may judge what kind of piety it is, to which these give encouragement.

"Whoever shall salute others in this manner, either in the vulgar or in the Latin tongue, *Praised be Jesus Christ*, and whoever shall respond *For ever*, or *Amen*, or *Always*, every such person shall gain (as Collet says[1]), an indulgence of 100 days, and likewise they who shall devoutly recite the Litanies of the Name of Jesus, shall gain an indulgence of 300 days.

"Whoever shall carry a torch when the Viaticum is carried to the sick, shall gain an indulgence of seven years and as many quadrigenes[2]; those who attend it without a light, shall gain an indulgence of five years and five quadrigenes; whoever, being hindered by just cause, shall procure the carrying of the torch by another, shall gain an indulgence of three years and as many quadrigenes."[3]

And similar facilities are accorded for the gaining even of plenary indulgences,—all for the promotion of piety and good works!

The doctrine of purgatory may be exhibited in a remarkable light, when it is viewed in connection with the doctrine of extreme unction, and the prayers appointed to be used at that pretended sacrament. It is not my intention to enter into the subject of extreme unction. The limits of this work do not admit of the exhibition of every montrosity either of Popish doctrine or of Popish practice; and a selection having been made of a few principal topics for illustration of the whole subject, these

the money they have paid into the confraternity expended on masses for the repose of their souls, exclusive of the entrance money."

(A treatise on the advantages and indulgences of the ancient confraternity of our Blessed Lady of Mount Carmel, &c. &c. Superiorum permissu. London: Thomas Richardson and Son.—Thirty pages.)

[1] In his book *De Jubilaeo*.

[2] A period of forty days.

[3] Dens Theol., VI. 443.

must be adhered to. I have dwelt longer on the subject of indulgences than I intended, and perhaps too long. But let us compare the doctrine of extreme unction, as it is set down by Popish divines, with their doctrine of purgatory.

Bishop Challoner tells us that extreme unction "remits sins, at least such as are venial, for mortal and deadly sins must be remitted before receiving extreme unction, by the sacrament of penance and confession."[1] Now, here it is surely fair to ask how the man can possibly be supposed to be in purgatory, who has received extreme unction before he died? For if he were duly freed (by penance and confession) of his mortal and deadly sins, the remission of venial sins now obtained would seem to be all that is requisite to procure for him free access into heaven; and if mortal sins remained uncancelled, his place, according to their own doctrine, would be not in purgatory, but in hell.

And that the fullest pardon of all sins is professedly given in the so called sacrament of extreme unction, will further appear from the language employed in the administration of it, where it will be remarked, there is no distinction made of venial and mortal sins, but sins in the general are spoken of,—an instance amongst many of a distinction familiar in the theological books of the Church of Rome, whilst no trace is to be found of it in her ritual services and forms of worship, the teaching of the one being therefore necessarily at variance with that of the other, and that which is likely always to make the deepest impression upon the mind, and especially to influence illiterate minds, being farthest and most dangerously wrong.

"The priest, making three times the sign of the cross on pronouncing the name of the blessed Trinity, says, 'In the name of the Father, + and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, may all power of the devil be extinguished in thee, by the laying on of our hands, and by the invocation of all the holy angels, archangels, patriarchs, prophets, apostles, martyrs, confessors, virgins, and all the saints. Amen.'"[2]

I cannot resist carrying on this quotation. Let the reader

[1] Challoner, Cath. Chr. Instr., ch. xi.

[2] Ibid.

contemplate the pitiful mummery and absurdity embodied in the following directions, whilst at the same time he keeps in view the purpose of the present argument.

"Dipping his thumb in the holy oil, he anoints the sick person, in the form of the cross, upon the eyes, ears, nose, mouth, hands and feet; at each anointing making use of this form of prayer—'Through this holy unction, and his most tender mercy, may the Lord pardon thee whatever sins thou hast committed by thy sight. Amen.' And so of the hearing, and the rest, adapting the form to the several senses."[1]

What account can be given of this inconsistency,—when that which seems to be done in extreme unction, proves not to be done at all, and even bishops and popes need to be helped out of purgatory? Nothing can be more simple. The attempted distinction betwixt remission of guilt, and remission of punishment, will not suffice for the purpose,—nor for any purpose. But both extreme unction and purgatory are gainful. If the unction were evidently good for nothing, nobody would care for it; and if it were certainly depended upon for all which is alleged of it, the dominions of purgatory would become immediately unproductive. By a judicious mode of dealing both with the one and with the other, both are made to yield very large returns. The inconsistency is only in the doctrine,—all is harmonious in practice.

[1] Challoner, Cath. Chr. Instr., ch. xi. The reader will regard with interest what Peter Dens says about this anointing of the organs of the different senses, &c. He approves the opinion that "by each anointing, grace is conferred and effects relating to that sense which is anointed, for example, the remission of sins committed by the sight, when the eyes are anointed, so that partial effects are produced by the several anointings, and so in the last the total and complete effect is produced." (Theol. VII., 17.)